

The 'Cosmopolitan' Self Does her Homework

Marianna Papastephanou, University of Cyprus

Philosophy of education has been exploring the degree of dependence on the home culture that the preparation of the 'young' for future mobility and the respect for diversity might allow. Since 'an education solely for cultural coherence will not do' (Merry, 2005, p. 482), fixed cultural boundaries are educationally challenged by means of cosmopolitan discourse. In David Hansen's words, 'from a cosmopolitan perspective education has to do with new forms of understanding, undergoing, and moving in the world' (Hansen, 2008, p. 298). However, concerns associated with multiculturalism and identity politics and sensibilities formed by postmodernism and feminism have presented liberal cosmopolitanism with the challenge to take local and particular cultures seriously and to reconsider its own relation to practice (Waks, 2009). A context-sensitive cosmopolitanism is expected to reshuffle particular identities in such a way that the self may be made to feel at home everywhere and, at the same time, fully at home nowhere. Re-conceptualized in a multicultural light, cosmopolitanism 'has come to be seen not as the transcendence of particularity in favour of an acultural universalism, but rather as an awareness of the complexity and diversity of forms of human life that interrupts and dislocates the absolute claims of the local and the enforced unity of a culture' (Donald, 2007, p. 291). When Others enter the picture, they appear as equally 'glocalized' identities whose difference must be respected. Education undertakes to cultivate such respect: 'effective curriculum and instruction that seeks to counter stereotyping and intolerance will attempt critically to examine the attitudes and cultural mores that allow prejudice to thrive' (Merry, 2005, p. 488).

Valuable work has thus been done in philosophy of education. Instead of further analyzing it, however, let us examine a crucial point on which most educational efforts converge, namely, the primacy of culturalist¹ cosmopolitanism. As I use it, the term means to approach cosmopolitanism from the perspective of *cultural difference* and of *cultural identity* in general, be it hybrid or 'coherent'. Culturalism is now either tacitly taken for granted or commonly accepted and prioritized as the focal point of debates regarding whether the cultural knowledge of the world is educationally more central than that of one's origin. The culturalist cosmopolitanism thus emerging assumes that other traditions or cultures are there to be learnt and people associated with them are cognitively met as producers of meaning and life experience that might be enriching of one's own. Or, Others can be met affectively as subjects who desire as much as we do to learn from the insights accumulated globally. Or, they can be met morally, as recipients of our respect, tolerance and hospitality, and communicatively, as interlocutors with whom we seek agreement or compromise.

To this cosmopolitanism corresponds a specific selfhood that can be envisioned and prepared educationally. As James Donald asks, what 'would cosmopolitan and

¹ By 'culturalism' some theorists mean the prioritization of cultural identity as primary good (Merry, 2005, p. 494, endnote 5) which gives little recognition 'to the widespread hybrid identities of persons living in multicultural societies' (p. 484). But in a more relaxed version, the term can include the emphasis on hybridity too.

multiculturally aware graduates *be* in the second decade of the 21st century' (Donald, 2007, p. 296)? The answer usually given within the above sketched culturalism can better be exemplified by reference to Jeremy Waldron's theory of the cosmopolitan self. Even when there is disagreement on many other aspects of what counts as cosmopolitan, most theorists would take as self-evident that cosmopolitanism is about enriched cultural choice and the hybridization of the self.

Waldron's idealized description of the cosmopolitan self refers to the modern rootless subject who is conscious, even proud, of living in a mixed-up world and having a mixed-up self (1992, p. 754; 2000, p. 228). While earlier Waldron took rootlessness as a literal precondition of the cosmopolitan, in his later work he grants it a symbolic significance so that 'many cultures in the world', and not just the diasporic of the global cities, 'have *already* something of a cosmopolitan aspect' (p. 231). Apart from this modification which responded to Will Kymlicka's criticisms and apart from the addition of Kantian qualifications, Waldron preserves the initial illustration of cultural cosmopolitan selfhood intact. He writes, '[the cosmopolitan] did not take his identity as anything definitive, as anything homogenous that might be muddied or compromised when he studied Greek, ate Chinese, wore clothes made in Korea, worshipped with the Book of Common Prayer, listened to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori diva on Japanese equipment, gave lectures in Buenos Aires, followed Israeli politics, or practised Buddhist meditation techniques' (Waldron, 2000, p. 228; see also 1992, p. 754). Hence, cosmopolitan is the education which cultivates such selfhood against any 'monocultural coherence' alternative. As Donald transfers Waldron's guiding idea to education, 'if the aim is to equip humanities graduates to survive and prosper in a diverse and globalized world, then developing their *consciousness of living in a mixed-up world and having a mixed-up self* does not seem a bad place to start' (Donald, 2007, p. 299).

