

## **Private Practice: Schön and the missing social dimension**

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## Introduction

There is little doubt how important ‘reflective practice’ is in the current educational landscape and perhaps nowhere more so than in professional education. Increasingly, however, critical questions are being asked about the reflective practice approach and its application in professional education settings. At the least we can say with Bradbury and others that reflective practice is now a mainstream educational activity (Bradbury *et al.*, 2010: 2) and that it has lost its critical edge. At worst, one may be tempted to say with Kagan that reflective practice has become ‘one of a handful of approved party lines’ in the subject. (Kagan, 1992: 43; quoted in Newman, 1999: 3)

Of course reflecting on whatever you do professionally is better than not reflecting on it, but a number of authors have begun to take issue with exactly how the demand that students reflect on what they do has been controlled and institutionalised in higher and professional education (see, for instance, Boud and Walker, 1998). Others authors have taken issue with the thinking behind the idea of reflective practice and have asked whether reflection really explains how it is that people learn professionally (see, for instance, Newman (1999), Erlandson (2005) and Procee (2006)).

One prominent line of criticism (common to both sorts of approaches) is that reflective practice is too individualistic in its conception of learning and that it leaves out the ‘social dimension’ of learning. Interpretations of what this missing social dimension *is*, however, often differ. The usual line is that Schön’s conception of the *process of reflection* is too individualistic: the question is whether people genuinely do learn through a process of (backward-looking) introspection rather than through conversation and interaction with other people and it is held that this social perspective is left out in imagining the reflective practitioner to be more in conversation with herself during reflection than with other people. (This is the criticism voiced by, for instance, Erlandson and Newman).

Another possible fault is that Schön conceives of a *practice* in an overly individualistic fashion. This is the criticism that I will explore in this paper.

## The ‘practice turn’ in social theory

In the broader social science literature, one can identify a growing interest in the idea of a social practice and in the role that the concept can play in thinking about the social. Searle (1995), at least, seems to suggest that the social practice should be the primary unit of analysis in social science and the idea finds some support in Schatzki *et al.* (2001) who write of a ‘practice turn’ in contemporary social theory. That practical ways of doing things can be shared between human beings and can be passed on from generation to generation presuppose coordination and communication between people, *but what it is* that is so communicated and passed on is often not explicit. The concept most often called on to fill the gap is that of ‘tacit knowledge’ and – at bottom – explanations of what it is that people know or can do when they can take part in social practices (or what people share between them when they are capable of practicing in a certain way with other people) comes down to the *sharing of a body of tacit knowledge* between people.

The appeal to tacit knowledge is important not only in contemporary work on social practices (see, for instance, Collins's paper in Schatzki *et al.* 2001), but also for Schön. Kinsella stresses the importance of tacit knowledge in Schön's work and views Schön's thought as 'infused' by the work of Polanyi. (Kinsella, 2007: 396) With Polanyi, Schön holds the importance of tacit knowledge to be that '...we know more than we can tell and more than our behaviour consistently shows...' (Argyris and Schön, 1974: 10) Examples of the 'more' that we can know but not say are, for instance how to recognise a face or how to ride a bicycle; for Schön, mastering this 'more' underpins our professional practices, such as designing a building, teaching a class or diagnosing an illness, too. While 'tacit knowledge' is equally important to 'individualists' about practice (like Schön) and 'socialists' (like Searle, Schatzki and Collins) it is in the interpretation of wherein tacit knowledge *consists* that the two differ. To anticipate, it will be my contention that Schön has got it wrong by conceiving of both 'practice' and 'tacit knowledge' in an individualistic light and that something like Searle's explanation of the tacit in an explicitly social light should be preferred.

### **Schön's conceptions of reflection and practice**

How does Schön conceive of matters like professional practice and expertise and what does reflection have to do with it? What sets the professional apart from the novice, according to Schön, is the professional's greater store of tacit knowledge of the domain in which he operates, but for Schön tacit knowledge comes down not so much to discreet abilities, but to a general way of approaching a problem. A particular difficulty in interpreting Schön is that he attempts to sketch what professional ability *is* not by outlining the characteristics of the professional or his way of acting, but by a number of (semi-fictional) examples illustrating what it is that the professional does that sets him apart from the novice. Thus, in his well-known example of the architect in his studio, Schön explains the different abilities of the architect and his student to design a building as a difference not in what the student and the architect can know or say but in what they can do almost without thinking and saying – the architect's mastery compared to the student's inexperience can be explained in terms of the architect's more extensive and fluent 'reflection-in-action'. As Erlandson explains: '[i]t is in *reflection* that the difference between teacher and the student is ultimately found; being more efficient in the discursive situation of architect practice is a positive consequence of reflection.' (2005: 666)

