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European citizenship and the inheritance of Europe¹

Introduction

In European policy and in that of its member states, learning is understood in relation to citizenship in a knowledge economy, and this forms part of an increasingly global discourse. Europe's policies are directed as much towards its construction in relation to its competitors, allies and potential investors as to its internal population. But part of this construction is formed of a discourse of Europeanness, of what makes Europe distinct in relation to these others, and why it represents a way of life its citizens should wish to strive for and protect. I am concerned here with the narrative of Europe with which its citizens are asked to identify, that is, with the use of history or heritage in the construction of European citizenship today and, further, with how the idea of narrative and voice operates within this². 'Citizenship' is understood here as a form of subjectivity, to which learning is central.³ The focus here is on the relationship to history constituted by this form of subjectivity and further, how conceptions of narrative and voice operate within this.

The discourse of narrative and voice operative in the current mode of governance in Europe constructs particular forms of democratic participatory citizenship and makes visible a conception of Europe through the promotion of its heritage; for example, the European Capital of Culture competition and the European Heritage Label.⁴ This process, of the cultural construction of Europe, has been described as the Europeanisation of Europe, that is, the inscription of a cultural identity on the geographical entity.

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² 'Citizenship' in this analysis does not refer to the traditional liberal conception of the relationship between the individual and the state as such but to a particular construction of citizenship operative in European policy discourse today.

³ To speak of the construction of subjectivity – or subjectivation, following Foucault (1982) - is not to imply a unilinear power relationship imposing a mode of thought and denying agency. Foucault's understanding of power is not an account of modes of repression but of relations between individuals constituted in a particular way in relation to their freedom (Foucault, 1978). Freedom is, for Foucault, essential to the possibility of power relations. Subjectivation refers then to our relation to ourselves as well as to others.

⁴ Through the European Capital of Culture competition, in which cities are regenerated and redeveloped in order to highlight their heritage in relation to Europe, a narrative is constructed in which the city in question becomes a 'European city', capitalising its European cultural assets. Europe has also developed the European Heritage Label, intended 'to increase EU citizens' feeling of belonging to a shared European identity and a common cultural space'⁴. Sites are awarded the label for their 'role in the construction and consolidation of Europe'⁴. Applications must describe the site, monument or 'cultural property' in contention as 'an object that is emblematic of European history'⁴, in terms of their significance for European history, thereby inscribing places within a narrative of Europe.

Discourses of narrative and of voice also operate across everyday educational and social practices in relation to forms of democratic participation and accountability. For example, this is facilitated by the use of technologies that offer the possibility of direct consultation with voters. The EU portal ‘Your Voice in Europe’ is one example. European policies, projects, and issues are presented through documents and videos on which users can comment, enabling their voice to be heard. Europe is made visible to the public, and a European public is created and evidenced⁵. Having an opinion and the possibility of giving voice to it is constitutive of a particular form of participation, engagement and accountability today. The point is not whether our opinion is right or wrong: the point is that we have one, that we know where we stand, and that we are able to articulate this.

The idea of having and giving voice as central to effective citizenship is evident also across educational research, policy and practice. Voice has become both a focus of study and a methodology in educational research, with an increasing use of life history, autoethnography, and storying found. Student voice has also become a focus of policy and practice. The establishment of school councils in order to enable student participation in decision-making is one example. In the education of teachers, the blog and learning journal are increasingly used in order to encourage reflective practice, the articulation of a particular form of accountability required of individuals today. This is not only the case for professionals, for the lifelong learner the ability to self-evaluate one’s progress and determine a course of action, with measurable objectives for self-improvement, is an organising principle for life.

