Education as Governance in Rousseau's Writings: Emile and Beyond

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1. When Rousseau and education are mentioned together, the first thing that comes to most minds is his book *Emile* (1762). *Emile* is universally recognized as a classic piece of writing on education, comparable in its importance to Plato's *The Republic*, and, like Plato's work, his *magnus opus*. Rousseau commentators, biographers mainly, often draw attention to the fact that the book was written nearly concurrently with *On the Social Contract* (1762) which was only published a month previously, and that the writing of the two books overlaps to a large extent with the writing of *Julie or the New Heloise* (henceforth *Julie*) which he began earlier and finished a little earlier in 1761. Not much is usually made of this fact however, except that writing the three books virtually together was an extraordinary feat (two, *Emile* and *Julie*, are very large tomes) revealing their author's well-known stamina and versatility at a time regarded as the most fertile and mature period of his writing. Otherwise than that, they are usually taken to be unrelated to each other in their subject-matter. And indeed, the books *are* all apparently on very different subjects; *Julie* is a romantic novel written in the form of an exchange of letters between the protagonists of the story, *Emile*, is about the education of a boy of that name, *On the Social Contract* is a work in political philosophy.

Part of the explanation for this lack of association of the three works must surely lie with the success of *Emile* not only as a classic but as one of the most influential books on modern educational theory and practice; the mainspring for most radical thinking and a permanent source of controversy over the years. Indeed, even within a short time of Rousseau's death it was imitated countless times, was translated twice in London, and became famous and influential right across Europe and especially in Germany, where it was acclaimed by such as Kant, Lessing, Goethe, and Herder. Kant became so engrossed with it that he read it without break in one sitting. Allan Bloom (1979) has described it, with its tale about the moral education of a young man, as the first *Bildungsroman.* Jurgen Oelkers (2002) has described influential modern writers or publicists like George Bernard Shaw, Thomas Mann, Ellen Key, D.H. Lawrence, and H.G. Wells, as subversive Rousseauists and attributed their attacks against the educational establishment of their time and their protests against the schooling systems to his influence.

Its practical influence on such as Pestalozzi and Froebel is well known; both wrote books and started pedagogical traditions and schools inspired by *Emile*. Equally well-known is its influence on Piagetian psychology. Ursula Peukert (1999) identifies the beginnings "of pedagogical reflection on childhood," and of early childhood education in the modern era with its influence and pronounces it still relevant for our times. It has been described as the fundamental influence on the *progressivism* which "crept into" the nineteenth century and became "the most dominant feature in the world of education" at the beginning of the twentieth; the first progressive classic triggering the 'child-centred' approach in education that continued to be powerful virtually throughout the twentieth century. (Darling and Nordenbo 2003:289) Of course, the numerous followers and sympathisers with the contents of the book are matched by its equally numerous critics

and detractors, but that is inevitable with a controversial and polemical writer of Rousseau's kind.

The fuss made about *Emile*, however, detracts from recognition of the full merits of his thinking on education. It is arguable that the huge popular and scholarly interest in the book has distracted attention from the rest of Rousseau's writing on the subject which is not inconsiderable. It has led to the reading of the book itself as a free-standing pedagogical text completely unrelated to his work on politics which was his other abiding interest at the time of its writing. I want to suggest in this paper that this reading is wrong, an impoverished reading of the book itself, and that, to the contrary, Rousseau's writings on education and politics from the *Discourse on the Science and Arts* (1750) (henceforth the *First Discourse*) to *On the Social Contract* should be read together since they are intimately tied together, and this is what it will attempt to do. I also want to suggest that, contrary to the practice of reading the books apart, *Emile* was written with *Julie* and with *On the Social Contract* as a single project. A reading of *Emile* enriched by reading it *with* these works instead of separate from them not only highlights the full range of his writing on education, it creates a case for an alternative reading of *Emile* different from the usual one that portrays it as a work about radical freedom and individualism. Indeed, what it shows is that the same collectivist sentiments underpinning his political writings are also at work in Rousseau's account of education in *Emile* and that both are preoccupied rather with governance.