What is the central problem of learning for Schön derives from his view that our tacit knowledge is 'more than we can tell'. The question is this: how is it that, if what we know is always more than we can tell, we can also *teach* someone else what we know? If one conceives of teaching as an activity that proceeds – not even all the time, but at least for a large part of the time – by *talking* to people, then how is practical knowledge taught? We are all well aware of the difference between teaching and telling and that teaching can proceed in many ways besides by telling, but even so, one must admit that a large proportion of what happens in any realistic teaching situation – and even one in which practical knowledge is being taught – does consist of people talking to each other. If talking to people does make up a lot of what we do when we teach practical knowledge, but practical knowledge always exceeds what can be said, how does all this talking even start to transmit from teacher to student that which is supposed to be taught? More importantly, for our present purposes, what does all this say about *what it is* that the professional knows or can do that the novice does not?

Schön gives his answer to both these questions by elaboration on a number of examples of the teaching of practical knowledge. In the example from the architect's studio, for instance,

the pupil is stuck on a particular problem and the architect shows her – through speaking to her, but crucially through drawing plans with her – how to surmount the problem. The problem of how the architect transmits his greater expertise is solved by the architect tackling the drawing *with* the student: the architect explains what he means, but at the same time draws and changes different possible designs with the student, commenting and drawing all the time. In this way, the student not only begins to understand the mindset of the architect and begins to see the different possibilities for the building that he sees, but (Schön thinks) the student begins to understand what it is to design.

This answer also sheds light on the question of what it is that the professional knows or can do that the novice cannot. For Schön, practicing professionally amounts to practicing *reflectively* and this comes down to ‘...on-the-spot surfacing, criticizing, restructuring and testing of intuitive understanding of *experienced phenomena*; often it takes the form of a reflective conversation with the situation.’ (Schön, 1983: 241 – 2, quoted in Reynolds and Vince, 2004: 2) It is this conversation with the situation that the architect demonstrates for the student and, for Schön, the student becoming a reflective practitioner herself consists in her beginning to have a reflective conversation with her situation too. It is important (and puzzling!) that Schön sees the outcome of the practical teaching situation not so much as the student becoming capable of doing something specific, but as one in which the student becomes capable of having a certain kind of reflective conversation with herself about the problem at hand. The *object* of reflective practice (what it is that is reflected *on*), is taken by Schön to be the practitioner’s own experience of the situation and not the experiences that she shares with her teacher or, even, the situation itself; tacit knowledge consists for Schön not so much in being able to modify or change a situation in a particular way, but firstly in being able to *conceive of or understand* the situation in her own way.

Why does Schön think it is a *good thing* to reflect in this way on one’s practice? How does *reflecting* (rather than doing something specific) become the mark of the professional? Kinsella (2007) offers the following explanation. What we must understand is that, for Schön, learning proceeds through the effort to ‘...surface and criticize our tacit frames...’ (Rein and Schön, 1977: 243) and reflection makes the individual aware that she can impose different interpretations or frames on her experience of reality. On Schön’s view, the interpretations or ‘frames’ that the individual imposes on her own experience has the effect of constructing reality for her. Without reflection, Kinsella explains, people do not pay attention to the contingency of their own understanding of the world (their ‘frames’) and do not pay attention to how they construct their own reality (2007: 398 – 9) Kinsella holds that ‘...by making implicit frames explicit the practitioner becomes aware of alternative ways of framing the reality of practice...’ (2007: 399) and, presumably, becomes aware of the possibility that he can both understand things and do things in different ways from the norm (thus making improvement possible).