To begin I provide an overview of recent policy usage of culture and heritage in the construction of European citizenship, before introducing Foucault’s approach to the study of history, in order to draw attention to the form of critique this enables. In his later work, Foucault’s historical analyses were focussed on Ancient Greek ethics and the care of the self, informed by his concern with ethics and subjectivity. In line with the concern here with the role of history in the construction of European citizenship I then turn to a point in European history, which has a defining role but which problematises any smooth linear ordering, and provide a reading of Martin Heidegger’s Rectoral Address to the University of Freiburg in 1933. The shift to this text is problematic in light of the opening concern with the liberal democratic context that is the central focus here. The text is invoked in order to provide a form of critique of the language of policy and the education and citizenship that it produces. Policy language is often analysed in the academic and in the public sphere in terms of its rhetoric or satirised for its overblown but apparently meaningless jargon. Such analyses both seek to point to a truer version of reality, and to invoke our desire for change and thus our political engagement. It is possible, however, that the result is cynicism and, therefore, the further depoliticisation of citizens. The language of policy is of concern here for what it does to us and what we do

⁵ Such technologies for participation are widespread, used not only by governments but also by media organisations, for example the BBC’s ‘Have Your Say’ and The Guardian’s ‘Comment is Free’ sites. The possibility of and the demand for feedback not only relates to matters of politics and current affairs, however; we are also, across the private and public sectors, continually asked to leave feedback on goods and services.

when we understand ourselves and act in its terms. Heidegger's text strongly invokes what is at stake in the relationship between education and citizenship. It is also redolent of the impossibility, or undesirability, of not questioning the culture of which we are part and are asked to inherit.

The creation of European citizenship

European citizenship was created as a formal legal category by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Following this, EU policy makers sought to create a European identity, a European public, to 'displace the cultural hegemony of nationalism' (Shore, 2000, p.21). Culture was central to the promotion of this idea of Europeanness. The narrative of Europe according to which its history, our shared heritage, is promoted, centres on the founding principles of the European Union, or the European Coal and Steel Community as it was first established in 1951. This post-war organisation was considered as the birth of a United Europe committed to the promotion of peace. Nationalism, insecurity and instability were seen as the risks against which European unity and solidarity was the only solution (Shore, 2000, p.16). In his proposal for the European Coal and Steel Community, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman stated:

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war. (Schuman, 1950)⁶

The 1951 Treaty that formalised Schuman's proposals created an economic community between continental Western European countries. In addition to economic stability and the improvement of living and working conditions, the agreement was also promoted as a means to overcome the possibility of war between European states and as a first step towards further integration.⁷

During the 1980s, information and culture became both the means and the content for the promotion of a European identity (Shore, 2000, p.45). There was no formal legal jurisdiction for cultural policy at this time and so measures were justified along economic grounds. Shore cites Jacques Delors: 'The culture industry will tomorrow be one of the biggest industries, a creator of wealth and jobs... We have to build a powerful European culture industry that will enable us to be in control of both the medium and its content, maintaining our standards of civilization, and encouraging the creative people amongst us' (Delors cited in Shore, 2000, p.46)

⁶ http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm

⁷ The emphasis remained on economic integration, however, as it was assumed that a European consciousness would organically develop as a result of this. In the early 1970s, however, more explicit references were made to culture as a means of fostering a European identity.

The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty formalized the cultural and educational jurisdiction of the European Community and a raft of measures were proposed to enhance European consciousness among its citizens, to address the lack of a 'sufficient consciousness of their European heritage and identity' (Shore, 2000, p.49). Various 'symbolic measures' were adopted to enhance the Community's profile, such as a new EC emblem and flag. As the Council of Europe describe the circle of twelve yellow stars set against an azure background: 'Against the background of blue sky, the stars form a circle, symbolising union. The number of stars is fixed, twelve being the symbol of perfection and completeness and bringing to mind the apostles, the sons of Jacob, the labours of Hercules, the months in the year, etc...'.⁸

The aspects of European heritage captured here, as well as, for example, the selection of Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy' as the European anthem, and the designation of arts, cultural and sporting competitions and awards, indicate the way in which the European Community sought to engender a European consciousness among its peoples. Shore asks not how such proposals were adopted but 'what kind of Europe is being imagined and constructed through these symbols?' (Shore, 2000, p.50).