2. Rousseau's first piece of writing on education, as is reasonably well-known, followed a brief experience of little under a year in 1740 spent as tutor to the two young sons of the de Mably family in Lyon. The experience itself convinced him that he was not cut for the job. However he wrote a pedagogical treatise, *Projet pour l'Education de. M. de Sainte-Marie*, probably inspired by Locke's treatise of the same kind, intended to give practical advice on the education of the elder son. This was his first piece of writing on education but its interest is purely historical; it need not concern us since its ideas were pretty conventional and the treatise itself was in no way a foretaste of what was to come in his writing of *Emile* which he started nearly two decades later in 1758. Following it, his first relevant reference to education came with the writing of his first political work the *First Discourse* with which he famously won the Dijon Academy prize. Written in abrasive and polemical style and creating an immediate sensation in the contemporary society which it attacked, the work challenged the assumption shared by the establishment and most of his Enlightenment contemporaries that the arts and sciences (which Diderot and d'Alembert were celebrating at the same time with their *Encyclopaedia*) were the finest accomplishments of human genius and contribute to the enlightenment and civilization of humanity.

Rousseau argued to the contrary. "Our souls," he insisted, "have become corrupted in proportion as our sciences and our arts have advanced towards perfection." (Cress 1987:5) The sciences and the arts he said, were no more than the sophisticated products of *amour propre*, the desire to gain popular approval and with it the rewards of fame and prestige that lay deeply ingrained in the contemporary culture and mentality and that were the source of the vanity, superficiality, moral decadence, and sheer inequalities of the contemporary bourgeois society from which he formally distanced himself and which

he described as no more than a slave society. There are echoes here (as elsewhere in Rousseau) of Nietzsche and of a later Foucault who made a somewhat similar assessment of the human sciences in our times, identifying them as part of the power technology of the modern state. Rousseau's criticism of the sciences and the arts extended explicitly to the educational institutions and practices of the time that both produced and reproduced them; "a foolish education," that "adorns our minds and corrupts our judgment," and that holds us captives us from our earliest years:

Everywhere I see immense establishments where youths are brought up at great expense to learn everything but their duties. Your children will not know their own language, but will speak others which are nowhere in use. They will know how to compose verses they will scarcely be capable of comprehending. Without knowing how to separate error from truth, they will possess the art of making themselves unrecognizable to others by means of specious arguments. But they will not know the meaning of the words magnanimity, fair-mindedness, temperance, humanity, courage. The sweet name homeland will never strike their ear; and if they hear God spoken of at all, it will be less to be in awe of him than to be in fear of him. (Cress 1987:16)

Education, he insisted in this *First Discourse* is not about cultivating 'civilisation' but about cultivating moral virtue – a position he continued to hold throughout his writings on the subject. The passage already indicates what were to be the major concerns that his educational thinking were to deal with over the years, especially in the most direct connection he was to make between politics and education where, like Plato before him, he saw education as a tool to serve the purposes of the state; i.e, as a tool of governance. This connection occurs for the first time in what was in many ways a preparatory text for the writing of *On the Social Contract*, the place where, among other things, he introduced for the first time the notion and politics of the 'general will', namely his *Discourse on Political Economy* (1755) (henceforth his *Third Discourse*).

3. The broad way he defines 'economy' in the *Third Discourse*, as "wise and legitimate government," is the way he defines education throughout his work on the subject. (Cress 1987:111) Indeed, later on in the same *Discourse* he describes education as "the general *economy* in relation to the government of persons." (Cress 1987:127, italics in original) This intimate association of the two, of education and governance is not only a feature of his writing on state education it remains constant through all his writing including *Emile*. The first concern with government, he tells us, arose with the first human association, namely the nuclear family, then it extended by degrees to "the large family which is the state". (Cress 1987:111) In the *Third Discourse* Rousseau makes a case for state institutions of instruction (what may be called public schools). "It is certain," he says, "that in the long run people are what the government makes them." Therefore it is up to the governors of the state, he continues, to "train men if you want to command them." (Cress 1987:119) Plenty of what follows in his recommendations for public education foreshadows the pedagogical precepts of *Emile*. Government gets its authority from the law and it should be exercised with wisdom rather than severity. "If you want the laws obeyed, make them beloved," (Cress 1987:119) he says, make them reflect natural reason

so that, in obeying them the ordinary citizen will act "in accordance with the maxim of his own judgement," i.e., with his well-formed private conscience. Thus the secret of good government is for the individual not to feel "at odds with himself." (Cress 1987:117) Good government is virtually invisible. It is not about punishing the offence when it occurs but about preventing it from occurring. Rousseau expects an obedience to just laws that is absolute and unconditional. For this to be the case, he says, the law must "penetrate(s) to the inner part of a man," it must be "exerted no less on his will than on his actions." (Cress 1987:119) At the same time such obedience, he insists, must not be blind. It must proceed from the voice of duty which must be the voice of virtue, and "Every man is virtuous when his private will is in conformity with the general will in all things, and we willingly want what is wanted by the people we love." (Cress 1987:121)

