Employing Marcuse's and Adorno's psychoanalytic insights for pedagogical theorization

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In this paper, my aim is to clarify the potential that Herbert Marcuse’s and Theodor W. Adorno’s psychoanalytic accounts may have with respect to the philosophy of education today. I will analyse the potential role of the “psychological” in the philosophy of education, particularly drawing on the psychoanalytic material of the two theorists. The motivation of the paper springs from our need for better theoretical and conceptual tools for integrating political and psychological perspectives in the philosophy of education. The reason for taking these tools from the philosophies of Herbert Marcuse and Theodor W. Adorno is that their theories deal with the broader societal context in which examined phenomenon and (traditional) theories are constructed (Horkheimer, 1937).¹

Psychoanalytic theory casts light on the psychological side of an individual’s development in a way which has so far been largely unexploited in the field of education. Martha Nussbaum points to the same issue in her recent book Not for Profit. Why Democracy needs the Humanities (Nussbaum, 2010), in which she draws on Donald D. Winnicot’s psychoanalytic thinking. In my view, the originality of both Marcuse’s and Adorno’s thoughts with respect to their political and psychological elements – and the possibilities these offer for thinking in new ways in the field of philosophy of education – is something we simply cannot afford to bypass. Emphasizing the psychological domain, balancing education between its psychological and political dimensions is crucial for the growth and development of mature personalities, that is to say, citizens of a just and democratic society (cf. Holma, 2012; Holma & Huhtala, 2014).

Critical theory understands the structure of society and the structure of the self as being fundamentally interconnected. A significant part of this mirroring relationship has to do with the fact that the subject develops and is brought up in a given society, which sets the parameters for the subject’s actions in the world. However, it also seems evident that this relationship cannot be seen in an entirely deterministic sense. The subject also has an inner, more “private” source of emotions and needs. As critical theorists, Marcuse and Adorno argue that a significant contradiction between the needs of society and those of the subject can lead to an unbalanced structure of the psyche. The task of psychoanalytic theory is therefore to provide better tools for reaching the more genuine and profound side of humanity than what late-capitalist society has produced. Psychoanalytic theory meets the challenge of revealing the potential mode for change particularly in relation to society.

In what follows, I will first outline some of the aspects of psychoanalytic theory in Marcuse’s and Adorno’s philosophies. Marcuse and Adorno both share the view that psychoanalytic theory enables a deeper understanding of the social and biological dynamics of consciousness. For both thinkers, psychoanalytic theory provides conceptual tools for thinking through contradictions between the needs of an individual and those of the governing entity. However, these theorists from the same school of thought end up with differing interpretations of psychoanalytic theory and its implications. By way of quite an original reading of Freud, Marcuse sees liberated society being possible through sublimation. Adorno’s inclination towards Freudian psychoanalytic theory is based on an atypical insight, according to which he sees the justification of psychoanalytic practice in its ability to illuminate the current damaged social fabric – rather than the more traditional justification which cites the healing or therapeutic relief psychoanalytic practice provides (See Kotkavirta, 2008; Holma &
Huhtala, 2014). In addition to the differences found between Adorno’s and Marcuse’s psychoanalytic theories, there is no consistent interpretation of psychoanalytic theory among the Frankfurters. Interestingly, for Jürgen Habermas, psychoanalysis provided an analogous model for critical social sciences. He finds psychoanalysis to be a model of a practice where the interest of knowledge is set to remove the distortions of language through self-reflective processes. In a similar manner, (pathological) language as a context for a critical investigation of social sciences allows for a reconstruction of the origin of distorted practice in society. Accordingly, psychoanalysis contains all the elements necessary for constructing social theory. With this philosophical step, Habermas’s account of psychoanalysis relegates the role of instincts to the form of the language. Hence, the emphasis shifts from the psychological dimension to the universal, ontological structure of language (Habermas, 1988).