First, far from embodying the thinking of a new age in human history, they seem to indicate an altogether more conservative current of nineteenth-century evolutionist thought... This invariably portrays the European Parliament and Commission as heroic agents of change on the side of history, leading Europe forward in search of its '*vocation fédérale*'. Second, despite claims made by supporters that the EU is forging a unique political entity that 'transcends' the nation-state and beckons the dawn of a new era of Europeanism, the new Europe is being constructed on much the same symbolic terrain as the old national-states of the last two centuries. Flags, anthems, passports, trophies, medals and maps are all icons for evoking the presence of the emergent state, only instead of national sovereignty it is the EU institutions and ideals that are emphasized and endorsed. (Shore, 2000, p.50)

Shore argues then that Europe does not offer a new mode of governance as such, just a larger scale, more powerful, version of what its member states have represented for the previous two centuries. The unification of Europe is presented as a step towards achieving its potential. The identification of shared core values, and emblems that encapsulate and define them, suggests an idea of an essential Europe which, in the interests of the protection of our way of life, we should wish to strive for.

Since these early attempts to create a European identity, however, the way in which we are asked to understand ourselves as European citizens, and the discourses and practices through which this is effected, have shifted. The Europe/nation-state distinction is not taken as the basis for the analysis here. Instead a particular relation to oneself and others, to home, work and education is identified, which these categories do not capture. As

⁸ http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/emblems/emblem.asp

Barry *et al.* (1996) have argued, the emphasis of governance has shifted from state control of welfare to an emphasis on individual responsibility. In this configuration, the discussion of citizenship is concerned with the reform of individuals at the level of skills and competencies (p.1). They contend that while political reason has shifted in this way the analysis of politics and the political lags behind, as an orthodoxy based on traditional oppositions (e.g. state/civil society) persists (*ibid.*).

The approach taken here then, drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, is focussed on the constitution of the individual as a 'citizen'. The particular form of subjectivity of which the construction of the European citizen is part entails a particular relation to or orientation to a set of values or way of life - democracy, social justice, inclusion - but to which the principles of mobility, adaptability, and accountability inscribe a particular relationship to oneself in the context and creation of the knowledge economy. The European citizen then does not shift allegiance from the nation-state to the European parliament, for participation at the level of the nation-state is constitutive of the mode of citizenship required by Europe. What is important is the prevention of a parochial, narrowly nationalistic, immobile understanding of one's citizenship. Government operates through the regulation of the choices of individual citizens, subjects of choices and aspirations to self-actualization and self-fulfilment, governed through their freedom (Barry *et al.*, 1996, p.41). Freedom is a resource for government rather than a hindrance to it (p.8).

Citizenship and narrative

Education plays a central role in the construction of European citizenship, evident in the centrality of education – or knowledge, skills and lifelong learning – to the knowledge economy. Lifelong learning and the idea of the entrepreneurial self are organising concepts for policy-making today across all aspects of our lives. While the European citizen then is future-oriented, seeking improvement, progress and opportunity, the construction of European citizenship also entails a particular relationship to history. As shown, a European heritage has been mobilised as part of this construction, a shared heritage around which a European public could galvanise. A particular relationship to history forms part of the relationship one has to oneself, a mode of subjectivation in which the narrative of Europe informs one's own narrative, where we place ourselves in the world, in relation to others, and how we imagine the trajectory on which we aspire our lives to continue.

Culture continues to play a central role in the promotion of the idea of Europe, then, not only to its citizens but to its others, competitors, allies and enemies. In 2007 the European Commission proposed an Agenda for Culture, the Communication on which begins:

Culture lies at the heart of human development and civilisation. Culture is what makes people hope and dream, by stimulating our senses and offering new ways of looking at reality. It is what brings people together, by stirring dialogue and arousing passions, in a way that unites rather than

divides. Culture should be regarded as a set of distinctive spiritual and material traits that characterize a society and social group. It embraces literature and arts as well as ways of life, value systems, traditions and beliefs.

