

**Concentric circles: patriotism, cosmopolitanisms,
and cosmopolitan education**

Georg Cavallar

Institutional affiliation:

Institut für Geschichte

A-1010 Wien, Dr.-Karl-Lueger-Ring 1

and:

Bundesgymnasium Wien IX, Wasagasse 10, A-1090 Wien

Postal address: A-1130 Wien, Spohrstrasse 47/5

Austria, EU

e-mail: georg.cavallar@univie.ac.at

Introduction: the cosmopolitan illusion?

Michael Hand was completely ‘unprepared for the media feeding frenzy’ when he presented the results of his research project on patriotism in schools to the public. He had argued that patriotism should be taught as a controversial issue at schools, as there are good arguments for as well as against loving one’s country. Reactions were often hostile. ‘Get this idiot off the radio – if he has a problem with Britain, then leave!’ or ‘[t]his man is nuts’ were two of the comments (Hand, 2008: 15 and 16; Hand and Pearce, 2008).

Recent years have seen a stunning comeback of cosmopolitan theories. In educational theory, Martha Nussbaum (1996 and 1997a), Jeremy Waldron (2003), Troy Jollimore and Sharon Barrios (2006), James Donald (2007), and David Hansen (2008) have developed divergent approaches. Especially Nussbaum’s theory has quickly come under attack. Academic criticism has been more refined and sophisticated; nobody wanted Nussbaum to ‘leave our country’. However, the overall assessment has often been negative: cosmopolitan education is seen as seriously flawed because cosmopolitanism itself is an ‘illusion’ (the title of Lee Harris’ essay); it is not wrong to teach the younger generation to be patriotic; cosmopolitan education inevitably takes place at the expense of patriotic education; Nussbaum’s approach can be traced back to the naïve Enlightenment belief in the blessings of a wholesale re-education of the masses; cosmopolitanism, far from being universal, is just another sectarian ideology, and so on (see especially Harris, 2003).

In this paper, I want to mediate between the two camps that have been set up. This is definitely not the first attempt at mediation. Many of the contributors in the volume *For Love of Country*, for instance, can be seen as critics of Nussbaum who view cosmopolitanism in a rather favourable light. My key author is Rousseau, who tried to show that civic patriotism is compatible with genuine moral cosmopolitanism as well as republican cosmopolitanism. In the following section, I will try to clarify these concepts, and distinguish them from other types of cosmopolitanism, such as human rights (or moral), cultural, economic, and epistemological cosmopolitanisms. Another dimension differentiates between thin and thick versions of cosmopolitanisms. Finally, moral cosmopolitan theories can be divided into sentimental and cognitive models. Rousseau winds up with a form of embedded cosmopolitanism which tries to strike a balance between republican patriotism and the two cherished types of cosmopolitanism (genuine moral and republican), offering a ‘synthesis through education’. Finally, I point at various problems and tensions inherent in his theory: Rousseau’s cosmopolitanism might be embedded and rooted, but too distant to have any weight and influence. There must be legitimate disagreement in terms of the degree of concession one could make to one’s obligations. Finally, the compatibility thesis is based on a problematic citizenship as identity-concept. I conclude that moral as well as republican

cosmopolitanisms should be taught as controversial issues. This in turn would foster the capacity for enlarged thinking, a core element of the idea of cosmopolitanism.

I have already mentioned that critics of cosmopolitan education claim that it tends to weaken commitments to local identities, and especially loyalty to one's country. Thus – they assert - we have to choose between cosmopolitan education and patriotic education; endorsing the former weakens the latter, and the other way round. Cosmopolitans often counter with the concentric-circles imagery, which goes back to the Greek philosopher Theophrastus in the fourth century A. D. and was particularly popular in the age of Enlightenment (Heater, 2002: 44-52). The Stoics suggested that we should perceive ourselves as surrounded by several concentric circles: the first one is the self, the next one's family, then one's neighbours, fellow-countrymen, and so on. The last circle would be humanity as a whole. Nussbaum concludes: 'To be a citizen of the world, one does not, the Stoics stress, need to give up local affiliations, which can frequently be a source of great richness in life' (Nussbaum, 1997a: 60; cf. Nussbaum, 1996: 9 and 141-3). However, people should also and at the same time develop an understanding of humanity 'wherever they encounter it' (Nussbaum, 1996: 9). This image raises the familiar problem how we should judge and assess priorities. For the moment, let me emphasize again that cosmopolitans use the imagery to rebut the claim that cosmopolitans wind up being bloodless rationalists and egoists who pretend to love 'everyone' in order not to have to love anyone at all, strangers who are at home nowhere in the world.