In conformity with our earlier quotation from the *First Discourse* Rousseau describes love for one's homeland as the first and overriding command of duty, and the first virtue. However, citizens are not born with it nor can it be forced on them, like any other virtue it must be "trained." Citizens need also to be trained in another equally important quality, namely the proper, ie., virtuous, use of their freedom, as conformity with the collective or general will. Without it, "you will merely have wicked slaves," who will act selfishly and dishonestly at the least occasion where they perceive the possibility for personal gain. (Cress 1987:124) And the training must start in early childhood:

"early enough never to consider their own persons except in terms of being related to the body of the state, and not to perceive their own existence except as part of the state's existence ... It is too late to alter our natural inclinations when they have taken their course and habit has been joined with self-love ... It is from the first moment of life that one must learn to deserve to live." (Cress 1987:125)

His definition of freedom is carried over by Rousseau into the writing of *On the Social Contract* where freedom is defined in terms of the compatibility of individual motivation with the general will. The sentiment of political collectivism is explicit in this quotation and in others in both the *Third Discourse* and *On the Social Contract*. The general will, he says, requires "the total alienation of each associate, together with all of his rights, to the entire community." (Cress 1987:148)The state, he continues in the *Third Discourse*, must set up public schools for the purpose of instructing the young in the practice of virtue because "children cannot be abandoned to the lights and prejudices of their fathers." (Cress 1987:125) Indeed, the provision of such schools is, he insists, "its most important business," (Cress 1987:126) and the schools must operate, as in Plato's political thought, "under the rules prescribed by the government and under the magistrates put in place by the sovereign." (Cress 1987:125)

4. However, after this strong case for state controlled institutions of instruction Rousseau suffered a complete change of heart in writing *On the Social Contract*, his most important political work and his follow up on the *Third Discourse*, though he continued to argue that the kind of instruction that is truly educative is one that cultivates the virtues. In *On the Social Contract* public schools are, surprisingly, not even mentioned. But then they reappear again years later in the writing of *Considerations on the Government of Poland* (1771) (henceforth *Poland*). Why? In *Emile* where, less

surprisingly, there is no mention of them either, he seems to provide a clue. There he justifies his newly found scepticism for public instruction with the argument that it was not required because the idea of a citizen requires the idea of a fatherland and that the latter idea no longer formed any part of the contemporary mind. Of course, the assumption continues to be that the job of public instruction is to train citizens. In *Emile* he criticised contemporary public institutions, as he had in the First Discourse, as "laughable establishments" creating nothing but selfish men in conflict with themselves who end their days "without having been good either for ourselves or for others." (1991:41) The view is consistent with that expressed in the *First Discourse* where, it will be recalled from my earlier quotation, he also accused them of lacking any interest in teaching virtue and love for the homeland. The education they give the citizen, he says in *Emile*, "if only by virtue of the prejudices it gives him," conditions him to a life of slavery not freedom. (1991:41) But he has, I shall argue later, a deeper reason than this scepticism with the public institutions of his time for his neglect of public instruction in *On the Social Contract*.

In writing *Poland* Rousseau was asked to take on the mantle of 'legislator'. Not for the first time since he had already been invited to this role earlier, in 1764, when he drew up a constitution for the island of Corsica. Corsica had been an ideal subject him because of the view fundamental to all his political thinking that large states are, in principle, impossible to govern legitimately. Poland was obviously a different matter. It possessed none of the ideal qualities of size, geography and political history of Corsica, yet, from his point of view it had its advantages; namely its ancient institutions and its independent-minded citizens. Thus, we find him begging the Polish people to ignore the modernizers among them who wanted Poland to become a modern state, and instigating them to a strongly nationalistic outlook and sense of identity. He urges them to conserve the idiosyncratic, conservative and dated, institutions native to their country that everybody else condemned as the main source of its troubles. Love of the homeland, or patriotism, is reaffirmed from the *Third Discourse* as the sentiment that would unite the people. Also reaffirmed is his view that an ideal constitution "holds sway over the hearts of the citizens," not simply on their actions. (Mansfield 1985:4) And, again, this requires the state to set up public institutions "to shape the souls of the citizens in a national pattern and so to direct their opinions, their likes, and dislikes that they shall be patriotic by inclination, passionately, of necessity." (Mansfield 1985:19)