As Dario Fo rightly pointed out, *'even before Europe was united in an economic level or was conceived at the level of economic interests and trade, it was culture that united all the countries of Europe. The arts, literature, music are the connecting link of Europe'*. Indeed, Europeans share a common cultural heritage, which is the result of centuries of creativity, migratory flows and exchanges. They also enjoy and value a rich cultural and linguistic diversity, which is inspiring and has inspired many countries across the world. (CEC, 2007, p.2)

The cultural agenda is depicted as continuing the long tradition of European culture but also as able to answer to current issues: 'Cultural activities also help promoting an inclusive society and contribute to preventing and reducing poverty and social exclusion' (p.3). This in turn enables it to fulfill its potential in providing economic growth:

Europe's cultural richness based on its diversity is also, and increasingly so, an important asset in an immaterial and knowledge-based world. The European cultural sector is already a very dynamic trigger of economic activities and jobs...creative entrepreneurs and a vibrant cultural industry are a unique source of innovation for the future. This potential must be recognised even more and fully tapped. (CEC, 2007, p.3).

The document reinforces Europe's commitment to its motto 'Unity in Diversity', illustrated in the passage: *'The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common heritage to the fore'* (p.4).⁹

'Dialogue' and 'heritage' recur throughout the Agenda for Culture document. I suggest that these terms are interconnected in a way that is important for understanding the construction of European citizenship today. They form part of a dominant discourse concerned with participation, inclusion, visibility, and accountability. References to and practices of dialogue, giving voice, and having your say are central to the way in which these central policy concerns are expressed and take effect. Heritage, as the Agenda for Culture document shows, refers to a selected history promoted, through the cultural industries and lifelong learning, to reaffirm a particular sense of historically-rooted but

⁹ The tension, inferred by Shore and often identified, between the European and the national levels, does not adequately reflect the way in which culture and history operate in the construction of the European citizen however. Regional and national culture and diversity are identified in the Agenda for Culture as resources to be built on and developed. The way in which this is done (e.g. through the establishment of cultural events, the provision of funding for the continuation of valuable cultural activity) is inclusive in the sense of recognising and making visible and accountable these cultural activities and spaces, and thereby Europeanising them.

future-oriented Europeanness. In both cases - dialogue and heritage - the idea of narrative is present.

Voice, narrative and heritage form part of the discourses and practices operative in the construction of European citizenship as a form of subjectivity. The ways in which we are asked to relate to history, as well as the particular history we are asked to identify with, are therefore important aspects of understanding who we are today. Foucault's genealogical approach to reading history was influenced by Nietzsche, as explained in his essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', an outline not only of the critique of the traditional study of history but also of the relationship of this critique and the genealogical approach to Foucault's concern with how we as humans are made subjects. Nietzsche's critique of history in the traditional sense was directed in part at the suprahistorical – that which aimed 'to compose the finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed in upon itself' (p.86). Foucault advocated instead what he termed 'effective history':

Effective history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity. This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting. (p.88)

The 'effective history' that Foucault identifies in Nietzsche's work has been defined by Mitchell Dean thus: 'An effective history both refuses to use history to assure us of our own identity and the necessity of the present, and also problematises the imposition of suprahistorical or global theory' (Dean, 1994, p.18). In the effective histories Foucault realizes, the readiness for cutting achieves a luminosity that enables us to see where we are in ways that would otherwise be obscured.

The critique of the traditional understanding of history, then, has implications both for the understanding of the human subject and for the understanding of the history or narrative in relation to which the individual is asked to situate herself. This effects a problematising of the unquestioning inheritance of bodies of knowledge as given entities by acknowledging their questionability, the possibility of cutting, perhaps to reveal their internal construction and so to dismantle it. This does not refer however to taking a critical approach to the rendering of history and to providing a truer version. These two aspects – the understanding of the human subject and the inheritance of a history or narrative – are crucially interrelated. European citizenship is considered here to be a particular form of subjection and a mode of subjectivation, central to which is an understanding of a European rootedness or essence on which one's values are centred; the individual is asked to relate to this in orienting herself within her own narrative, now understood according to particular forms of participation and accountability. If the idea of voice as a measure of our willingness and ability to participate as citizens is to be taken seriously, rather than written off as part of European Commission rhetoric, then perhaps attention should be given to the relationship we inescapably have to history – to what we

inherit from our families, our cultures, in our everyday lives, the negotiation of contingency that is our experience as well as the questions raised when we are confronted with our (individual/familial/national/cultural/religious) history. The idea of narrative as a linear, teleological, perfectible trajectory is disturbed by this reality.