Types of cosmopolitanisms and cosmopolitan educational theories

If we avoid post-modernist vagueness, we can define cosmopolitanism as the belief or the theory that all humans, regardless of race, gender, religion or political affiliation belong to, or should belong to, one single community. Cosmopolitanism's three basic tenets are: its reach is global in scope, all humans belong to it. Second, it includes an element of normative universalism: all humans enjoy equal moral status, and they share certain essential features. The focus is on individuals, not on nations, tribes or peoples, so cosmopolitanism endorses a form of normative individualism. Finally, this global community should be cultivated, for instance, by trying to understand cultures different from one's own (Albrecht, 2005: 22-61, Benhabib, 2004: 133, Hayden, 2005: 3, Kleingeld, 1999: 505, Kleingeld and Brown, 2002).

In current debates, the term 'cosmopolitanism' often remains quite vague and leads to sweeping generalizations. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish among different types of cosmopolitanism. The core idea of *human rights* (or *moral*) cosmopolitanism is that there are universal rights and obligations, and these should not be limited in scope, that is, they should be applied to all human beings. *Political* cosmopolitanism usually argues for some sort of global world order based on the rule of international law. Some – but not all – advocate a

world federation or world state (Cavallar, 2005, Kleingeld, 1999, Hansen, 2008: 292). *Cultural* cosmopolitanism acknowledges the diversity of cultures across the globe, and claims that ‘we should recognize different cultures in their particularity’ (Kleingeld, 1999: 515). In the eighteenth century, *economic* or *commercial* cosmopolitanism held ‘that the economic market should become a single global sphere of free trade’ (Kleingeld, 1999: 518). Major representatives were Adam Smith and other intellectuals of the Scottish Enlightenment, but also the German Dietrich Hermann Hegewisch. In recent years, economic exchange unrestricted by state intervention has been attacked as neoliberalism, and classic economic cosmopolitanism has been reformulated in a way that includes elements of moral and political cosmopolitanism (Hansen, 2008: 293, Sen, 1999). *Epistemological* cosmopolitanism is a way of thinking (‘global thinking’, according to Ulrich Beck), a cognitive orientation with the key feature of impartiality. It is a disposition which entails an openness towards others, and an appreciation of diversity (Beck, 2006, Vertovec and Cohen, 2002: 13).

We should not only distinguish among forms of cosmopolitanism. There is another dimension: all forms can come in thin (moderate, weak) or thick (strong, extreme) versions. Strong moral cosmopolitanism, for instance, claims that loyalties, affiliations and preferences at the local level can *only* be justified ‘by reference to the interests of all human beings considered as equals.’ Thin moral cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, claims that the ideal of world citizenship is not the ultimate source of legitimization. This type of cosmopolitanism simply insists ‘that one’s local attachments and affiliations must always be balanced and constrained by considerations of the interests of other people’ (Scheffler, 2001: 115).

Finally, moral cosmopolitan theories can be divided into sentimental and cognitive versions. Sentimentalists like Richard Rorty claim that works of literature operate directly on the readers’ sentiments, whereas cognitivists like Martha Nussbaum assert that normative truths are discovered in a fundamentally cognitive process when reading and analysing works of literature (Jollimore and Barrios, 2006: 365-70).