Important as it no doubt is to true professionalism that the professional *can* act autonomously and can shape his practice according to his own lights (rather than just doing what is ‘tried and trusted’), in the remainder of this paper, I’ll argue that Schön’s focus on the individual’s own interpretations of her practice misses something more fundamental – the role that the social context plays in constituting different practices in the first place. Firstly, I shall hold that we can make no sense of the idea that the individual *can*, by imposing different frames on her own experience, make or even change her own practice. Practice is irredeemably social and requires that the individual practice *with other people*, so that just reinterpreting her own experiences cannot be the basis of any practice. Secondly, I shall hold that even if the individual *could* make her own practice by interpreting her own experiences, this would

not be any good. The normative element in saying that a practice is good or that it constitutes learning or improvement also requires the social dimension and is simply not available in individual (or 'private') practice. Schön's individualistic or 'private' conception of practice is at once too poor to explain how practices develop and, inasmuch as it is convincing, presupposes a social dimension that is at odds with its individualistic emphasis and that it never acknowledges. In order to explain the importance of the social dimension for the possibility of practice, a detour is needed through recent 'practice theory' in the social sciences.

### **The social nature of practice**

What does it mean to say that practices are constitutively social? Searle's explanation of social practices in terms of 'institutional facts' and his distinction – crucial to the explanation of institutional facts – between regulative and constitutive rules for human behaviour may help here. Searle (1969, 1995) distinguishes between two different kinds of rules that may drive individual behaviour. What Searle calls 'regulative' rules guide antecedently or independently existing forms of behaviour, while what he calls 'constitutive' rules '...do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behaviour.' (1969: 33) Take these two examples: the rules of dining etiquette (such as 'keep your elbows off the table' or 'hold your fork in your left hand') regulate the independently existing practice of eating – these rules prescribe how one should eat, but eating would exist whether one followed the rules of etiquette or not. But take the rules of football, chess or any new game that you would yourself care to design: without the rules of football, football as a game would not actually exist (and so with any other game). Of course people could kick balls around without the rules of football, but if the rules of football did not exist, what those people would be doing would not be playing what we know as 'association football' (it would be playing some other kind of game, or none – compare how rugby union and rugby league, while both different kinds of rugby are defined and differentiated in terms of their different rules). These sorts of rules are, for Searle, *constitutive* – they do not just regulate activities that people would take part in anyway, but bring distinctive kinds of activities – distinctive *social practices* – into being.

Searle's distinction helps us to understand the nature of social practices. Not all human practices are *social* practices in Searle's sense. Take the difference between 'fishing' and 'marrying someone'. Of course fishing is sometimes a social activity; after all, people catch fish together, compare their catches, form fishing clubs and so-on. But in another sense, the act of catching fish doesn't require the involvement of other people or a conventional way of doing things. Fish can be caught in a variety of ways and any successful way of getting a free-swimming fish from water onto land is fishing. The fact that I might do this together with other people is neither here nor there to this basic fact. But take 'marrying someone': unlike fishing, marriage as a social institution depends on being done in a conventional manner: you cannot become married *unless* you follow the relevant conventions, such as saying the right words (the marriage vows) in the right order when prompted by a registrar or priest, in front of witnesses and in a building with an open door and so-on. The conventions of marriage do not just regulate marriage, but *constitute* the very practice of marriage in a way that the conventions of fishing do not constitute fishing.

Searle's account makes clear how integral the social dimension is to so many of the human actions that we take for granted. Take the very existence of phenomena such as money, property and government: it does not take much imagination to realise that 'democracy' would not exist without constitutive rules declaring what an election is and how elections are won or that 'banking' would not exist without constitutive rules determining whose money is

whose, when it can be accessed and so-on. Social practices, to a large extent, make up our social world and this is true also of the professional world – what it is to file a lawsuit, compile company accounts, arrest someone or any number of things that professionals do are all social practices, brought into being and sustained by the constitutive rules for regulating people’s conduct in that particular field. While there no doubt are many things that people do largely by themselves and that do not necessarily involve acting in terms of constitutive rules, the importance of constitutive rules to some of the most simple human interactions cannot be overstated. Take this (seemingly) very simple example.

The philosopher John Searle orders a beer in a café in France and the waiter brings it over. Searle drinks the beer, leaves some money on the table and leaves.

Searle explains the great metaphysical complexity of all that we take to be going on in this scene – all of it has to do with the different social practices, roles and rules that we see played out here. What is a café (where one pays for one’s beer) as opposed to a house, say (where one does not)? Who is a waiter and who a customer and what are the roles of each in their interplay? How much money should Searle leave on the table? (Answer: as much as is stated on the price list that must appear by law next to the bar – and in France this sum can differ depending on whether Searle sat at a table or at the bar). What should the waiter do with Searle’s money and why? (Answer: he should not keep it, but should pass it over to the owner of the café, unless he is himself the owner.) Which other rules and regulations should the waiter abide by? And so on.