Turning now to Heidegger's 1933 Rectoral Address to the University of Freiburg, Germany is a difficult move. This is, in part, the point, but it is not intended as a disturbance for its own sake. It is in the many tensions that this text brings to light – for example between the current context and the emergence of the fascist regime, between Heidegger as a philosopher of the European canon and his notorious role in the regimes – that history exists. Schuman's proposal for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community states Europe's desire for rebirth, its need to come to terms with itself following the events of WWII and the atrocities of Nazi Germany. This coming-to-terms-with is an ongoing process, not of healing and understanding, but of the facing of trauma anew by each generation as they learn of the extents of the possibility of human action and suffering. I will make reference to the historical context in what follows, however, I will read the *Rektoratsrede* as a philosophical text on the relationship between education and citizenship, focusing on who the German citizen is and what relationship he is called to have to himself and to education.

Heidegger's *Rektoratsrede*¹⁰

Heidegger's Rectoral Address entitled 'The Self-Assertion of the German University' is concerned not only with the *essence* of the university but also with the will to that essence. Heidegger refers first to his own leadership as rector as the spiritual leadership of the institution. Leaders (a reference not only to himself but to the country's leaders) must themselves be led by 'the relentlessness of that spiritual mission that forces the destiny of the German people into the shape of its history' (p.5). This being led, or following, is only truly awakened 'through a true and common rootedness in the essence of the German university' (p.5). Heidegger's concern with rootedness and essence is reinforced by his questioning whether the relation of scholars to the university and to Germany is true and genuine: 'Does this essence have the genuine strength to shape our existence?' (p.5).

Heidegger emphasises the role of the scholar, the will of the individual, suggesting that the essence of the university is generally assumed to be its 'self-administration' but, he asks, 'have we really fully considered what this claim to self-administration demands of us?': 'Self-administration means that we set ourselves our own task and determine the way and manner of its realization ourselves' (p.5). This seems to be a common understanding of what self-administration might refer to, i.e. institutional autonomy and academic freedom. Heidegger then says, however, that 'in doing so we ourselves will be what we ought to be' (p.5). The self-administration of the university, then, exists in the self-administration of the individual in relation to a particular truth. Being 'what we ought to be' may refer to a particular set of ideal characteristics, but it also suggests being

¹⁰ For reasons of space and the focus of this paper the reading of the *Rektoratsrede* focuses on the first half of Heidegger's speech.

self-administrating. In the latter case then the ought is not prescriptive as such but refers to the scholar, or citizen, as being able to determine their own thought and action and that it is theirs to determine. There is a sense of an ethical responsibility to the self and others implied in this.

The relationship between ‘ought’ and ethical responsibility has a particular meaning. Ought is not to be seen in the sense of moral philosophy but makes an ethical ontological claim that failing to respond to the call of obligation and self-realisation is a failure to live fully at all. The ethical responsibility referred to then is closer to a Foucauldian or Levinasian usage, referring to a condition of our human existence, not a moral choice that one can make. Self-determination does not refer to a liberal conception of freedom and autonomy but as a form of perfectionism, a disciplined responsiveness to the call of one’s culture.

To be who we ought to be, we, ‘the body of teachers and students of the highest school of the German people’, should know who we are, and this is only possible with ‘the most constant and unsparing *self examination*’ (p.5).

Neither awareness of the present state of the university nor acquaintance with its previous history are enough to guarantee sufficient knowledge of its essence – unless we first, with clarity and severity, delimit the essence for the future, and in such self-limitation, will it, and in such willing, assert ourselves. (p.5)

Finding the essence of the university then involves a more radical movement in thought than a critical assessment of its current state and its historical development. The history in which the essence of the German people and therefore the German university is grounded far precedes the establishment of the modern institution of the university: ‘The will to the essence of the German university is the will to science as will to the historical spiritual mission of the German people as a people that knows itself in its state [*Staat*]’ (p.5). Throughout the RA, science refers not to the modern academic distinction but to the traditions of Western knowledge, and thereby encompasses philosophy: ‘All science is philosophy, whether it knows it or wills it – or not. All science remains bound to that of the beginning of philosophy’ (p.6). Heidegger asks under what conditions science, in this sense, can and should exist in the future, and he relates the question to what is at stake in seeking the essence of science and of the university:

Together, science and German destiny must come to power in the will to essence. And they will do so and *only* will do so, if we – teachers and students – *on the one hand*, expose science to its innermost necessity and, *on the other hand*, are able to stand our ground while German destiny is in its most extreme distress. (p.5-6)¹¹

¹¹ The distress of German destiny referred to here again highlights the tension in reading Heidegger’s text. The distress may be that to which the Nazi party responded and gave it its initial appeal to the German public, the dire economic situation in the country at that time. It may also be that crisis which Heidegger foresees in the rhetoric of the party; German civilization is at stake.

The standing our ground refers again to the self-determination of the individual as part of the culture, not being swayed by more immediate and powerful calls. The innermost necessity of science refers here to its relationship to the nation: 'science educates and disciplines the leaders and guardians of the destiny of the German people' (p.5). The future of the German nation - its scientists, doctors, lawyers, philosophers, and so on - depends on attending to the essence of science in this broad sense, not its 'all too contemporary' (p.6) current operationalised form. The existence and pursuit of science is part of what makes the good society, as expressed in Plato's *Republic*. In the face of the stultification of the university then both the nation and the university must be subject to question. If there should be science – if this is something the German scholar sees fit to protect – then 'under what condition can it truly exist?' (p.6):

Only if we place ourselves under the power of the beginning of our spiritual-historical existence. This beginning is the departure, the setting out, of Greek philosophy. Here, for the first time, Western man rises up, from a base in a popular culture [*Volkstum*] and by means of his language, against the totality of what is and questions and comprehends it as the being that it is. (p.6)

A consideration of the history of the university or of science as we currently understand them is not sufficient. For Heidegger, German destiny lies in this history, its beginnings in Greek thought and civilization. Understanding the will to essence in this way requires consideration of what is meant by knowledge, theory and practice and their relationship to the nation. Heidegger wants to regain certain 'distinguishing properties of the original Greek essence of science for our existence' (p.6). One is expressed by Prometheus: 'Knowing, however, is far weaker than necessity' (p.6). For Heidegger this means 'that all knowing about things has always already been surrendered to the predominance of destiny and fails before it' (p.6). Destiny for Heidegger is the highest point and this was Greek existence. Knowledge never reaches this standard, it is always subject to the pressure of it and of what has gone before.

Precisely because of this, knowing must unfold its highest defiance. Only then will the entire power of the concealedness [*Verborgenheit*] of what is rise up and knowing will really fail. In this way, what is opens itself up in its unfathomable inalterability and lends knowing its truth. (p.6)

There is no higher or truer knowledge than that of the truth of the world itself. When what *is* is revealed to us by our seeking to really know it, by the will to science, then the extent of the failure of what we know is also revealed and knowledge rethought on the basis of the truth of what is. The modern understanding of theory, which places it at a meta-level to the reality it aims to describe, falls short, in Heidegger's account, of the Greek meaning, which he translates as 'pure contemplation' (p.6). This is not, he corrects, meant as theory 'pursued for its own sake, but only in the passion to remain close to and under the pressure of what is' (p.6). For the Greeks, this was the 'highest mode of "human "being-at-work"' (p.6): 'Theory was to be understood as the highest

realization of genuine practice. For the Greeks, science was not a “cultural asset” but the innermost determining centre of all popular [*volklich*] and national [*staat/Wit*] existence’ (p.6).

Here Heidegger invokes his critique of the modern institutionalized understanding of science, so removed from its Greek origins, as constitutive of a way of life in an intensive, contemplative sense, rather than in the instrumentalised, enframed experience of science, and of the world through science and technology, of the modern period. Heidegger acknowledges that history has of course distanced science from these origins but ‘this does not mean that the beginning has been overcome, let alone that it has been negated...The beginning still is...The beginning has invaded our future. There it stands as the distant command to catch up with its greatness’ (p.6):

Only if we resolutely submit to this distant command to regain the greatness of this beginning, only then will science become the innermost necessity of our existence. Otherwise it will remain an accident into which we fall or the dispassionate contentment of a safe occupation, serving to further a mere progress of information.