It goes without saying that the forms of cosmopolitanism (moral, political, cultural, and so on) are not mutually exclusive. In fact, most cosmopolitan theories include elements of various forms. For instance, Martha Nussbaum combines thick and cognitive moral cosmopolitanism with cultural and epistemological cosmopolitanism (Friedman, 2000). Kwame Anthony Appiah argues for ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’, which negotiates between legitimate local loyalties and universalism. In contrast to Nussbaum, he holds that local affiliations are not derivative (Appiah, 2007, Hansen, 2008: 292f.).

What can we infer from all this for cosmopolitan theories in general, and for cosmopolitan educational theories in particular? First of all, it does not make sense to talk about ‘cosmopolitanism’, we should refer to ‘cosmopolitanisms’ instead. Traditional images of cosmopolitanism as an offspring of Enlightenment rationalism which ignores or suppresses human interests, passions and emotions are simply mistaken. Lee Harris’ attack on Martha Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan theory is a case in point. Harris exclusively focuses on Nussbaum, ignoring the impressive diversity of cosmopolitan traditions since the eighteenth century (Albrecht, 2005; Cavallar, 2010). His description of cosmopolitanism as based on enlightened rationality, the naïve belief in the power of education, Kantian moral autonomy, and aiming at turning human communities into giant anthills which work like clockwork mechanisms – this description is a caricature (Harris, 2003: 52-59). In addition, Harris implicitly equates patriotism with ‘natural’ and ‘concrete’, whereas cosmopolitanism is seen as ‘artificial’ and ‘abstract’. These equations are not plausible, as Jeremy Waldron has convincingly shown in one of his articles (Waldron, 2003: 24-5 and 27-39). The odds are, it seems, that cosmopolitan theories carry the day.

What do all these distinctions mean for cosmopolitan educational theories? Depending on which forms of cosmopolitanism we endorse, we will emphasise different aspects in our theories. For instance, if we think that an age of globalisation requires students to understand its political and economic dimensions, then we will want to make sure that curricula include elements of political and economic cosmopolitanism (Albert and Dickel, 2006). If we believe that neo-liberal globalisation endangers democratic institutions and accountability, then our cosmopolitan educational theory might include elements of legal cosmopolitanism (Jones, 1998). Suppose we are convinced that one of the goals of education is to put oneself in another’s place, to learn to judge and evaluate, and to think in a critical way. In all likelihood, we will endorse *cognitive* moral cosmopolitanism, not its sentimentalist version (Jollimore and Barrios, 2006: 376-82).

Rousseau and a precarious legacy

I think it is obvious that I have little sympathy for all-out attacks on cosmopolitan theories. It might also have become clear that I see cosmopolitan educational theories as viable and meaningful. I will now turn to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who is a fascinating author for our topic as he works out an early compromise of thin moral cosmopolitanism and civic patriotism. Although he was a rather eccentric intellectual, his version of embedded cosmopolitanism seems rather main stream and common sense, offering a sort of ‘commentary’ on the traditional concentric circles imagery. Still, I think that his cosmopolitan theory is full of tensions and problems, which seem to be typical of any compromise in this field.

For a long time, Rousseau has been seen as one of the ‘classics’ of pedagogical thought (Todorov, 2001, Schneider, 2005, Oelkers, 2008). Although he is sometimes seen as anti-cosmopolitan, he offers a precarious synthesis of moral and legal cosmopolitanism on the one hand and republican patriotism on the other (for the following see Cavallar, 2002: 284-305). Rousseau attacks what could be labelled thick cultural cosmopolitanism – or, rather, Europeanism – , that is, the belief that a single thick conception of the good life should spread all over the globe, swallowing existing cultures and traditions. Rousseau deplores the fact that Europeans of his age endorse a way of life that successively becomes more monotonous and more uniform. Linking the trend towards cultural, European-wide homogeneity with decadence, Rousseau claims that ‘there are no longer any Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards, or even Englishmen; there are only Europeans. All have the same tastes, the same passions, the same manners, for no one has been shaped along national lines by peculiar institutions’ (Rousseau, 1991a: 168).