The full chapter he dedicates to public instruction in *Poland* repeats the warning in the *Third Discourse* that the instruction of citizens must start early, in childhood. "The newly-born infant, upon first opening his eyes, must gaze upon the fatherland, and until his dying day should behold nothing else." (Mansfield 1985:19) A "truly national education," he continues, produces "a Pole, not some other kind of man." At the age of ten a boy:

"should be familiar with everything Poland has produced; at twelve to know all its provinces, all its roads, all its towns; at fifteen, to have mastered his country's entire history, and at sixteen, all its laws; let his mind and heart be full of every noble deed, every illustrious man, that ever was in Poland so that he can tell you about them at a moment's notice." (Mansfield 1985:20)

Rousseau affirms that a truly national system of institutional education "belongs only to men who are free," freedom for the citizen, however, he again re-affirms from his *Third Discourse*, cannot be conceived apart from doing one's patriotic duty. (Mansfield 1985:20)

5. To return to the question, why, with this insistence on the need for public instruction in both the *Third Discourse*, written before it, and *Poland* written after it, is there no such chapter in the writing of *On the Social Contract*, not only, there is no reference to it all? With regards to the writing of *Poland*, the work as a whole is usually classified together with others written during the same period (such as *The Confessions* (1770) written the year before, *Rousseau Judge of Jean-Jacques, Dialogues* (1776), and *Reveries of the Solitary Walker* (started 1776 and left incomplete at his death)) as belonging to the final phase of Rousseau's writing, dated between 1764-1778 which were marked by paranoia and self-absorption and a general distrust of his contemporaries and humanity in general. One is, therefore, tempted to explain it as a work of old age and disillusionment and to relate it to *On the Social Contract* somewhat in the way Plato's *Laws* are related to the earlier writing of *The Republic*, where Plato had lost faith in the ability of human beings to achieve the ideal state. But one cannot explain the relationship of the *Third Discourse* with *On the Social Contract* in the same way.

A second temptation is to distinguish his writings on education and politics into two kinds; the pragmatic, those in which Rousseau wrote with the contemporary social and political realities in mind and that would include the *Third Discourse* and *Poland*, and the ideal, or revolutionary writings, which is, in fact, how *Emile* and *On the Social Contract* are customarily considered. There are also those who would make recourse to an apparent lack of unity in his work in terms of what they perceive as the erratic nature of his writing in general, which was notorious in his time. Rousseau himself complained against it as a popular and false misconception in a letter he wrote to Christophe de Baumont in 1763 defending the contents of *Emile* against its condemnation by the same Archbishop. There he insisted that though he had "written on various subjects," it was "always with the same principles, the same morality, the same faith, the same maxims and, if you will, the same opinions." (Mason 1979:231) My own view, as I said at the beginning, is that *On the Social Contract*, and *Emile* can, in fact, be read as parts of a single project, and that the earlier political writings, the three *Discourses* specifically, that led up to them were integral to their production. This reading is possible if *Julie* is read as the bridge between the former and the latter.

6. Let me say something brief about *Julie*. As I remarked briefly earlier, the book is, on the face of it, no more than a romantic novel, a popularly successful work, especially with the society ladies of the time because of its dramatic/melodramatic story of fidelity and unrequited love, and the tragic death of Julie, the narrative's heroine, at the end of it. There are three main male protagonists in the story; St Preux, Julie's personal tutor and her tragic early, and, as it turns out, only, true love, de Wolmar a wealthy gentleman of her social rank, whom she marries on her father's command, and Lord Edward Bronston, St Preux's provider and mentor after the latter's unsuccessful love affair with Julie had also cost him his job. Notwithstanding her former passionate love affair with St Preux, Julie's marriage with de Wolmar is successful. They have two young sons whom she

raises at home in their early years, together with a young niece, Henriette, and she runs a harmonious and happy household. In short, she fulfils her duties as a wife and mother in exemplary fashion, and seems self-fulfilled with her own life. After three years abroad St Preux is invited to join the household by de Wolmar, surprisingly in view of the fact that he knows about his wife's earlier relationship with the younger man. However his confidence in the two is repaid; after an early, and successful, struggle with their passions the relationship between Julie and St Pruex matures into one of mutually respectful friendship, which is extended in St Preux's case to de Wolmar. Bronston is important because he is the addressee of letters sent to him by St Preux reporting to him on events and on the general conduct of the de Wolmar household.