Undoubtedly, such graduates will survive and prosper. But, in what follows, I express some doubts as to their cosmopolitan selfhood. I not only imply that a strong kind of *identity* politics will still inform their thought but also that they will run the risk of *identitary* politics (which I see as a condition either of self-exculpating politics or of inability to even spell politics).

Upon closer examination, the above examples illustrate a conformist self whose cultural loans derive from, and reflect, stereotypes. Koreans are there for us to provide us with clothes; the Japanese provide our technological devices; Greek (ancient in all probability) is to be studied; the Chinese supply cooked food; as to the Italians, they compose music.² Waldron argues that 'as long as a person can live like that [as shown by the examples – M. P.], it is evident that people do not need what the proponents of cultural identity politics claim they do need, claim in fact that they are entitled to as a matter of right, namely, immersion in the secure framework of a single culture to which, in some deep sense, they belong' (2000, p. 228). But, ironically, his very selection of examples could be used by his opponents as proof that such belonging is inescapable, or that, at least, his own approach has not escaped it. Waldron's preference for the adjective 'cosmopolitan' may stave off the '-ism' of cosmopolitanism but not of *West-centrism*. The stereotypical images involved in the above illustration show that this supposedly hybrid and rootless self is, in fact, rooted in the dominant culture, in the latter's elevation of utility to *the* common good and in its standardized perceptions of Others. It is immersed in the West's own ways of including and excluding cultural material, of maintaining the coherence of the West-

² My discussion of the stereotypes ends here because of time and because the overall idea is quite clear.

rooted, modern self and of affirming identity politics by raising one's secure self-image to an exemplary status.

One may wonder why this self does not see Akira Kurosawa's films. But even this again reaffirms that the set of foreign influences comprises what has already passed through the Western cultural filter and gained the status of 'laudable' global cultural knowledge. A preferable example might be of a self familiar with Japanese ancient lyric poetry (beyond the well-known haiku) that is largely unknown in the West. Such an example³ depicts a self (and a student) that appears more hospitable to and welcoming of other traditions. For, as Hansen explains, the cosmopolitan quest for meaning is participatory 'in the sense of openness to being formed, not merely informed [and, I would add, served –M. P.], by what one sees and learns' (2008, p. 296).⁴

Does this mean that all we have to do is to be more on our guard so as to select more unsettling examples of hybrid formation? No. Even with an example such as the above, it is, again, the self that primarily benefits from the intercultural formation and not the Other, who might be affected by such formation only by implication.⁵ The association of cosmopolitanism with fluid, hybrid and diasporic identities is arbitrary insofar as the latter terms remain couched in a pragmatic monological idiom that is incapable on its own to undo the *idem* of *identity* [to effect a 'deconfounding' in Cavell's terms (Saito and Standish, 2008)]. By the 'idem' I do not refer to identity as a closed structure but, rather, even to the most heterogeneously composed and culturally porous identity so long as it displays the most complicit closure regarding specific challenges that Otherness presents. The mere polemical reversal of the old qualitative priority of rootedness over rootlessness does not suffice to account for cosmopolitanism understood as an ethico-political **relation** of an I (or We) to an Other.⁶ Apart from the *informing* and the *forming* there should be a *reforming* / transformative cosmopolitanism of radical redirection. Information entails enrichment; formation sees as cosmopolitan the knowledge of, and participation in, the meaning-making efforts of the whole of humanity. Formation over-relies on a cognitivist cosmopolitanism (one, at best, reconciled with affective elements of *ethos*) indirectly related to action and insufficiently critical of culturalist cosmopolitanism, and this is why it is not quite the same as the refashioning of the self. It does not cover

³ It can be defended despite its intellectualism, which is a problem that cannot be dealt with here.

⁴ Educational cosmopolitanism goes beyond the aims of 'liberal and multicultural education, understood as including matters such as coverage and comprehensive scope, cultural recognition, and holistic self-development on the part of individual students' (Hansen, 2008, p. 305).