From the perspective of Adorno’s and Marcuse’s theories, both rationality and sensuous desire play their respective roles in enabling critical rationality. However, repressive civilization rejects the expressions of natural impulses and drives (Marcuse, 1974; Adorno, 1973). The main obstacle hindering the realization of critical rationality is embedded in the mode of rationality that is typical of our time: the calculative logic of late-capitalist society has become the predominant form of rationality, penetrating most areas of public and private life. The contemporary culture industry exemplifies this alienating mode of rationality: culture is perceived as a means to increase consumerism through its reifying effect on the human mind. In the second part of the paper this leads me to examine the concept of rationality regarding Marcuse’s and Adorno’s psychoanalytic theories. The link between critical theory and psychoanalytic theory arises from the possibility of actualizing the non-dominating and critical form of rationality. This is central from the standpoint of education and the formation of society. Thus, in the light of Adorno’s and Marcuse’s critical theory, the task of education seems to be one of fostering ways of experiencing nonconformity with the surrounding society.

Marcuse and sublimation

For Marcuse, the possibility of actualizing the non-dominating form of rationality is closely attached to the instinctual and hence bodily existence of the subject. With his radical account of sublimation, he seeks to demonstrate how the revision of instinctual energy makes it possible to establish a subjectivity which utilizes the human potentiality to its fullest. From the perspective of the philosophy of education, Marcuse’s inventive use of psychoanalytic theory seems intriguing, given that education is traditionally seen as subject to societal transformation.

Within the framework of psychoanalytic theory, the natural impulses of human beings, hence non-cognitive in their essence, play a crucial role in the development of rationality. Marcuse’s modification of the Freudian concept of “sublimation” treats it as a potential source of emancipation (Marcuse, 1974). Before continuing with Marcuse, Freud’s original idea of sublimation should briefly be introduced. This is important in order to understand Marcuse’s reconceptualization of the term, as well as his use of psychoanalytic theory in a broader sense. For Freud, sublimation refers to the rechanneling of sexual energy to some secondary object. In other words,
sublimation means that biological, instinctual impulses are blocked and subsequently revised from the standpoint of their original, free expression, in order to assure order in society. The substitute satisfaction for Freud was work, art and intellectual activity (Freud, 1962). As is known, throughout his career Freud cherished his thesis that Western civilization inevitably causes instinctual repression. Accordingly, the most cultivated cultural achievements of modern society are the outcome of instinctual repression. Due to this repression, the unconscious (the Id) and conscious (the Ego), are unable to function in a manner complementary to each other. The most pathological outcome of this is crystalized in the death camps of the Second World War, in the horrific alliance between instrumental reason and insanity.

Marcuse, quite contrary to Freud, sees sublimation as a form of emancipation rather than repression (Marcuse, 1974; Bowring, 2012). For him, sublimation contains genuine possibilities for full, holistic individual growth which answers the individual’s true needs (Marcuse, 1968). This is possible because sublimation can serve the pleasure principle and therefore further the subject’s development with respect to its true needs and desires (Bowring, 2012). The pleasure principle refers to the very early stages of personality development characterized by primary narcissism. At this stage the body, along with the external world, is experienced merely as an extension of the psyche. The pleasure principle seeks instant gratification of one’s needs. This feeling of self-sufficiency is discharged in the next step of development in which the ‘conscious self’ emerges. Gradually, through the process of socialization, the pleasure principle gives way to the reality principle, or performance principle, as social life and structures require more delayed and indirect instinctual gratification (Marcuse, 1974). However, as stated above, Marcuse’s model suggests that sublimation can be attached to the pleasure principle also at the mature adult stage in a sustainable and constructive manner. In this way, feelings of social solidarity or aesthetic satisfaction are possible. Marcuse takes works of art as such sublimations. Harmony and fulfillment can be reached through art and the experience of beauty, even though immediate satisfaction remains delayed or unachieved. However, Marcuse sees that unmediated forms of pleasure foster emancipation, as unmediated pleasure does not require the involvement of the governing system (Bowring, 2012). In a society where emancipation is derived from sublimation in the way that Marcuse outlined, work is organized in a pleasant and non-alienating manner. According to Marcuse, the need for a happy and contented life is biologically rooted (Marcuse, 1974).

Clearly, ‘emancipation through sublimation’ remained a utopian, yet possible vision in Marcuse’s mind as well. The pleasure derived from consumption based on sexual enticement comes with work that is organized in an alienating manner. Marcuse takes this as a repressive form of sublimation. The current order of society neglects genuine needs for intellectual and aesthetic development in favour of unhealthy forms of consumption. The integration of sexual desire into work and consumption serves to deny the gratification of desire, even though the gratification is “promised”. As David Ingram points out, desublimation can therefore actually signify repression. (Ingram, 1990).