One may think that waiting tables is a relatively simple practice, but doing it to an acceptable standard requires being conversant with an enormous amount of (mostly unspoken) social conventions and rules, most of which few waiters would ever explicitly have considered. The point is that, while there *are* some things that we do (like catching a fish to eat) that do not require adherence to any social rules or conventions for doing them successfully, taking part in any practice (from table-waiting, through furniture-making, to air-traffic control and plastic surgery) that has added social significance requires adherence to a range of constitutive rules for that practice in order to be seen just as taking part in it (never mind taking part in it successfully). Any account of practice that wishes to explain *what* the waiter, air traffic controller, accountant, lawyer or what-not does in his or her job and *how* they become expert at it, needs to understand how all of these people can act in accordance with the various constitutive rules that make up their practice.

### **Wittgenstein, private language and private practice**

Searle’s account of constitutive rules draws heavily on another important account of social practices – Wittgenstein’s account in the *Philosophical Investigations* of language as being constituted (like games are) in terms of rules for the use of words. A quick detour is needed through Wittgenstein’s argument that a private language is impossible, before we return to the criticism of private practice.

In *Philosophical Investigations* S 258, Wittgenstein presents his celebrated argument that a ‘private’ language – that is a language in which what the individual words mean can only be known to one person – is impossible. In making his argument, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine trying to name a private sensation – say a certain kind of headache. Say you resolve to call a certain stabbing headache you sometimes experience ‘S’ and another kind of throbbing headache ‘T’. Wittgenstein asks whether this resolution constitutes having given names to these private sensations (names only you can understand – since only you can

actually know what these headaches are really like, only you would be able fully to understand the language).

In *PI* SS 243 – 273 Wittgenstein explains why your naming your sensations in this way could not for the basis of a language. He begins by noticing the following feature that meaningful words generally have: meaningful words are such that they can be used correctly or incorrectly. For instance, a word like ‘cat’ is used correctly when used to refer to a cat, but incorrectly if used to refer to a dog. That meanings sustain a contrast between correct and incorrect use in this way is a more or less intuitive feature of meaningful words. But take the case of a word for a private sensation, like the sensation you named ‘S’ today. What happens the next time you try and use your word ‘S’? Say tomorrow comes and you wonder whether the *dullish* headache you have then should be called ‘S’. You ask yourself: ‘yesterday, did I intend for “S” to mean this kind of dull headache too?’ Imagine you’re not quite sure whether you meant yesterday that this kind of headache must be called ‘S’ too.

The important point is that you can convince yourself either way: if it seems to you now that you then intended ‘S’ to mean this sort of headache too, nothing can stop you from calling this headache ‘S’ too and regarding it as an ‘S’ – nothing will decide the matter of whether this kind of headache is really an ‘S’ or not. Whatever you now think you then meant by ‘S’, you will now actually go on to call ‘S’. It is no good, of course, to say that you will remember that you did not call a dull headache ‘S’ yesterday, because you may, of course, remember wrong. Remembering, after all, is just another sort of seeming: that you *seem* to yourself to recall that you did not call a dull headache ‘S’ yesterday does not in itself constitute a fact about what particular sort of headache you named ‘S’, your remembering is only a recollection of what happened. Wittgenstein holds that, for a private word, whatever seems the right way to you to use it will *be* the right way to use it (there being nothing else that can constrain one’s applications of ‘S’). And here comes the important point: saying that whatever *seems* right will *be* right is tantamount to saying that there is no real rightness or wrongness to how one should use ‘S’ at all. After all, if everything it seemed I should do would be right to do, I could do nothing wrong and if I could do nothing wrong, what I *do* do would not be worthy of being called right either.

Now if *this* were the case, that private words cannot be used right or wrong, this would clash with the assumption about meaning stated earlier, that for meaningful words there has to be a distinction between correct and incorrect use. There being no right and wrong ways to use private words, Wittgenstein concludes that they cannot be meaningful and, therefore, cannot form part of a language.

