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**FROM THE PARVENU-PARIAH DISPUTE TO THE TENSION BETWEEN
LIFE AND THE WORLD.
ON THE GENESIS OF CERTAIN EDUCATIONAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CATEGORIES OF
HANNAH ARENDT**

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Hannah Arendt was not the only thinker by whom the very significant correspondence between life and thinking is visible. Her biography is particular in this respect, though: about Arendt it can be said without any exaggeration, that the history of the 20th century not only concerned her (as it was the case with all contemporary intellectuals), not only created conditions and the atmosphere of her creative work, but simply was cast upon her philosophically and somehow created Arendt as an authentic thinker. Over the 30s politics, in its most radical shape of the so called Jewish question, transformed the future German scholar and publicist, dwelling in the kingdom of pure thought, into an ordinary German Jewess, who after having wandered all over the world without a passport for years, got into the US to eventually become an American lecturer and publicist. But her origins, education, intelligence and unique critical sense put her into permanent opposition to the new culture. In the 30s politics took over Arendt's thinking in a way and from that point on it was always the most important area of her inquiries.

It can be claimed that in Arendt's thinking two different dimensions meet: the oldest and the newest history of Europe. In other words, totalitarianism and anti-Semitism which forced Arendt (along with the philosophical impact of Heidegger) to step back to the Greeks and Romans, from whom she sought the conditions of possibility of understanding the 20th century. These two aspects of argumentation are interwoven in her work. In this paper I would like to show the connections between both aspects of the genesis of Arendt's thinking that allowed her to develop the unique reflection on the modern condition of education.

Parvenu and pariah

The historical events of pre-war Germany were for Arendt not only an obvious personal shock and changed her attitude to philosophical thought, but they also directed her attention to the eternal problem of Jews as the defamed people, as Arendt described it in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. For the situation of the Jew in European society brings about the particular tension between two attitudes: the ambivalence between *parvenu* and *pariah*. The historical genesis of those seems to be quite complex and would deserve a separate study. What matters here is that a member of a minority people, living on the margins of society, always needs to face the difficult choice: is he to save his national identity at the price of possible social

exclusion, or is he to somehow separate himself from his fellows and strive for social acceptance at all costs. “An exception Jew” is someone, who in spite of his origins is socially attractive enough to count on approbation in society. Examples of such figures were Jews in the salon of Fabourg Saint-Germain, described by Proust. Such an attitude condemns its agent to „parvenu’s bad conscience at having betrayed his people and exchanged equal rights for personal privileges” (Arendt 2004, p. 89). The social status of *parvenu* is most endangered when the situation of the whole nation improves, let’s say in the case of being granted equal rights, when from the point of view of the society those particular Jews cease to be single exceptions and become members of privileged groups. Whereas for an exception Jew the essential difference between the exception Jews and the rest of Jewish people vanishes: “But social pariahs the Jews did become wherever they had ceased to be political and civil outcasts” says Arendt in part on anti-Semitism (p. 83). It means that the question of political equality of all hindered the social promotion of the few.

On the other side there is obviously the “pariah’s regret at not having become a parvenu” (p. 89). It was also the case of Rachel Varnhagen who established the famous intellectual salon in Berlin, which split after 1806, when Napoleon had entered Berlin. Many of its members became anti-Semites and the possibility of living without social status was lost, as Arendt puts it in an article (Arendt 2005, p. 62) preceding the biography of the Berlin intellectual. After the split of the salon Rachel tried somehow to assimilate with the goy society, which the marriage with Varnhagen was to facilitate. In Rachel Varnhagen’s biography Arendt shows the way in which a pariah who desires to become a parvenu is forced to contradict himself and that “entrance into the society was possible only at the price of lying” (Arendt 1974, p. 208). For the parvenu it is necessary not only to suppress all passion, but also to convert it into a means for social climbing. That was the reason, for which Rachel, never having been able to fully pay this price, after all the efforts of an ambitious parvenu, stayed a pariah – a rebel. “The price demanded of the pariah if he wishes to become a parvenu is always too high and always strikes at those most human elements which alone made up his life” (p. 213). The price of social life is always one’s own nature – Rachel never got rid of her own nature and that is why she never become a real parvenu. Before the salon in the Berlin attic split though, and before Rachel started to tread towards unsuccessful assimilation, the most important thing for the members was self-education and the richness of inner life, which purpose had nothing to do with social promotion, so it lacked fillister attributes.