The parts of *Julie* that seem directly about education are those where St Preux reports to Bronston on the education of the boys and Henriette and on an interesting discussion of education he has with de Wolmar himself, which read like, and are, a preparation for *Emile*. The basic pedagogical principles St Preux discovers at work in the de Wolmar household are broadly similar to Emile's. The boys' education is Julie's responsibility until they are of the age of understanding (i.e., six years old) when they will pass into the hands of a male tutor, St Preux. Henriette will continue to be educated by her mother. Less directly, *Julie* is an account of the wise and successful management or governance, and therefore education, of a family household, its servants and dependants. de Wolmar's, described as a wise, enlightened observer of human nature and of those around him, who combines a father's interest with the detachment of a philosopher, is the hidden hand behind everything; Julie makes the laws, the practical rules, for the family and household, her husband sets her the constitution, the principles, from which she translates her laws. Hence the de Wolmar family and household exemplifies what Rousseau regards as the proper roles of husband and wife in a well-ordered family based on the natural disposition of the male to perceive things in their abstract generality, and the female's for being practical and recognising the details of things.

This explains why the education of the boys is their mother's responsibility until they reach the age of abstract reasoning, then it must fall to a man. Rousseau does not explain why it is a tutor rather than their father, it cannot, in de Wolmar's case, be his general distrust of fathers quoted earlier, so it must correspond with his general observation in the *Third Discourse* for a division of government between legislator and executive, the tutor being the latter. The education of girls, he will continue to hold in *Emile*, is their mother's responsibility until they are married, then it falls to their husbands. But the relationship is by no means one way; the moral education of their husbands, in turn, falls to their wives. The husband educates with his wise governance, the wife with her modest virtue; the two roles are complementary in a well-ordered, or just, family. The husband's authority is felt rather than seen. The way husband and wife together, in turn, educate "their servants to behave in the way they want, is to show themselves as they really are;" i.e., by being frank and open in their behaviour, by being consistent in the practice of virtue and in their general actions with the demands they make on others. (Mason 1979:141)

A new question arises at this point: given all this, why isn't Emile raised in a family like the de Wolmar's rather than as a solitary individual in a one-to-one relationship with his tutor who takes him into custody as soon as he is weaned from his nurse. Why doesn't he have siblings? Why wasn't *Emile*, written partly in overlap with *Julie*, a more detailed pedagogical elaboration of the principles described and discussed in the latter? Why did

Rousseau feel that he needed to write a separate novel rather than a detailed, if separate, appendix to *Julie*? In fact, the education of Sophie, Emile's eventual wife and perfect companion, described in a substantial section, Book Five, on the 'Education of the Woman', in *Emile could* be read as a straightforward elaboration of Henriette's education, which is only minimally described in *Julie*. The answer is Rousseau's radical intentions in writing the book, and radical meant going to the roots. Emile had to be educated as a *man* first before he was socialized into his society and eventually became a citizen because the de Wolmar family, he believed, was still a fiction. It would have to be created by Emile himself en route to creating the ideal state of *On the Social Contract*.

7. Indeed, in my reading, the key figure that inspires the politics of *On the Social Contract* is that of de Wolmar. de Wolmar provides Rousseau with his model for the Legislator, a controversial figure not found either in the *Third Discourse* – how did he come to it? In his letter to de Baumont, Rousseau had insisted that all his work revolved around one fundamental principle: "That man is a naturally good being, who loves justice and order; that there is no original perversity in the human heart and that the first movements of nature are always right." (Mason 1979:232) His first two *Discourses* are a "genealogy" of how he, man, subsequently went wrong, how "by successive deviations from their original goodness, men finally became what they are," i.e., the degenerate slaves he describes in his conclusion. (Mason 1979:233) On the other hand, *Emile* and *On the Social Contract* are about how they *should* be. In other words, Rousseau's writing in these works moves from his 'destructive' condemnation of the present-day bourgeois social order in the *Discourses*, via his account of government in the *Third Discourse*, to provide a constructive account of an ideal just and harmonious social order in *On the Social Contract*. This ideal order, he decided, needs to be created de novo, it requires a new kind of man and woman; a man and woman who would start it together and serve as its models for imitation. Their education is the subject of *Emile*. How did he get there?