⁵ When I mention this example to my students (some are Greeks from Greece and most are Greeks of Cyprus) the reforming effect is that they realize that not only their ancestors but other traditions had lyric poetry around the same period. The forming effect they themselves recognize is that they find in those poems (translated in Greek for lack of knowledge of the Japanese language) aesthetic pleasure and enlargement of their thought. Yet, there is no illusion that they supposedly do any 'favour' to the Japanese culture, let alone influence the life of contemporary Japanese people, when they let themselves become thus enriched.

⁶ Yet, Waldron has added the Kantian element which accommodates some relational, intersubjective dimension of cosmopolitanism. It is no longer the urban dweller who by living in the global city is closer to cosmopolitanism. 'Kant appeals to Waldron because he starts from the opposite assumption that "we are always likely to find ourselves alongside others who disagree with us about justice"' (Donald, 2007, p. 299). Yet, this relational approach is again deep-down monological and self-affirming in imagining the Others as solely those with whom we may talk not as those to whom we may owe responsibility and settlement of the damages we may have caused them.

the idea of rupture, disorientation, new beginning that cosmopolitanism as an ethico-political ideal of undoing the lurking 'idem' requires.

The 'idem' of the Western identity is, more often than not, re-asserted through the prioritized culturalist cosmopolitanism. Somehow, and curiously, wherever the Western self roams, she encounters only people who might be just different and thus inviting her regard, yet never illiterate, starved and needy who might be inviting of something other than 'the sympathetic and indignant judgement of the spectator of the circumstances' (Badiou, 2001, p. 9) and other than the momentarily charitable reaction of the benefactor. Ubiquitous in cultural and educational studies, the term 'difference' takes a very safe and uniform meaning the very moment it is celebrated as the ultimate challenge a Western self may encounter.

Even when other challenging realities may become perceptible, nothing seems to connect them with a destabilization and an action other than charity. Following Alain Badiou, we see that this consistency and coordination of the mixed-up self and its mixed-up world is not accidental. 'After decades of courageous critiques of colonialism and imperialism', we have arrived at 'today's sordid self-satisfaction in the "West", with the insistent argument according to which the misery of the Third World is the result of its own incompetence, its own inanity – in short, of its *subhumanity*' (Badiou, 2001, p. 13). When the issue is the current global state of affairs, the mixed-up world becomes neatly and conveniently separated into two parallel realities supposedly never entangled in relations of domination and pending debt. The subjects of those realities are meant to meet simply as well-intended interlocutors, as the one side is ready (or, at least, it prepares its 'young') magnanimously to tolerate the idiosyncrasies, even the incomprehensibility, of the other side. Predictably, the order of agreement is dominant in this kind of relational cosmopolitan, intersubjective engagement making the order of treatment imperceptible and, in the end, forgotten.

The corresponding mixed-up self is a creature of modernity (Waldron, 2000, p. 228). Indeed, it is a creature of an era that privileges spatiality over temporality, mobility over duration and synchronic culture over tradition and natural environment (Eder, 1990, p. 27). Nowhere in the examples above do we encounter a relation of the self to local histories or to the global past⁷ or to nature. The education suiting the modern self will assert conveniently that anything concerning the past should be forgotten, unless it concerns parallel, disengaged and congenial co-habitation of spaces. For instance, nothing in the above examples or in the general educational tendency indicates that the cosmopolitan student: will know about the details of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba; hear about the number of dead Kenyans (and the many more tortured) in the 1950s during their struggle for independence;⁸ and learn about how the secularist attempts of development in Iran by Mossadeq in 1953⁹ were nipped in the bud. And, even if the student were to learn all this, would she follow this

⁷ The part of Waldron's work that touches upon history [e.g. his 'Redressing Historic Injustice' (2002)] does not neutralize the criticisms just raised.

⁸ Harvard University Professor Caroline Elkins, whose study of the revolt *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* won the Pulitzer in 2006, claims the number is probably at least as high as 70,000 but more realistically it is in the hundreds of thousands. Internet source: wikipedia, Mau-Mau uprising.