The dispute between pariah and parvenu, which for a European Jew established first of all the innermost dilemma, was at the same time a necessary fracture of identity of the

educated Jewry. For us, however, it is interesting mostly for another reason. The difference between pariah and parvenu discloses the very first version of the very typically Arendtian (and very important for her later analyses) distinction of public and social realms. For a pariah is someone, who, as opposed to parvenu, never comes to terms with social conformism at the cost of public affairs, someone who is a rebel, living on the margins of the social world and never ceases to fight for a better and more equal world. Once having applied those categories, it is easy to characterize different modes of assimilation according to them: the political one consisting in equality in law, although not ensuring social equality, or even hindering it, and the social assimilation based on differences and dedicated for those who are distinguished. According to Arendt it is only the pariah who can develop a true political consciousness, not rejecting his Jewish identity, even if social acceptance be the price (see also Young-Breuhl 2004).

The private – the social – the political: Reflections on Little Rock

Reflections on Little Rock was the first journalistic text that brought about a public controversy¹, in itself a foretaste of the great storm which was to burst a few years later with regard to the report on Eichmann's trial. The text is full of uncompromising opinions based on original conceptual distinctions going against, not only public opinion, but also intellectuals.

In the paper Arendt addresses the problem of racial desegregation in schools of American South. In this article Arendt more quotes than clarifies certain distinctions characteristic for her way of thought – they were developed into a mature shape of philosophical discourse almost at the same time in *The Human Condition* (1958), where Arendt elaborated meticulously on her anthropology, developing its basic categories from the ancient model. In *Reflections* the threefold distinction of realms of human conduct into three areas: private, social, political, is functioning more as an implicit assumption.

In *Reflections* two main argumentation lines meet. On the one hand Arendt claims that such a deeply rooted problem as racial segregation, not easy to combat by adults, cannot be simply cast upon children's shoulders. That is the issue to be developed a year later in *The Crisis in Education*. In *Reflections* Arendt argues that introducing compulsory school

¹ However, it was not the first conflict between Hannah Arendt and the public. Earlier it was the American Jewry whom Arendt quarreled with. After the state of Israel was founded and the basic problems with its legal status emerged, Arendt undertook the polemics with the radical Zionism (among others in *Aufbau*, then *Commentary*), facing the very vehement critique and partial ostracism in the Jewish Diaspora.

integration and endangering children with its effects, at the beginning rather drastic ones (the article is illustrated with a photograph of a Negro girl coming home from school under escort of her father's white friend, both followed by a menacing mob of white youngsters), adults somehow release themselves from the responsibility for the public world (here for its social aspect) and cast the struggles within this world upon children. That is why, as Arendt argues, the racial desegregation in the South should not be started from the school; it is adults who need to come to terms with racism first. That would mean to start with scandalous law, according to Arendt, as it invaded the private sphere and was still valid at that time, forbidding mixed marriages. There seems to be much sense in this argumentation. Arendt obviously does not so much try to maintain the existing social divisions, but rather turns our attention to the fact that the top-down decisions (in this case the federal law, conflicted with the state law) are not able to simply abolish certain divisions and prejudices, deeply rooted for hundreds of years. It is followed by a conviction, that "the more equal people have become in every aspect, and the more equality permeates the whole texture of society, the more will differences be resented, the more conspicuous will those become who are visibly and by nature unlike the others" (Arendt 2003, p. 200).

On the other hand this by rights pragmatic argumentation (concerning the order of doing things and the way of attaining goals) is interwoven with essential argumentation, based on the very differences between the private, the social and the political areas. The scope of the private area seems to be quite obvious (in the field of education it is the sphere of family) and requires no further explanation. But in this phase of her intellectual biography, Arendt marked out the public area in two basic and very unlike forms: the social and the political. The school is included into the social sphere: "this public world is not political but social, and the school is to the child what a job is to an adult" (p. 212). The basic line of argumentation consists here in a conviction that state and law should watch equality (in this particular case the racial equality) only in the political area and that "it is not the social custom of segregation that is unconstitutional, but its *legal enforcement*" (p. 232). Legal instruments cannot and should not try to interfere in social inequality and society, as long as it has not yet reshaped itself into a mass, is based on differences, the right to associate freely, forming groups and also on the right to exclude from those groups certain people according to any criteria. The school is a social place in which the nature of society, based on differences, is still valid. It means that the state or the public sphere can interfere in the curriculum, for here the preparation of future citizens is at stake; it should not, however, interfere in the social rules at school – it is parents who are called to decide here and take the responsibility for the consequences.