Wittgenstein’s account is sufficiently controversial to merit a warning: there isn’t consensus regarding the point about memory and even if some form of ‘use’ theory of meaning such as Wittgenstein advocates is correct, it still needs to be explained how individual humans with individual brains become capable of using words. However, in this context – where we are not interested in language so much as in what this tale might illustrate about social practices – the account is helpful to make one thing very clear: practices cannot be invented privately – they cannot be constructed by the individual alone through reflection on only his experiences.

Take this example. Say I resolve to make up some kind of private game: I resolve to perform a certain kind of action (perhaps raising my arm above my head) whenever I have a certain feeling (maybe whenever I experience a feeling of boredom or *ennui*). A first thing to notice is that no-one would be able to play this game with me – people would be able to play their own versions of this game, of course, but, seeing as only I could experience my *ennui* only I

could know when to raise my arm and when not. Furthermore, I would also be the only person capable of deciding whether I was playing the game right or wrong – since no-one but I could decide whether I play the game correctly or incorrectly, I could really do pretty much as I want in this game. You, certainly, would never have any grounds for criticising me for raising my arm at the wrong time – who are *you* to say, after all, whether I am experiencing *ennui* right then or not?

Just as is the case with the private language that Wittgenstein criticises, when it comes to a private game like this, calling my action of raising my arm above my head *right* or *wrong* would lose much of its force, since it is simply up to me and my own subjective experiences when I should raise my arm. And recall the point from above regarding memory – with a private game like this, I could not even be sure that I play the game in the same way from day to day, for what guarantee is there that what I regard as a feeling of *ennui today* would be the same as what I would regard as *ennui yesterday*? Since it would all depend on my impressions of what I should do, I could never guarantee that my own practice is consistent – I could not even guarantee that it is really the same game that I am playing from day to day. The point is that without a *standard* for whether a performance is good or bad, right or wrong, it is not only the case that other people can't make sense of my game, there are no real rules determining how I should act and, therefore, no true *practice* can exist on the basis of my doing what I feel I should do. Pretty much any raising of my arm in my private game would count as my playing that game and 'anything goes' simply is not a practice.

The problem for Schön's conception of an individual or 'private' practice that consists wholly on the individual changing his or her actions on the basis of her own interpretations and experiences is that no-one can create a *practice* on this basis that is both interpretable to other people and for which there exists real rules that determine the content and shape of the practice over time. If any human behaviour is to count as a practice – and certainly as a social practice in Searle's sense – it needs to be governed by constitutive rules that are made and interpreted collectively (not individually) and since so much of what professionals do (for instance, arguing a case in a court of law, sectioning a patient, filing a patent and so-on) involves social practices we need to explain how professionals learn to take part in these practices not on the basis of how they interpret their own experiences but in terms of real interactions with other people in terms of constitutive rules. How people can begin take part in and can improve in social practices requires a social explanation and this perspective is simply left out on Schön's account.

### **What good is reflective practice?**

But even if you don't buy all this *philosophy* about the nature of social practices and what that implies for how we should think of professional learning, there is another argument to be made against Schön's very individualistic notion of what practice amounts to and that is that it is just not very clear what *good* Schön's kind of reflection would be. The point isn't to make a very complicated argument against reflective practice, but a very simple one. The point will be that, even if a wholly *private* practice is possible (contrary to what I've argued above) it just isn't clear what building a private practice based on reflection would ever be good for.

I cannot be the first to have noticed how *ineffectual* reflective practice sometimes is and how little room it leaves for criticising – and attempting to improve! – someone's performance. If it really is the case that a student in a reflective assignment can draw pretty much any lesson they want from any experience (and reflection in Schön's sense is, after all, just about

imposing different frames on one's experience) then there really is very little room for a teacher ever to *criticise* a student for drawing a bad lesson from reflection. This is not to advocate a 'big stick' conception of education, but to hold that, without the space to criticise a performance it is also very hard to hold that someone is really *improving* at something or *learning* something at all. Both *improvement* and *learning* require that someone moves from a state in which they are less good at an activity to one in which they are better at it and talking of performances that are 'less good' and ones that are 'better' in this way already makes space for criticism of the less good performances or at least for evaluation of someone's performances in terms of an external standard. If someone is to be capable of *learning* anything, we have to leave space for 'good' and 'bad' performances.