⁹ <http://www.iranian.com/History/2000/July/Coup/index.html> We may view those examples as proof of what Habermas sees as a possibility for non-Western cultures to draw the 'universalistic content of human rights from their own resources and in their own interpretation, one that will construct a convincing connection to local experiences and interests' (2003, p. 369) as well as of the fact that such possibilities had often been violently stopped.

knowledge to its ultimate conclusions? Would she realize that the liberal paternalism involved in the assumption that ‘while “we” can survive change and innovation and endure the tensions created by modernity, “they” cannot’ (Barry, cf Merry, 2005, p. 485) has not remained in theory but determined as practice the historical course of those others? We take pride in our supposed ability to repeatedly reinvent ourselves, but this prerogative has not been extended to others and, worse, it was often blocked whenever their reinvention meant less profit for us.¹⁰

Yet, what kind of reinvention does this mixed-up world allow to the mixed-up self today? What otherness can feasibly be accommodated within it? As Islam did not qualify as a possible contributor to the idealized self-description, other than perhaps as a subtext to Israeli politics, let us consider an Islamic idea. For Islam, *riba* signifies the increase of wealth through excessive gain without providing services of equal measure in exchange and it is proclaimed a grave sin (Chesneaux, 1968, p. 98). Something like this never comes up in idealized illustrations of hybridity, and an exploration of its practical consequences for the mixed-up self is never attempted. As to Buddhism, it does not just have meditation techniques for relaxing after a day of hard work but it also has images of a specific lifestyle. The Buddhist *Dhamma* is an ideal of a harmonious society where private interest and the search for gain have no place, unless it is a question of financing some pious foundation (Chesneaux, 1968, p. 89). Could these ideas be practiced by the mixed-up self when the latter is largely constructed by an education designed to prepare the future citizens to live and work within and across borders, to seize opportunities and to achieve, to survive and prosper in a globalized world?

Ironically, the ‘cosmopolitan’ student favoured (or unquestioned) by many thinkers today only does his homework. In a façade of rootlessness this self learns all the stereotypes and preferences of the homeland and the home culture; he excels in reproducing, popularizing and disseminating them like a good disciple; he is silent about ethico-political liabilities because the title and key-words of the assignment do not include them; and he is rewarded with the best mark, that is, with the elevation of this homework to the status of global exemplarity, the desirable model for all.

Apart from being unable to avoid a much deeper-laid rootedness, culturalism fails to notice a stronger argument in favour of some rootedness that has nothing to do with purist homogeneity. I illustrate this by reference to Ernesto Che Guevara. While still a student, Che set out from Buenos Aires to a journey of homelessness which was to last until his death. Unlike other travellers, global city dwellers and elated global crowds, during that journey, he did not simply encounter different people. He did not just witness diversity but also poverty, oppression, uneven power and lack of education and medication. His determination to act so that such realities and ‘differences’ were no longer operative led him in 1964 to an intermediate stop, the United Nations. Against our contemporary assumptions that nothing contests hybridity other than a conservative purist concern about the loss of homogeneity, Che expressed there his mistrust of the capacity of a forced hybridization to produce a politically active and interventionist identity. This is how he phrased it in his famous UN speech.¹¹ ‘The North Americans, for many years, have tried to convert Puerto Rico into a reflection of hybrid culture – the Spanish language with an English inflection, the Spanish language with hinges on its backbone, the better to bend before

¹⁰ Instead of always committing the worst crimes in the name of universalism, as some postmodern critics of cosmopolitanism, or of nationalism [e.g. Braidotti (2004, p. 132)] argue, in fact, the West committed some of its worst crimes by denying to others the universalist principles it usurped for itself.

¹¹ He delivered it before the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 11, 1964.

the United States soldier' (Guevara, 1964, p. 3). Che (who came from a mixed Spanish, Basque and Irish background, was fluent in many languages and had read Buddha, Russell, Aristotle, Nietzsche, Freud etc) expressed that mistrust of hybrid identity not for communitarian reasons of ecological preservation of cultures as museum pieces but for political reasons of local empowerment. He envisioned peoples' ability to articulate confrontational words against whoever would violate their freedom. The 'radicalism' of this vision can be made to connote not just the 'extreme' but also, and on etymological grounds (from *radix*=root), the 'rooted', or the act of going to the root, to the origin or cause of something.