Adorno and Addendum
Adorno emphasizes the importance of understanding that exterior conditions transform our instinctual energies. He highlights the inseparability of nature and subject by stressing that the nature within the subject is shaped by the surrounding society. Accordingly, the repressed interplay between the natural impulses and dynamics of the psyche leads to a distorted experience of the self. Nature within the subject is inaccurately identified as something external.

Before moving on from the instinctual level to a more cognitive level and examining the possibility of a critical rationality through a critique of rationality’s current mode, I will recapitulate Adorno’s conception of natural, instinctual impulses and his use of psychoanalytic theory, as follows. Adorno sees that due to the embodied features of current society, the subject experiences nature within itself as something external and disturbing. Thus the subject also tries to rationalize the non-rational part of its nature, hence its entire psyche. As is known, unconsciousness affects our conception of ourselves decisively, yet we cannot steer this defining relation toward ourselves. Adorno takes unconsciousness as a potential route to “gain back” an undisturbed nature relationship in a way that is undistorted by instrumental reason and its tendency to dominate. For Adorno, “Instrumental reason” refers to the type of rationality which concentrates merely on means instead of ends and thus leads to the domination of nature and humans at the expense of the individual and social morality. Hence, unconsciousness is a domain of the psyche where nature within the subject is not colonialized by instrumental reason. Therefore the possibility of initiating a non-dominating form of rationality lies in unconsciousness. Here Adorno differs from Freud, who saw unconsciousness as a chaotic, instinct-driven part of the psyche. (Freud, 1991; Holma & Huhtala, 2014).

According to Adorno, the origin of our experience of freedom actually lies in archaic impulses that motivate our actions. He sees these impulses (Addendum, Hinzutretende) as being more fundamental than the Ego, and that they therefore precede consciousness. Addendum (das Hinzutretende) is a physical, bodily impulse which plays a role in Adorno’s conception of “willing”. It is the part of willing that does not transcend physical conditions. (Adorno, 1973; see also Holma & Huhtala, 2014). However, the impulse becomes distorted under the reduced form of freedom imposed by the dynamics of contemporary Western society: the Ego, the task of which is to reconcile the natural impulses with the demands of society, assumes control of all the subject’s impulses. The bodily “impulse” is misunderstood as something to be settled by consciousness, a motif already found in Plato. Attaching the impulse to consciousness carries the assumption that the action-steering motivation is “visible” and within reach of the subject’s “self”. Freedom therefore becomes identified with the Ego, and as a result the non-conscious impulse is repressed. Accordingly, Addendum comes to signify “unfreedom” instead of being the original source of the experience of freedom (Adorno, 1973; O’Connor, 2009).

In Adorno’s view then, nature is a necessary condition for human existence as well as the source of human freedom. According to him, reason originates from nature, specifically from the natural need for self-preservation. Hence, reason is tied to nature and to a great extent is conditioned by its material aspects. Adorno seeks to dissolve the dualistic polarization of subject and nature, doing so by blurring the border between reason and nature, subject and object (see Wiggershaus, 1987). Further, he emphasizes that all aspects of human life derive from the nature relationship. This is to say that the relations of the subject (the self-relation, relation to others, etc.) reflect
how the subject perceives itself in relation to nature. Understanding oneself as a reflective and hence also rational part of nature is crucially important (Ibid, 1987).

Rationality

The Enlightenment’s idea of an emancipated society implied a rational subject no longer governed by tradition but rather by critical rationality. Rationality, or more specifically the critique of rationality, is also at the very heart of critical theory. In Negative Dialectics, Adorno problematizes Western rationality with his reservations concerning technology and instrumental reason, and their repressive role with respect to nature. By rationalizing nature within the subject, the subject becomes unable to recognize the invisible ways through which instrumental reason “furnishes” life in late-capitalist society. Understanding ourselves as reflective parts of nature means understanding that nature will always be within us, and that part of the psyche will refuse to submit to the self-deceptive logic of instrumental rationality. In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse suggests positive ways to ground and actualize both moral and scientific rationality. Despite the differences in their views, the two critical theorists share the insight of the aesthetic mode of rationality being a foundational basis for a critical and hence liberating form of reason. Aesthetic rationality is seen to contain the dimensions of imagination, creativity and compassion that enable transcending obvious, “given” reality, thus making possible a critical stand towards the existing social order.