Take the following example. In season 4 of the television drama *The Wire*, the mathematics teacher Mr P. demonstrates a multiple-choice problem – A, B, C or D – on the board and asks one of his students, Kelvin, to solve it. Kelvin immediately answers correctly – C – but when quizzed regarding how he worked out the answer Kelvin explains that he had come across multiple-choice questions before and that he has learnt that teachers always give away the correct answer (without their knowing it) by tapping on the blackboard with their crayon next to the right answer and that *that* is how he could tell the right answer straight away. One could say that Kelvin had learnt a pretty sophisticated reflective lesson from his earlier exposure to multiple-choice questions: the 'dinks' that the teacher makes with his crayon next to the correct answer unintentionally gives the answer away. In this scene, Kelvin was pretty satisfied with his answer – he was genuinely pleased with what he had learnt and, no doubt, had reflectively thought that he had learnt his lesson very well. But even though Kelvin was pleased with his learning, from another perspective – *the perspective of mathematics* – Kelvin's learning journey was disastrous, for he had failed to learn how to solve mathematical problems at all.

The point is that if all learning is reflection on one's own experience and only individual experience determines whether one is learning something or not – then Kelvin's learning *was* a success and one has little grounds for criticising his learning journey. If you feel, however, that Kelvin had missed the point of his mathematics lessons so far, then you are adopting a more social view of when learning is a success or not and relying on shared criteria for when learning is a success. The point is that *in order to say that Kelvin got something wrong here*, you need to mention that he has failed to pick up the rules of the social practice that is doing mathematics and if you are to introduce this kind of talk, you have to *move beyond* Kelvin's interpretation of his own experiences and evaluate his performance against a shared social standard. The most basic problem with Schön's account is that it does not leave room for the fact that Kelvin can't begin doing mathematics just on the basis of how he interprets his own experiences but that he has to follow the rules of mathematics like other people do (something that leaves room for his being right or wrong) in order to do mathematics. In order for Kelvin not just to have his own private way of solving problems, but for his solutions to count as mathematics, he cannot reflect simply on his own experiences, he has to be willing to enter the practice of mathematics with other people, do what they do and submit to their possible criticism.

Recall that, for Schön, the reflective conversation with the situation is a remaking or reinterpretation of their practice world. Besides the point raised above, that the individual *cannot* remake their practice world by themselves, but that the nature of meanings of practices are always already social, it deserves to be made clear that, if one takes Schön's individualism to its full conclusion, reflective practice cannot really be about *learning* anything (in the normative sense of 'improving at something') at all, but is, at heart, just

about seeing your practice in a different light. And the question must be asked: what good is that – seeing your practice in a different light?

Firstly, individual reflection cannot teach someone anything new – individual reflection as Schön understands it just ‘surfaces’ our tacit frames, but that doesn’t mean that we learn anything new, just that we make explicit something that was always implicit in our thinking. Secondly, if we know more than we can say anyway, then, even in reflection we won’t be able to surface *everything* we know in any case. So at best reflection can help us partially to bring to light something we know how to do already and one wonders of what ultimate value this is. Seeing as it is so hard to understand how individual reflection can lead to *new* learning, perhaps this is why reflective practice as we encounter it on professional courses today is less an exercise in improvement, but more one of reassurance or self-congratulation – not ‘look how clever I’ve become’, but ‘look how clever I’ve been all along’. Perhaps this is why people think reflective practice is such a democratic form of education – it gives everyone the opportunity to be congratulated for the tacit knowledge that they have already. As reflection on experience is individual (and no-one’s reflection on their experiences can be better than anyone else’s), all really *can* have prizes in (private!) reflective practice. For the critical educator, as much as for the socially-minded one, however, this outcome is unlikely to be tempting. The intellectual tools that students need to become capable of *criticising* the social order they find themselves in would be tools that help them to see social reality for what it is and not just to reflect on their own subjective experience of it. Not only is it the case that the social dimension is necessary to being able to learn how to practice, it is necessary also to reflect usefully on society.

## Conclusion

In this paper, I have attempted to show how Schön’s individualistic account of what ‘practice’ amounts to – by leaving out the social dimension – fails to be able to account for how people can learn to become part of social practices or can improve at them. While it is conceivable that one can, through reflection and trial-and-error, become better at practices that aren’t constitutively social (like fishing), our professional worlds actually involve a mass of constitutively social practices and how we deal with these cannot be explained simply by appeal to individual reflection.

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