Rousseau also dismisses economic or commercial cosmopolitanism, doubting that commerce is primarily beneficial, as Montesquieu, Adam Smith and others claimed (Rousseau, 1997: 18 and Cavallar, 2002: 287). Finally, Rousseau criticizes the natural law cosmopolitanism of Samuel Pufendorf and Denise Diderot (natural law cosmopolitanism is an early form of moral or human rights cosmopolitanism). Pufendorf’s key concept, that of sociability or *socialitas*, Rousseau claims, does not establish a true community. Against Diderot’s article on ‘Natural Right’ written for the *Encyclopédie* in 1755, Rousseau holds that the ‘*fraternité commune de tous les hommes*’ might be an empty idea (Rousseau, 1991b: 101 and 109).

Rousseau’s attack on the ‘supposed cosmopolites’ (who are merely hypocrites) apparently aims at making room for genuine moral and political cosmopolitanisms. One element of this theory is what can be labelled republican cosmopolitanism, which includes republican patriotism. This type of patriotism sees human fulfilment culminating in the citizenship in a free republic. Rousseau does not endorse nationalism, where coherence is based on ethnicity, language, or common heritage. For him, the true *patrie* is a republic (Viroli, 1995: 93-4). Like Montesquieu and other early modern European civic humanists, Rousseau adored the ancient republics as shining examples of civic virtue and material equality. Emotional identification with the political community enables citizens to respect the laws, to lead a life that sustains political liberty, and to develop civic virtue. This in turn will solve the problem of realizing the general will, which is accomplished if civic virtue dominates, ‘the conformity of the individual will with the general will’. This way, all the vices associated with *amour propre* can be avoided (Fidler, 1996: 130, Scott, 2006). The goal of republican education is to transform a mere aggregate of selfish individuals (as in

commercial society) into a ‘moral and collective body’ (Rousseau, 1991c: 11, Roosevelt, 1990: chapter 5, Oelkers, 2008: 161-7). Patriotism and civic virtue coincide, and integrate *amour de soi* and *amour propre*.

Republican cosmopolitanism is a form of legal cosmopolitanism. There are two versions: Like John Oswald or Friedrich Schlegel, Rousseau advocated an alliance of republics, whereas Anacharsis Cloots was in favour of a world republic with *departments*, but without states (Cheneval, 2004). Rousseau’s ideas are notoriously difficult to interpret. He praised the plan of a European federation developed by Saint-Pierre, but also mocked his naivety and the plan’s focus on princely sovereignty (Rousseau, 2008: 95 and 123-5). Rousseau develops different concepts in other writings. His scattered comments do not allow for a comprehensive reconstruction, but occasionally he suggests that small republics could form loose defensive confederations to deter aggression (Cavallar, 2002: 298-300).

I will now try to offer a tentative summary. Rousseau’s theory can be understood as an attempt to show that genuine moral cosmopolitanism is compatible with republican patriotism (the compatibility thesis). This would imply that Lee Harris’ dichotomy between patriotism and cosmopolitanism breaks down. We do not have to choose between either. For Rousseau, cosmopolitanism is acceptable if squarely rooted in and evolving from adherence to one’s particular community. I suspect that Rousseau went a step further and implied that republican patriotism, properly understood, leads to thin moral cosmopolitanism. According to this interpretation, Rousseau endorses an evolutionary approach, and a bottom-up procedure. Civic patriotism is the first and indispensable step in the evolution of a genuine ‘love of humanity.’ Patriotism and cosmopolitanism do not exclude each other, they can form a synthesis with the help of education. Both form concentric circles. ‘Willing generally’ can only be properly learned in a specific community. A global general will might be created by continuous republican practice. Participation in a community governed by just laws and the general will helps people to form ideas of justice with a more extensive application. Human history would be a learning process, and the crucial lesson is parallel to Emile’s, who, as a first step, has to cultivate his moral sensibility to those he knows and has relations with. After all, ‘the word *mankind* will signify anything to him. ... It will be only after having cultivated his nature in countless ways, after many reflections on his own sentiments and on those he observes in others, that he will be able to get to the point of generalizing his individual notions under the abstract idea of humanity and to join to his particular affections those which can make him identify with his species’ (Rousseau, 1979: 233). Abstract moral reasoning has to be practised, learned and perfected in order to achieve a true cosmopolitan attitude. A more limited sensibility is a necessary if not sufficient condition of emotionally identifying with the whole species. According to this interpretation, Rousseau is a peculiar kind of cosmopolitan, who believes in the human capacity to learn, form syntheses, and develop one’s moral

potential. Jean Starobinski has labelled this interpretation ‘synthesis through education’ (Starobinski, 1988: 30-2).

