

Moral Knowledge, Moral Sensitivity and Moral Education

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The aims of this paper are twofold: firstly, to demonstrate the possibility of knowledge in the moral domain, and secondly to specify the ‘objects’ of such knowledge. Moral non-cognitivism is seriously flawed in its account of truth in relation to moral judgments, in its rejection of the possibility of moral facts as well as in its reliance on a number of questionable distinctions such as that between fact and value and descriptive and evaluative discourse. It operates with an excessively narrow, and all too frequently absolutist conception of reality, the result of which is a misplaced scepticism.

The nature of moral facts is explicated by reference to moral properties and moral requirements. Such facts, though non-inferential, may be said to be directly observable by those in possession of a distinct sensibility and conceptual vocabulary upon which the recognition and significance of morally salient features depends.



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