The main obstacle to actualizing critical rationality for both Marcuse and Adorno is that false consciousness inhibits the subject from identifying its genuine needs. Contemporary society imposes false, even irrational needs, such as the need for overwhelming production and consumption, or the necessity to do “alienating” work instead of that which is inherently rewarding and meaningful. Here the Marxist legacy is clearly visible. Most importantly, it heeds the conceptualization of ideology that reproduces exploitative social structures. Marx’s theory of society points to an account of “false consciousness” which sheds a light on the alleged willingness of the subject to accept the exploitative and unsatisfactory conditions of modern society. (Ingram, 1990). However, the critical theorists did not identify themselves with the orthodox form of Marxism, which refers to “the critique of capitalist society as a system with an economic base and with a superstructure and with a superstructure and ideology which were depended on that base” (Wiggershaus, 1987). Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, analysed by critical theorists as having the same epistemic structure, counterbalanced critical theory with its understanding of the social and natural dynamics of consciousness (Ingram, 1990; Geuss, 1981). Marcuse’s reading of Marx was motivated by his attempt to outline his vision of revolutionary subjectivity. For Marcuse, the Marxist conception of alienation was useful in criticizing the repressive and reified structure of late-capitalist society. (Farr, 2014). Contrary to Adorno who was never concerned with the role of labour, Marcuse found it central to his philosophy. In Adorno’s work, it was the theory of reification that played an important role. He based it on Marx’s theory of value, particularly the distinction between use value and exchange value (Rose, 1978). Basically, this implies the idea of how qualitatively different objects are made alike through the application of the exchange value. As we will shortly see in this section, “identity thinking”, according to Adorno, is a pervasive symptom of reification in late-capitalist society.
In the current era of global capitalism, educational institutions are increasingly organized around the need to produce skills that enable the subject to cope with the demands of late-capitalist mass societies.6 In a rather recent analysis of education, Nussbaum also made the observation that education has become progressively market-driven, and in this way its role has shifted from producing competent democratic citizens and seeking ways to improve conditions through transformative educational practices, to serving the needs of the economic status quo (Nussbaum, 2010). According to Marcuse, identifying between “true” and “false” needs is ultimately the task of the individual; however, this is threatened by the lack of freedom in a repressive society. This “failure of praxis” (shown in unhealthy consumption habits, eco-catastrophes caused by human activity, etc.) follows the failure to use or even identify the potential of praxis (Marcuse, 1968; Ingram, 1990). Still, Marcuse sees that late-capitalist society also has critically conscious subjects whose needs cannot be satisfied by increasing materiality. The crucial element for distinguishing false from genuine needs is the motive that it is largely instinctual.

That is to say, Marcuse grounds rationality firmly in biology. According to him, historical circumstances transform instinctual energies into destructive forces (Marcuse, 1974). However, he sees rationality as an immanent source of the “pacification of existence”, which refers to a nature relationship of a reflective subject that is conscious of its own domination. The pacification of existence would mean meeting the demands of a more sustainable way of life; for example, controlling economic and population growth. (Ingram, 1990). Hence in a non-repressive society, instinctual energies would assume the form of sensitizing agencies which would foster the balanced development of the individual.

For Adorno, the integration of an exterior authority into one’s psyche is closely intertwined with our current way of thinking and use of concepts – what he calls “identity thinking”. Basically, identity thinking in Adorno refers to the manner in which we use concepts to pick out the particulars they denote. (Rose, 1978). The reason why Adorno grants the a decisive role to the way in which concepts, and thinking with them, are used, is that according to him, concepts are the instruments through which the subject first distinguishes itself from the rest of nature, and therefore conceptual thinking is the defining element of our rationality. In her article ‘From the Actual to Possible: Non-identity thinking’, Deborah Cook phrases this in the following way: “if speech serves as a means to the end of controlling nature, the attempt to dominate nature conceptually for the purpose of self-preservation eventually turned against both outer nature and our own inner, somatic nature”. Adorno insists that concepts have their origin in a human somatic, bodily experience. Moreover, identity thinking fails to realize this. The resulting antagonism between the subject and the object is not only at the heart of all civilizing rationality, it has also become the basis of “a proliferating myth of irrationality” (Cook, 2005). The origin of identity thinking is evident in the fear of unknown, hence in human self-preservation through the will to dominate. This is the basic thesis of Adorno and Horkheimer’s co-written book Dialectic of Enlightenment. Nature – which is experienced as unfamiliar and hostile – is reduced back to something already known. Moreover, the subject only identifies the parts of the object which it can exploit, leaving the rest unidentified. Gradually this identifying function became a characteristic feature of our thinking.