Thus, rootedness need not be ancestral but ethico-political, although the latter is not necessarily at odds with the former. Being a nomadic subject 'means to be in transit within different identity-formations, but sufficiently anchored to a historical position to accept responsibility for it' (Braidotti, 2004, p. 137). The most critical outlook owed to the local is the one which confronts head-on asymmetries that the local either causes to others or undergoes due to uneven power within and out. In other words, critical cosmopolitanism requires us to be at home with, and *respond* to, the hiss of history. If history haunted just individuals, things would be much simpler because one would suggest psychoanalysis. But the past haunts all human dwellings, the whole world of today, and that invites ethical endeavour¹² and politics of material measures. This is why to accept responsibility is, in its productive ambiguity, an ethico-political cosmopolitan project *par excellence*.

Ethico-political cosmopolitanism does not address differences in outlook and practice but asymmetries and uneven life potentials caused by domination and control. Such cosmopolitanism is more encompassing than a mere internationalism of economic mobility or of institution building for supposedly dealing out justice worldwide. Facile culturalism has damaged cosmopolitanism to such an extent that the very term's presupposing the polis and the politics of cosmo-polis is forgotten. Since modernity, cosmopolis is regarded as a gigantic household in need of management and housework, politics amounts to housekeeping and domestic affairs and the private has imposed upon the public sphere the logic of maintenance at the expense of politics as vision and struggle for the ideal city and the ideal world (Arendt, 1989, pp. 25-30).

Rather than being cosmopolitan, the modern, apolitical, managerial, mixed-up self might be just globalized because nothing in that particular idealized self-description concerns responsibilities beyond those toward the self and other than the enrichment of one's existential choice. To show this, let us hypostatize the idealized self-description somewhat extremely. Think of a German philosopher of the WW2 time, who studied Greek, read French thinkers, was taught by Jewish professors and had Jewish colleagues and friends and who obviously did not consider his identity to be muddled by all that. He might even be considered, in virtue of his work, a guardian of thought-provocation itself. But if we attach on this list of particulars his silence over Nazi atrocities, his failure to respond to provoking times, we realize that thinking of him as cosmopolitan would be rather embarrassing, if not gruesome.¹³

Now let us multiply our small narratives of scholarly selfhood and concretize cosmopolitanism by reference to two other professors, Kurt Huber and Pedro Albizu Campos. Huber taught philosophy and musicology at the University of Munich in the

¹² Amongst other things, it invites us to revisit the utilitarian framework of our dominant conception of the common good.

¹³ Conversely, to argue that there was something cosmopolitan about him we would need to look at his work and thought rather than at the facts listed above.

early 1940s' and worked with a non-violent resistance group, the White Rose (*die Weisse Rose*),¹⁴ against Nazism. The group distributed leaflets quoting extensively from the Bible, Aristotle, Novalis, Goethe and Schiller exhorting the German people to act on the grounds of philosophy and reason. Like the other members of the group, Huber was arrested and beheaded in 1943.

Campos was a Puerto-Rican scholar of African descent who became a leader of the people of Puerto Rico and a symbol of their struggle for independence.¹⁵ Amongst other things, in 1932, he accused Cornelius Rhoades¹⁶ of infecting Puerto Rican citizens with cancer as part of medical non-consensual experiments. Rhoades was just transferred and placed in charge of two chemical warfare projects, while Campos was jailed and later subjected (in the 1950s) to radiation experiments.¹⁷ He died in 1965 – one year after Che had paid tribute to him in the UN as a figure of resistance to the forced hybridization that was aiming to perpetuate the *status quo* in Puerto Rico.

Neither Huber nor Campos is a renowned, metonymized public figure, but they can both be considered exemplars of what it might mean to be a nomadic subject sufficiently historically anchored in a place to take responsibility for it. Huber responded ethico-politically to the liabilities burdening his collectivity. Campos responded ethico-politically to the legitimate demand of his community not to be oppressed by another. Their homelessness was one of principles that do not apply differently to the 'We' and to 'Others', and of a 'universality of law' (Badiou, 2005, p. 129) that should never be trampled over. The exceptionalism of the circumstances under which their cosmopolitan sensibility was enacted may invite the criticism that not all cosmopolitan manifestations can be of this kind. But this amounts to missing the point of their being discussed here. They are being discussed for being emblematic of a rooted cosmopolitanism beyond simple cultural knowledge and of action inspired by a critical *homework* guided by local self- or other-corrective ethico-political visions of a better world for all.