As he says in the letter to de Baumont, and as he repeats both in *Emile* and in *On the Social Contract*, the point of departure for everything he writes is man's natural goodness; his goodness when his behaviour conforms with the laws that nature gives him. So what are the laws that nature gives him, and that, Rousseau assumed, can be read into nature itself? In the *Discourses* he identifies one basic law; *amour de soi*, or self-love, which translates into care for oneself, while the original condition of man, as nature made him, was of a solitary, asocial, satisfied, self-sufficiency (I am continuing to use 'man' because it is literally the male of the human species he means). The loss of this condition, Rousseau tells us, occurred when the population grew and proximity with others became inevitable. Then a second instinctive human sentiment was triggered off, that of pity. Pity, he continues, was the original sentiment that drove men into society. Pity is what draws human beings together as they answer the cries for help of others, and through the distress of their fellows they come to recognise his own vulnerability.

Hence we have the first human association, the nuclear family with its natural, gender-defined division of labour to which is transferred the same qualities of self-love and a harmonious self-sufficiency possessed by the solitary savage, and assumed by Rousseau to be ideal for all forms of human association, including the state. In effect, Rousseau assumes that what is natural for both the individual and the social, is self-sufficiency and a sense of harmonious unity that comes from a sense of identity. His task in the first two

Discourses, again as he says in his letter to de Baumont, was to show how these qualities were lost to modern societies which, as they became larger, became ever more complex political, demographic, and economic entities, and how, commencing with the institution of private property then moving to the creation of industry, a degenerate form of *amour propre*, the other sentiment triggered off in the social make-up of man, beside pity, became dominant in these societies. *Amour propre*, which drives both men and women in contemporary society to seek the esteem and reward of others at all costs, creates social inequality, division, insincerity, moral depravity, and a profound sense of alienation from the state and from one's fellow citizens, and the sciences and arts contribute to this outcome which, he believed, was not merely historical; the original natural integrity and self-sufficiency of the nuclear family cannot, he thought survive in any political entity incapable of possessing the features of a closely-knit community.

Indeed, one popular misconception about Rousseau that must be dispelled immediately is that he was anti-social. The contrary is true; he regarded the advance into society as a net gain for humanity because the savage self-sufficiency of the pre-social individual restricts him to a satisfied but limited and brutish life, determined by instinct rather than intelligence. Indeed, there is a third, positive, sentiment, he identifies, that becoming social animals triggers off in human beings. Standing in sharp contrast with *amour-propre* and proceeding from the original motive of self-love, *amour de soi* (making it the most natural of his sentiments), it drives him towards self-perfection. Rousseau does not want to eliminate *amour propre* in favour of *amour de soi*. *Amour propre* is a quality natural to the human social animal. Emile first experiences it as the desire to please his tutor on whom he is made periodically to feel dependent. Later, like any other young man on the threshold of manhood, he experiences it as a need to please the other sex. The question he sets himself in *Emile* is how to it can be prevented from degenerating in the way visible in bourgeois society, and this is a question of governance, a question of education. Rousseau's answer is that it must follow on and be subject to the sentiment of *amour de soi* as the desire to be true to oneself.

Rousseau's first attempt to describe an ideally just and well-ordered society appears in the letter 'To the Republic of Geneva' with which he preceded his second submission for the Dijon Prize, his *Discourse on Inequality* (1755) (henceforth the *Second Discourse*) which, this time, was unsuccessful. There we find him describing the kind of state he says he would live in given a choice and his model is an idealized Genevese polis represented as the family writ large, where the men were citizens and the women "chaste guardians of mores and the gentle bonds of peace," and live together in an intimate community, but not governed like a family, with paternal power. (Cress 1987:32) "It must be said," he says about the power of the state in the Second Discourse, "that it is from civil society that this power draws its principle source." (Cress 1987:73) In the *Third Discourse*, however, concurrently with his growing disillusionment with the citizens of Geneva, we find him abandoning the model, arguing at still greater length against identifying the government of a state, however small and intimate, with that of a family, and consolidating his view that a state should not be governed as a patriarchy. He also makes the fundamental Platonic assumption that the state is the individual (not the family) writ large, with the anatomy and functions of the one replicated in the other. The state is a machine, the citizens, the body politic, are "the body and members that make the machine move, live and work." (Cress 1987:114) The body politic, or civil society, is a moral

being with a collective will, the general will, which functions with the same instinctive sentiment of the individual, it “always tends toward the conservation and well-being of the whole and of each part.” (Cress 1987:114) Hence, he contends, it must be regarded as infallible, and he continues to retain this view in *On the Social Contract,* which continues with the same collectivist sentiment at work in the *Third Discourse* and in the writing of *Poland*.