Rousseau offers a version of ‘embedded cosmopolitanism’ (Appiah). He concedes key arguments of the critics of cosmopolitanisms. He combines republicanism with elements of legal cosmopolitanism and a thin version of moral cosmopolitanism. I do not deny that this theory is full of tensions and quandaries. In particular, the dividing line between nationalism and republican patriotism seems to be very thin. According to my interpretation, Rousseau tries to strike a balance between genuine moral cosmopolitanism and defensive republican patriotism, while perceiving the dangers of chauvinism that becomes ‘exclusive and tyrannical and makes a people bloodthirsty and intolerant ... It is not permissible to strengthen the bond of a particular society at the expense of the rest of the human race’ (Rousseau, 1991b: 131). However, I admit that there are passages which speak a different language. The interpretation I have offered here is one possible reading of Rousseau among others.

Conclusion

In this conclusion, I won’t deal with problems intrinsic in the position I have just developed, such as the conception of a thin moral universalism, or the thesis of an essential similarity of humans. I rather want to focus on Rousseau’s precarious legacy.

First of all, I want to point at what might be called Rousseau’s dilemma: I suppose that Rousseau would have subscribed to the following statement of one of Nussbaum’s critics: ‘Teach children instead to be “citizens of the world”, and in all likelihood they will become neither patriots nor cosmopolitans, but lovers of abstraction and ideology, intolerant of the flaw-ridden individuals and cultures that actually exist throughout the world’ (McConnell, 1996: 81). Rousseau suggests that we do not need a fake moral cosmopolitanism or a shallow sociability, we need true moral cosmopolitanism. But will we ever reach this distant goal? Does this not turn moral cosmopolitanism, or Nussbaum’s ‘cosmopolitan humanism’, into a Kantian regulative idea which helps us to orient our thinking and acting (Nussbaum, 1997b: 23), but may be too remote to have any actual bearing on the ground?

This leads us to a second, follow-up problem: suppose we accept the image of concentric circles, and suppose we accept the regulative idea of a ‘community of dialogue and concern’, where do we draw the lines? Nussbaum admits that the Stoics varied ‘in the degree of concession they make to [...] special obligations’ on the local level (Nussbaum 1997a: 61). She cites Cicero as an example, which is unfortunate, as Cicero evidently was a staunch defender and enthusiast of Roman imperialism. It is dubious if he deserves the label

‘cosmopolitan’ at all; if so, then it is a cosmopolitanism of an aggressive and imperialist mould (Harris, 2003: 49-50, Sellars, 2007: 22-4). Again, where do we draw the line? Do we wind up with a very thin and minimal conception of moral cosmopolitanism, with mere duties of non-aggression and non-interference? Or are there duties of beneficence, which would point towards a thicker version? (Friedman, 2000: 591-2). This is a problem of judgement, and, consequently, a source of legitimate disagreement.

Next, let us look at the thesis that civic patriotism and thin moral cosmopolitanism are compatible. In recent years, there have been attempts to defend this thesis of compatibility, so widespread in the eighteenth century (Bowden, 2003; Ypi, 2008). However, critics have pointed at possible negative consequences linked with the traditional citizenship as identity-concept, with its emphasis on narrow moral commitments, affective bonds, loyalty, and identity. As a civic humanist, Rousseau endorsed this traditional concept (Williams, 2003: 208-11; Boyd, 2004; Jollimore, 2006: 371).