The task of a cosmopolitanism minus the quote marks, a homework yet to be done, is (amongst other things) to research in the way the home has been implicated in the

¹⁴ The most famous members of the group are Sophie and Hans Scholl. In 1941 Hans Scholl read a copy of a sermon by an outspoken critic of the Nazi regime, Bishop August von Galen, decriing the euthanasia policies (extended that same year to the concentration camps) which the Nazis maintained would protect the European gene pool. Horrified by the Nazi policies, Sophie obtained permission to reprint the sermon and distribute it at the University of Munich as the group's first leaflet prior to their formal organization. Huber wrote the sixth and last leaflet. From their second leaflet: 'Since the conquest of Poland three hundred thousand Jews have been murdered in this country in the most bestial way ... The German people slumber on in their dull, stupid sleep and encourage these fascist criminals ... Each man wants to be exonerated of a guilt of this kind, each one continues on his way with the most placid, the calmest conscience. But he cannot be exonerated; he is guilty, guilty, guilty!' Wikipedia source.

¹⁵ He was known as El Maestro, the teacher, he studied at Harvard University and he was elected president of Harvard's Cosmopolitan Club. He met with foreign students and lecturers, like Subhas Chandra Bose (Indian Nationalist leader with Mahatma Gandhi) and the Hindu poet Rabindranath Tagore. He also helped to establish several centers in Boston for Irish Independence. He graduated from Harvard University obtaining a Law degree while studying Literature, Philosophy, Chemical Engineering and Military Science. He was fluent in English, Spanish, French, German, Portuguese, Italian, Latin and Greek.

¹⁶ Rhoades was a famous medical researcher.

¹⁷ In 1994, under the Clinton administration, the United States Department of Energy disclosed that human radiation 'experiments' were conducted without consent on prisoners during the 1950s and 1970s. Campos was among the subjects of such experimentation (Wikipedia source).

condition in which the world is found today. And this is a universal task for no home (class, group, collectivity, community, state or empire) of any sort is excluded from it. In this case, homework becomes a kind of introspection that has decentring effects. Against the deracinated humanitarianism of the risk-averse actor who intervenes as a punishing hand; and against the individualist missionary Samaritanism of older, modern versions of cosmopolitanism we must realize that estrangement from home presupposes the highest and deepest possible knowledge of home. Not because cosmopolitan encounters with otherness are self-disclosing in the facile abstract universalist sense of reasserting one's humanity through the conclusion that 'we are all human, after all'; quite the contrary: because home for humanity is the whole past and present world and homelessness is the transcendence of the world as it is for the sake of an as yet 'no-topos', the world as it should be.

But what is a more homely cosmopolitanism outside the order of the global public figure or the order of the heroic that has or has not attracted the public global eye? Cosmopolitan sensibility includes 'in its everyday avatar respect for the moral, ethical, and cultural reality of other people, which encompasses in turn the willingness to engage that reality through speaking, listening, contemplating, being patient and the like' (Hansen, 2008, p. 302). The risk (despite intentions) confronting the relational aspect of this cosmopolitan sensibility that singles out respect and not, say, responsibility is: (1) to overlook the material reality of other people and the particular issues it raises, (2) to presuppose that the reality of other people has run parallel to ours, perhaps never entangled with ours or even shaped and set in course by ours and (3) to limit engagement with otherness to the communicative needs of the speaking subject. Important as this approach remains, it cannot cover the ground of the political because the latter pushes communication in the direction of the struggle to change some realities, not just to focus on those realities that require nothing other than respect. Some realities are not there to be imagined, respected, perhaps not even to be negotiated, but to be felt by all people (a universal call) as stirring or disturbing and to be treated within the order of action.

And now let us go even further back, to another philosopher, the first to use the term *cosmou politis*. Diogenes the Cynic emphasized indeed mobility and rootlessness in his world citizenship. But, unlike the modern, globalized Western self who moves about motivated by distinction, settling down, pleasure or profit, Diogenes traveled light, with a modest sack rather than with a full purse and philosophized *aneconomically*. Economy [home and property (*oikos* and *nomē*)] is the management of the household (and, further, government and administration of a place), while politics is the public deliberation on the city's direction, on the implicit ideals of how the city should be. For Crates, Diogenes's pupil and the Stoic Zeno's teacher (Dawson, 1992, p. 111), who distributed his property to the poor of his home city (p. 133), mobility meant not only free movement but also and more importantly symbolic freedom from the stranglehold of home and property and severe criticisms of political conduct. The *polis* Crates praises is one 'where no one owns anything, and war and conflict do not exist' (p. 149). For the Cynics, if love of money is the *metropolis* of all evil, its *antipolis* is a *cosmopolis* (*ibid*) where dice is the currency among cities (p. 113).