What has been said so far about Adorno’s conception of identity thinking is that its origin is not in any specific historical character, but that it results from human
development. This indicates that identity thinking is present in any society. However, when the subject is exposed to the salient dynamics of capitalist society, identity thinking is established as the overriding mode of thought. (See also Huhtala & Giacchetti, 2015; Rose, 1978). The subject identifies the object of its thought, but in doing so errs by assuming that the identification is complete. Ultimately, according to Adorno, this identification error extends to the way in which the subject perceives itself as well as others. As stated before, nature, including that within the subject, the unconscious, is experienced as something alien and frightening. Fear of the unknown is falsely “tamed” by projecting it outside to the other. “False projection makes the environment like itself. [t]he outside is a model which the inner world must try to conform to: the alien must become familiar; but false projection confuses the inner and outer world and defines the most intimate experiences as hostile. Impulses which the subject will not admit as his own […] are attributed to the object – the prospective victim” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1979). Here again, Adorno stresses the materiality of cognition, and at the same time underlines the social character of physical impulses.

Clearly, if we take Adorno’s point seriously, this logic of identifying is highly damaging to the way we perceive our environment, and hence our overall way of experiencing the world. Identity thinking as the superseding mode of thought results in the exchange value also being applied to objects originally beyond the purview of market capitalism. The most pathological consequence is that social relations take the form of capitalist exchange relations. Adorno sets forth the model of negative dialectics as a corrective for rationality. Negative dialectics hints at establishing a different kind of relation between the object and the subject, where the “subject has always to consider its being part of nature”s non-identity and at the same time the object’s non-identity has always to be considered as mediated by human understanding through reason”. According to Adorno, “non-identity” would be the actual aim of identification. This implies that thought should actually “identify” not to a lesser but to greater extent, and in other ways than identity thinking. According to Adorno, the concept of non-identity cannot be fully captured because it represents a level of nature that goes beyond our conceptual understanding. Paradoxically, it is only through concepts that non-identity can be understood. Adorno emphasizes that this tension between the characteristics of nature considered outside the scope of human interpretation and our perception of nature within the scope of conceptual understanding should be maintained. Non-identity points to the realization that the subject is not identical to one’s immediate existence as a creature of nature. Nor is the subject a-historically identical or transcendental, but is instead exposed to historical forms and changes. Accordingly, autonomous subjectivity would require experiencing nonconformity and non-identity with late-capitalist society. (Adorno, 1973; Huhtala & Giacchetti, 2015).

**Conclusion**

One of the main insights of critical theory was its emphasis on analysing the relationships between the structure of society and the structure of personalities socialized into society. The contradiction between the needs of society and the needs of the subject can lead to the use of psychological defence mechanisms, such as self-deception and rationalization. For Adorno and Marcuse, psychoanalytic theory allows for an understanding of the subject that is also empirical, not merely philosophical.
Whereas mere philosophizing involves the danger of self-deception and rationalization, psychoanalysis aims to expose the psychological roots of rationalization. Adorno emphasizes the inseparability of nature and the subject, by stressing not only that reason is a product of nature but also that human needs are partly products of the surrounding society: society regulates and influences the type of needs that we have, or, as importantly, those we find ourselves having (see also Holma & Huhtala, 2014). Put simply, society molds the nature within us.