I admit that my thinking on these issues is quite preliminary. My overall conclusion is that not only patriotism (as Michael Hand suggests), but also moral as well as republican cosmopolitanisms should be taught as controversial issues. ‘We think these questions must be regarded as open, in the sense that they are matters of reasonable disagreement among reasonable people’ (Hand and Pearce, 2008: 3). So we have come full circle.

Teaching cosmopolitanisms as controversial issues would foster, I think, a core element of the idea of cosmopolitanism, the capacity for enlarged thinking. In other words, I am inclined toward the view that teaching cosmopolitanisms should be based on epistemological cosmopolitanism. Several authors claim that confronting our biases, engaging with another culture, or understanding ‘the other’ presupposes the capacity for enlarged thinking (Nussbaum, 1996: 10, Williams, 2003: 237-9, Jollimore and Barrios, 2006: 364, 379). Nussbaum calls this ability to assume another point of view the ‘narrative imagination’ (Nussbaum, 1997a: 10 and 85-112). As this is a cognitive endeavour, we should endorse the cognitive, not the sentimental version of moral cosmopolitan theories (Jollimore and Barrios, 2006: 379). Melissa Williams enumerates three conditions: First, the capacity for enlarged thinking develops through exercise. We need training to make critical moral judgements. Second, we have to encounter diversity to make this exercise – we need perspectives different from our own. Third, the form of this encounter would be dialogue, ‘a mutual engagement among diverse perspectives that are *immediately present* in individuals’ lives’ (Williams, 2003: 237). I think that one advantage of teaching cosmopolitanisms this way would be that the teaching itself would remain rooted and embedded. The outcome might not be the kind of cosmopolitanism we would like to see, but it would be compatible with our understanding of

students as potentially autonomous agents who can develop their cognitive faculties, especially their ability to judge, to evaluate, and to weigh.

References

Aksu, Esref (ed., 2008). *Early Notions of Global Governance. Selected Eighteenth-Century Proposals for 'Perpetual Peace'*, Cardiff, Wales University Press.

Albert, Mathias, and Sascha Dickel (2006). ‚Educating Globality: Zum Lernfeld „Internationale Beziehungen/Globalisierung“ im Gymnasium‘, *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*, 13, 2, 261-74.

Albrecht, Andrea (2005). *Kosmopolitismus. Weltbürgerdiskurse in Literatur, Philosophie und Publizistik um 1800*, Berlin and New York, de Gruyter.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2007). *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers*, New York, Norton.

Beck, Ulrich (2006). *The Cosmopolitan Vision*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Benhabib, Seyla (2004). *The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents, and Citizens*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Bowden, Brett (2003). ‚Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism: Irreconcilable Differences or Possible Bedfellows?‘, *National Identities*, 5, 3, 235-49.

Boyd, Richard (2004). ‚Pity’s Pathologies Portrayed. Rousseau and the Limits of Democratic Compassion‘, *Political Theory*, 32, 4, 519-46.

Cavallar, Georg (2002). *The Rights of Strangers: Theories of international hospitality, the global community, and political justice since Vitoria*, Aldershot, Ashgate.

Cavallar, Georg (2005). ‚Cosmopolis. Supranationales und kosmopolitisches Denken von Vitoria bis Smith‘, *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 53, 49-67.

Cavallar, Georg (2010, under contract). *Imperfect cosmopolis: studies in the history of international legal theory and cosmopolitan ideas*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press.

Cheneval, Francis (2004). 'Der kosmopolitische Republikanismus erläutert am Beispiel Anacharsis Cloots', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 58, 3, 373-96.

Donald, James (2007). 'Internationalisation, Diversity and the Humanities Curriculum: Cosmopolitanism and Multiculturalism Revisited', *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 41, 3, 289-308.

Fidler, David P. (1996). 'Desperately Clinging to Grotian and Kantian Sheep: Rousseau's Attempted Escape from the State of War', in: Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann (eds.), *Classical Theories of International Relations*, Houndmills et al., Macmillan Press, 120-41.

Friedman, Marilyn (2000). 'Educating for World Citizenship', *Ethics*, 110, 586-601.