Homelessness may not just be to refuse to inhabit, or be formed by, a single communal space but to refuse the systematic and ongoing educational conditioning of pupils to always making economic sense whether within or across borders. I am not suggesting that the Cynic version of cosmopolitanism is the only possible alternative to globalization or that its *aneconomical* character is totally defensible. I am saying,

rather, that the cosmopolitanism of the Cynic is not as undemanding on selfhood as it is now made to appear when limited to mobility beyond locality or to a moralized other-orientation. What most contemporary thinkers tend to forget is Diogenes's cynic, uncompromising, radical and anti-conventional (or, frequently, post-conventional) self-hood that the modern bourgeois mobility or politeness would find cumbersome, to say the least. This is something that has to be kept in mind when all that is retained from Diogenes is so selectively and conveniently the literal meaning of rootlessness.

There is something auto-affective, indeed, self-congratulatory in the emphases on difference, diversity and their respect by the 'empathizing' self that characterize almost all cosmopolitan educational discourse. To balance out the tendency toward such emphases (which themselves must, however, never be given up) with a more other-originating cosmopolitanism, one may need a dose of disrespect. What the Cynics offered, apart from what is usually recognized to them (the coining of the term and the idealization of mobility), is the caustic idiom, namely, [adapting Nietzsche (2003, p. 122)], to 'philosophize with a hammer'. For, everyday, homely cosmopolitan topics may include issues of spilled blood or of inequality or of destruction of life and of nature. In such a case, responsibility becomes justificatory and the confrontational words and the corresponding persuasion do not belong to the order of bourgeois politeness; the appropriate idiom is the caustic.

How would the self of the culturalist idealized description cope with such an idiom? The Western self who learns to concentrate only on recognizing diversity and who is predictably afraid of being rude when discussing politics becomes equally defensive when a political conversation cuts deeper, when it comes to 'bloody truths' [to adapt Cavell (1991, p. 133)]. The 'cosmopolitan' selves who would be involved in such a 'risky' conversation would place themselves in the position of the martyr, the one who is rudely and relentlessly reminded of being in a state of political denial of responsibility or of blood spilled in their name, in the *name* of universality, but, in fact, for the *sake* of home and property. To them, it is only now that the order of treatment enters the picture. And they would tolerate such 'mishandling' precisely because of their having learnt to value political correctness and the moralist imperative to be polite, without ceasing for a minute to consider the Other 'one-sided', 'too emotionally involved', 'utopian', perhaps 'fanatic', 'militant' and, ultimately, radically¹⁸ Other.

But in a context of relativism, anti-universalism (Enslin and Tjiattas, 2008) and anti-representationalism what kind of 'aversive thinking' (Cavell, 1991, p. 134) can be tolerated or be effective in moving the interlocutor (and public opinion) about the truth of a reality? The modern plea for spatiality involved the imperative 'forget history' and directed it at particular recipients at will, a will dictated by power. What modernity had initiated postmodernity completed it through the hostility to representation (in its double sense of depicting a truth and speaking for an Other), to criteriology and to the universalism of right and wrong. What is left of political cosmopolitan dialogue, what might the 'grounding' of the caustic be?

Let us explore a possible path, one paved by J.-F. Lyotard's distinction between philosophical piety and paganism. 'Whereas the pious philosopher aims to speak the truth, the pagan uses ruses and trickery in order not to redefine the truth but to displace the rule of truth' (Readings, 1992, p. 73). Paganism is to judge without

¹⁸ To a deracinated, globalized internationalism any radicalism (which comes, as said above, etymologically from rootedness) is automatically dogmatic.