Marcuse, in accordance with Adorno, emphasizes the role of aesthetics and the importance of understanding that historical conditions transform instinctual energies. Moreover, aesthetic experience does not follow the logic of instrumental rationality; nor does the experience become exhausted in the act of identification. When comparing Adorno and Marcuse, it seems fair to say that Adorno yielded to negativity, whereas Marcuse, in his examination of the utopian outlines of an emancipated society, did not succumb to such an extent. Marcuse saw that when the subject is given an opportunity to fulfill its (natural) dimensions holistically, sensuous rationality is able to emerge. Moreover, this liberation, springing within the subject, would dialectically flow out to surrounding society. Marcuse’s views do not align with Adorno’s theory of rationality, but a common denominator is that rationality contains an element of hope and emancipation, mainly in the dimension of the unconscious. From the perspective of philosophy of education, Marcuse’s optimistic conception of rationality seems appealing. After all, education has mostly to do with building the future and therefore features the aspect of hope.

Given that there are justified grounds for seeing a non-repressive environment as a valuable goal and that Marcuse promptly addresses concerns shared with the philosophy of education, the question still arises of whether Marcuse gives away his vision of human nature a bit too easily, and in this way is unable to avoid the very problematic nature of the issues he sets out to overcome. Hence, by postulating a fixed vision of human nature and its needs, does he not risk reiterating the existing conditions – rather than transcending them? According to Adorno, only through negation, that is, by refraining to postulate straightforward alternatives and thus examining the status quo attentively by not losing sight of historical conditions, it is possible to create a space for starting something qualitatively new. Granted that psychoanalytic theory sheds light on the structure and dynamics of the psyche underlining the role of self-knowledge through self-reflection in order to emancipate the subject from internalized domination, it rejects the idea of possessing intact knowledge of oneself. Part of our psyche always remains beyond our grasp and thus unfamiliar to us. In an Adornian light, the aim of creating critical consciousness should not be to resolve and demolish the difficult feelings of unfamiliarity, but rather to advance the ways of cancelling false projections – to reject the urge to be at home everywhere. Hence, education should foster the subject’s ability to face non-identity inside oneself as well as in the surrounding society. Moreover, education should provide individuals with the ability to recognize the subtle and invisible ways through which the calculating mode of rationality operates in late-capitalist society. Regarding education, Adorno’s conception of non-identity could be developed in the direction of promoting ways of experiencing nonconformity with such a society. The precarious and unforeseeable nature of education should be interpreted as its strength instead of its weakness. As Adorno himself states: “Philosophy must dissolve the semblance of the obvious as well as the semblance of the obscure” (Adorno, 2013).
Max Horkheimer, one of the leading figures of the Frankfurt School, was first to outline the distinction between traditional and critical theory in his 1937 essay “Traditional and Critical Theory”, which became the programmatic basis of the Institute of Social Research. Critical theory formulated by the first generation of the Frankfurt School differentiates itself from other theories, such as those of natural sciences and of hermeneutics, by conjoining social science and philosophy. Moreover, critical theory strives to pay attention to the process of social existence by systematically associating elements of psychoanalysis with a critique of rationality (See Wiggershaus, 1994). For further reading see for example Raymond Geuss, The Idea of Critical Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and Martin Jay The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).


The departure point for Marcuse’s insights is that the crisis of Western civilization is to be traced back to historical conditions rather than biological necessities (Marcuse, 1974; See also Bowring, 2012).

Marcuse makes a distinction between “false” and “true” needs. To define whether a need is false or true, it must be tested in terms of “truth” and “falsehood”. Marcuse acknowledges the ambiguity and historicity of these terms; accordingly the assessment must involve the standard of priority, which heeds the “optimal development” of the subject in terms of the material and intellectual resources available. The pervasiveness of toil and poverty act as universally valid standards for assessing the character of the need at hand (Marcuse, 1968).

It should be noted that Freud did not highlight the exclusive role of the pleasure principle as such. Rather, he (too) saw that the pleasure principle attached to the reality principle enables subjects to experience more rewarding pleasure than what merely answering urges at the level of the pleasure principle would offer. Accordingly, the acknowledgement of the waiting gratification, which is gained through a passing – not lasting – pleasure, provides more profound fulfillment than unmediated, primitive gratification. Hence, the pleasure principle plays its respective role for the Ego as well, not only for the Id (Bowring, 2012).

In a fairly recent academic discussion, Christiane Thompson addressed the educational relevance of Adorno’s philosophy in late-capitalist conditions (2006).

Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg) famously stated the task of philosophy to be “the urge to be at home everywhere (1997)”. 

NOTES
REFERENCES