8. In *On the Social Contract*, however, Rousseau shores up his collectivism with the figure of the Legislator which he introduces to solve the problem he struggled with without much success in the *Second* and *Third* discourses, after rejecting the validity of democratic procedures in the *Third*; where does the general will come from, and how will the citizens know what it is? *Julie*, in my view, provided him with his answer. *On the Social Contract* opens with an explicit, and startling, retraction of the strong objections he had made in the earlier two *Discourses* to casting the patriarchal family as the model for state governance. He now describes it as “the prototype of political societies,” and he casts “the leader” in “the image of the father, the populace is the image of the children.” (Cress 1987:142) Politically, the state is no longer the individual writ large as it was in the *Third Discourse*, it is, once more, the family but in a much more literal way than the *Second Discourse*. And the model for the ideal, well-ordered, state is the de Wolmar family and household. The figure of the Legislator replicates that of de Wolmar, the wise and just paterfamilias with exactly the same qualities. He is “the engineer who invents the machine, (Cress 1987:163) his authority “can compel without violence and persuade without convincing,” (Cress 1987:164) it comes from a “great soul.” (Cress 1987:48) The general will, incorporated in the body of magistrates/executive, replicates the role of Julie in the household as manager and educator who “constructs (the machine) and makes it run. (Cress 1987:163) And the relationship between Legislator and magistrates/executive is similar to that between the husband and wife in the de Wolmar household; intimate and harmonious because based on the recognition of their respective roles. Institutions of public instruction are redundant in *On the Social Contract* because a state that modelled on the de Wolmar household is itself the educator.

The question that followed for Rousseau was how does one produce such a Legislator/ Paterfamilias? Again *Emile* was his answer. Emile’s education, which culminates with his marriage to his perfect partner Sophie, prepares him to take his family away to the piece of land in the wilderness he had identified on his previous educational travels with his tutor where he will found a new society on the lines of *On the Social Contract*. Its last phase, in fact, includes the study of political science or what are practically the contents of the book. Its earlier phases could not occur in a family with siblings because contemporary families were no more than a product and reflection of the wider society and were contaminated by the same depravity; a break was required. What Rousseau wanted was a ‘new man’ for a new society and this, in turn, required a new kind of education. In *Emile* it takes the form of a one-to-one relationship with a wise tutor away from any contact with the present society. There the innocent child would first learn to be a man, as nature made him, i.e., as a self-sufficient, self-directed solitary imbued with a strong sentiment of *amour pour soi*, but properly respectful of his dependence on his tutor, while conscious of his powers of self-perfection. His *amour pour soi* will protect him from the dangerous allure of his society into which his tutor wisely and carefully

inducts him in the next phase of his education, when he is ready for it. The intention is that he will remain his own man whatever happens, even if he appears to others as a 'monster'; one who "while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before." (Cress:148)

Is de Wolmar the model for Emile's tutor also? The usual comparison made is between Tutor and Legislator. My reading of Rousseau's work, however, makes the paterfamilias de Wolmar the model for both. Education is "the art of forming men," the art of governance, and this practiced by all three. (1991:33) The mode of governance of the three is similar if exercised with different entities; the state, the family household, and the man. Each regards the entity he governs as his creature, and each has the quality of the divine about him in his wisdom and judgement. Emile's tutor is "more than a man himself," like the Legislator and the Paterfamilias. (1991:49-50) His divinity renders him infallible and he demands complete obedience. All study human nature carefully never going against its general rhythms and precepts, but they study their particular subjects as well. With all, their mode of governance/education is 'negative', i.e., a matter of prevention and control rather than direction or instruction, their power is, therefore, virtually invisible to their subjects so that these have the illusion of acting freely. "Let him believe," Rousseau says of Emile, "he is the master and let it always be you who are." No subjection, he continues, is as perfect "as that which keeps the appearance of freedom," for "thus the will itself is made captive." (1991:120) This is the same spirit he employs in his politics also.

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