criteria, and as such it is just gaming. 'Ruse is not just a technique or a device for the purpose of overcoming one's opponents; it is much more than that. Ruse is an activity bound up with the will to power, because the will to power, if the word is to have a meaning, is carried out without criteria' (Lyotard and Thebaud, 1996, p. 16). In such a context, the non-represented is glorified as that which exceeds the order of representation and of its violence, and in this way it preserves its eventual, ineffable and exceptionalist character. The Holocaust is an example of unique and unrepresentable horror – on the indisputable objectivity of which, of course, very few thinkers have remained silent. But non-represented can also mean – as I see it – unknown or forgotten, never wronged in the consciousness of the strong, of the wrongdoers themselves, of the third party, the judge, or anyone interested in politics. 'One ought to be pagan' means that 'one must maximize as much as possible the multiplication of small narratives' (Lyotard and Thebaud, 1996, p. 59). To what effect? Justifiably, revolutions are no longer feasible or desirable options. Those who have been wronged not only in practice but also in theory (since too few have recounted or 'theorized' their stories) or those who may wish to speak in their name have no means to demand justice or the refashioning of the self, other than to articulate, to re-present the inflicted wrong. The only ruse and trickery they can perform in such postmodern times is, perhaps, the *mimesis* suiting the hybrid: to imitate the strong or their language game, to learn the language of the strong and limit the inflection of weakness to the least possible so that it can be received only as charming. Is it accidental, one wonders, that some of the most successful politicians of the Third World who achieved the status of the global figure and are still remembered or who voiced globally and effectively the concerns of their people had been bilingual, studied in Europe or in North America or managed to be hardly distinguishable in mannerism from their Western colleagues?¹⁹ The various wronged, their (global) representatives or those who may wish to speak in their name may mimic the lifestyles of the strong and pretend that they are like them so as to draw their attention and perhaps persuade them – for, the Habermasian verb 'to convince' is no longer allowed in this new philosophical universe, in fear of universalist criteriological connotations. They can trick those who are strong by articulating the wrong and make the strong speak about it themselves, in their self-bestowed inflection of impartiality and in what we might call 'their own genuine way of putting things nicely', without malapropisms. And they must do that gently, in order not to offend the masters, and subtly, in order not to raise the suspicion of self-indulging propaganda, lest there be neither effectiveness nor charm and enthusiasm in their move. For, non-toxic universalism²⁰ and intoxicating displacement presuppose one another.

Perhaps the best idea of trickery, an idea that is imposed by our times, may operate not *outside* the dominant language game (as Lyotardians think) but entirely *within* it. On the melancholic stage of contemporary world politics and the corresponding supporting discourses the most persuasive narrative of injustices suffered and of injustices still productive of effects such as hunger, illiteracy and the like, is given not by the one who avoids the game of the strong and shifts her position but by the one who learns to play the game better. *With and against* Lyotard, perhaps the cause of justice can be taken up not by the pagan but by the perfect mime.

¹⁹ A result of the mixture of educational opportunity and achievement, perhaps?

²⁰ I borrow the term 'non-toxic universalism' from Enslin and Tjiattas (2008, p. 24).

If the empirical pragmatics I have just sketched is too cynical, then, we have to question and undo it by re-addressing theoretically and practically the Manichean universe of strong and weak on which it rests. We may have to go beyond the false drastic choice between the old universalism of the grand narrative of ahistorical cosmopolitanism and the new isolationism of small narratives unable to cross divides, employ criteria and articulate ethico-political transcendence. If we truly do not want cosmopolitanism to just be a critical response to world troubles, to be ‘merely parasitic upon crisis’ (Hansen, 2008, p. 290), then, the best way to avoid this is to start by demanding the solution of some crises, to open up the space in which a non-parasitical cosmopolitanism would flourish without being a luxury for some and an unreachable dream for others. Contemporary world troubles are not just the usual trials of humanity but realities with specific authorial subjects, continuously authorized by global liabilities (and academic inattention or denial is one of them) and with a possible expiry date. The latter potential often obfuscated by a pacifying, *pax romana* culturalist logic can be activated precisely by a militant cosmopolitanism of driving criticisms home. If the position of the ‘one-sided’ critic or her mime should be temporary, that is precisely because it presupposes a Manichean and not a mixed-up world, a world always tidied up in two distinct global spaces. In front of ‘the good-Man, the white-Man’, lies the ‘victim-Man’: ‘on the side of the victims, the *haggard animal exposed on television screens*’. This morality ‘which rests on the misery of the world’ always ‘assigns the same roles to the same sides’ (Badiou, 2001, p. 13). It does so to the exclusion of what is indeed universal in cosmopolitanism: a universally justified call to all to strive for a better world for all biota. Doing one’s homework critically is a universal task from which no one is excluded because no one may permanently claim the position of the victim or the benefactor. About the inexorable specificity of such a project let us not worry: even if cosmopolitanism always begins from the home, it surely does not end there.

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