But if we submit to the distant command of the beginning, science must become the fundamental happening of our spiritual and popular [*volklich*] existence. (p.6)

The ‘distant command of the beginning’ reaffirms the sense of a perfectionism constituted by Ancient Greek culture from which, for Heidegger, German culture derives. German culture then will only be maintained in its greatness by responding to the command, the call, of this origin. Science and the national culture are then inextricably linked in this orientation to one’s existence. This orientation, the ethic to which Heidegger is referring, is formed of questioning, which is not ‘a preliminary step that is surmounted on the way to the answer and thus to knowing; rather, questioning itself becomes the highest form of knowing’ (p.7). This is not the highest form of knowledge, but of knowing, in the sense of a questioning relationship to one’s self, others and the world. This will to essence is not an unrestricted exploration for its own sake but is disciplined by the command of one’s culture, to submit one’s self to a law. This for Heidegger is the highest freedom.

The much-lauded “academic freedom” will be expelled from the German university; for this freedom was not genuine for it was only negative. It primarily meant lack of concern, arbitrariness of intentions and inclinations, lack of restraint in what was done and left undone. (p.8)

Heidegger makes direct reference in relation to the will to essence and academic freedom to the Student Law, the *neue Studentenrecht*, which ‘sought to organize students according to the *Fuhrerprinzip* in an effort to integrate the universities into the National Socialist State’ (p.8, Translator’s note). One should respond to the law of one’s essence. The will to essence of the German student requires one first to define that essence. While acknowledging the immediate call imposed by the Student Law, Heidegger is concerned

with what is at stake for Germany if how one responds to its call is not grounded in a self-determined will to essence.

Conclusion

There is, of course, a wealth of historical and philosophical literature on this speech and on Heidegger in relation to it. My concern here, however, was not to seek the truth or a better truth about this fateful event, or to suggest that this and other events should be added to the narrative of Europe promoted through educational and cultural policy. 1933, the year of Heidegger's address, marked the inception of a period that is emblematic of European history. As European citizens we are asked to understand ourselves in relation to that history, and to make explicit our own individual narratives in the formation of our globalised, hybrid identities. In both cases, the idea of a true essential self, or Europe, that is our basis and our potential, is present.

The purpose here is to provide a critique in the sense of drawing attention to the way in which discourses and practices operate today in the production of our citizenship. I hope to have shown how the current individualised rendering of citizenship governed according to one's learning, mobility, and adaptability is oriented not towards a national or European state but towards a configuration itself governed in part according to a cultural heritage. It is a depoliticised form of citizenship, but for which participation, democracy and social justice, are organising principles. The invoking of Heidegger's address here is intended to indicate the necessity of rethinking a politicised European citizenship.

Heidegger's address itself provides a critique of the relationship between citizenship and education found in current European and member-state policy, defined by lifelong learning for the knowledge economy. This current form inscribes us into particular practices of accountability (self-auditing, 360° appraisal, learning profiles, for example) according to which we are included, made visible, and thus participate. Heidegger's concern with the will to essence is a different form of accountability, which consists in one's thought and action being guided by an answerability to a culture's highest principles and attainments. Their weight is felt not directly, but by their being unattainable, and it is in how one answers to that pressure that one, we might say, finds their voice in the self-determining sense Heidegger invokes.

The ethic - the relationship of oneself to oneself - that Heidegger presents, then, provides a critique of the instrumentalised relation to knowledge we find in the construction of citizenship for the knowledge economy today. The concern with perfectionism and destiny, origin and essence, however, are problematic. There is a risk in taking up Heidegger's thought as a critique of the current understanding of education that one takes on a tone of lament for a time past. This, and the concern with essence, origins and destiny, may compromise thinking critically toward a politicised citizenship. It is this problematic aspect of Heidegger's thought that requires further elaboration than I can provide here. The preliminary consideration of Heidegger's text here does, however,

disturb the complacency that appears in the rendering of history as heritage, as a resource on which to capitalise for the future. Rather it is something with which we are confronted in the present and, further, on the basis of which that present might be critiqued and lived differently. It is through this attitude of critique that we might find our voice, and thereby a political citizenship.

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