Hand, Michael (2008). 'Fifteen minutes of infamy', in *Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain. Newsletter 2008*, 15-16.

Hand, Michael and Joanne Pearce (2008). 'Final Project Report', <http://www.google.at/search?hl=de&q=should+patriotism+be+promoted%2C+tolerated+or+discouraged&meta=>, November 14, 2008.

Hansen, David T. (2008). 'Curriculum and the idea of cosmopolitan inheritance', *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 40, 3, 289-312.

Harris, Lee (2003). 'The Cosmopolitan Illusion', *Policy Review*, 118, 45-59.

Hayden, Patrick (2005). *Cosmopolitan Global Politics*, Aldershot, Ashgate.

Heater, Derek (2002). *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking and its Opponents*, London and New York.

Jollimore, Troy and Sharon Barrios (2006). 'Creating cosmopolitans: the case for literature', *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 25, 5, 363-383.

Jones, Phillip W. (1998). 'Globalisation and Internationalism: democratic prospects for world education', *Comparative Education*, 34, 2 (1998), 143-55.

Kleingeld, Pauline (1999). 'Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 60, 1, 505-24.

Kleingeld, Pauline, and Eric Brown (2002). 'Cosmopolitanism', in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/cosmopolitanism>, visited November 23, 2007.

McConnell, Michael W. (1996). 'Don't Neglect the Little Platoons', in: Nussbaum, *For Love of Country?*, 78-84.

McDonough, Kevin, and Walter Feinberg (eds., 2003). *Education and Citizenship in Liberal-democratic Societies. Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, Martha C. (1996), edited by Joshua Cohen. *For Love of Country?*, Boston, Beacon Press.

Nussbaum, Martha C. (1997a). *Cultivating Humanity. A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.

Nussbaum, Martha C. (1997b). 'Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 5, 1 (1997), 1-25.

Oelkers, Jürgen (2008). *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, London, Continuum.

Roosevelt, Grace G. (1990). *Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1979). *Emile or On Education*, ed. Allan Bloom, New York, Basic Books.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1991a). 'Considerations on the Government of Poland', in: Stanley Hoffmann and David P. Fidler (eds.), *Rousseau on International Relations*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1991b). 'First Version of the 'Social Contract'', in: Hoffmann and Fidler (eds.), *Rousseau on International Relations*.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1991c). 'Discourse on Political Economy', in: Hoffmann and Fidler (eds.), *Rousseau on International Relations*.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1997). 'Discourse on the Sciences and Arts or First Discourse', in: *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, ed. and translated by Victor Gourevitch, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (2008). "'Abstract' and 'Judgment' of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace", in: Aksu, *Early Notions of Global Governance*, 95-131.

Scheffler, Samuel (2001). 'Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism', in: *Boundaries and Allegiances*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 111-30.

Schneider, Barbara (2005). *Jean-Jacques Rousseaus Konzeption der „Sophie“*. Ein hermeneutisches Projekt, Bonn, Universitätsdruckerei.

Scott, John T. (ed., 2006). *Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers*, volume III: Political Principles and Institutions, London and New York, Routledge.

Sellars, John (2007). 'Stoic Cosmopolitanism and Zeno's Republic', *History of Political Thought*, 28, 1, 1-29.

Sen, Amartya Kumar (1999). *Development as Freedom*, New York, Knopf.

Starobinski, Jean (1988). *Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Transparency and Obstruction*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.

Todorov, Tzvetan (2001). *Frail Happiness. An Essay on Rousseau*, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press.

Vertovec, Steven and Robin Cohen (2002). *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Viroli, Maurizio (1995). *For Love of Country. An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Waldron, Jeremy (2003). 'Teaching Cosmopolitan Right', in McDonough and Feinberg (eds.), *Education and Citizenship*, pp. 23-55.

Williams, Melissa S. (2003). 'Citizenship as Identity, Citizenship as Shared Fate, and the Functions of Multicultural Education', in: McDonough and Feinberg (eds.), *Education and Citizenship*, 208-47.

Ypi, Lea L. (2008). 'Statist Cosmopolitanism', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 16, 1, 48-71.