“Discrimination is as indispensable a social right as equality is a political right. The question is not how to abolish discrimination, but how to keep it confined within the social sphere, where it is legitimate, and prevent its trespassing on the political and the personal sphere, where it is destructive” (p. 206).

Even if we agree with this threefold distinction and the specific characteristics of particular spheres, the ascribing the school to the social could still remain problematic. Although the school obviously is not a political place *par excellence*, like the parliament for instance, it can still be argued to be the public place in which social distinctions should not be relevant. Analogically the court is not and should not be the political institution in the narrow sense, but is a public institution (not a social one), that, according to Arendt’s presupposition itself, should cherish legal equality and for which social distinctions are completely irrelevant. The analogy between the school and the workplace is unconvincing insofar as there are different workplaces: some of them are private places, some social, while others are public institutions, where the right to choose companions according to any criteria is not granted.

What seems to be essential here is as yet not fully crystallized conception of the public world. Already in *The Human Condition* it becomes problematic if the social sphere is at all ascribed to the public realm. For it is rather characterized here as nowhere between the private and the public. But putting aside the question how to define the social sphere, it seems problematic to ascribe anything non-social (and, of course, non-private) to the political sphere and vice versa. What follows then is putting everything that obviously cannot be defined as *par excellence* political – to the social sphere, i.e. to the area of distinctions and inequalities. The question is as follows: cannot there exist a public institution which is neither political nor social? There seems to be many such institutions, like courts, museums, theatres, public means of transportation, or in general, the public cultural institutions, infrastructure, the public healthcare system, and so on. These areas could hardly be regarded as political ones (no matter if this word is to be taken in its general sense or if we, following Arendt, identify the political with the sphere of free action), but still they are definitely public and non-social institutions in the Arendtian sense, which means that the right to take part in them cannot emerge from social distinctions and exclusions. It also seems that school, being a non-political institution is still not a social one, but public as a museum, or theatre; it can be believed that the problematic feature of Arendt’s argumentation on the school in Little Rock is an effect of a lack of this sub-category in her distinctions².

² Another difficulty lies in the social world itself. In Arendt’s concept of society a certain ambiguity is imprinted. Sometimes, as in *The Human Condition*, its meaning is close to the common understanding, though the

But our purpose is not so much to evaluate the categories acquired by Arendt, but rather to see their development. This development led to coining the more phenomenologically justified concepts that became a framework of her whole philosophical anthropology and assessment of the modern and contemporary worlds that emerged from that anthropology. In the field of education these concepts allowed Arendt a year later to formulate amazingly ingenious observations concerning the condition of contemporary education.

As Elisabeth Young-Bruehl notices (Cf. Young-Bruehl 2004, p. 312), in the background of *Reflections* concerning black children, somehow the Jewish question and pariah-parvenu categories return and govern Arendt's approach. Black children sent to school for whites are forced to emancipate by the power of social promotion against their dignity, so they become parvenus, while the true emancipation of the pariah proceeds in the political sphere. From our point of view however, the difference between pariah and parvenu is relevant for one more reason. It is this difference in the situation and attitudes of Jews in European societies and states before World War II that became a trigger to direct Arendt's thoughts towards later distinctions between the political and the social and also enabled the application of those distinctions in the field of education.

The World and Life: The Crisis in Education

The Crisis in Education is a kind of philosophical response³ to the controversies brought about by Arendt's judgment on the Little Rock situation. At any rate it is a text of thoroughly different character, while the problematic stays the same. In *The Crisis* the judgments concerning Little Rock are philosophically generalized: now we encounter not a journalistic piece of writing any more, but rather a truly philosophical investigation, which, while having

evaluation of the phenomenon could be astonishing; another time, and it seems to be the case of *Reflections*, it means the old "society" and salon more than society in a contemporary connotation, e.g. as a civil society. It is the latter understanding of society which is followed by the possibility of understanding it as a sphere of differences and exclusions.

³ The reader should not be misled by the dates of the first issues of those texts. That *The Crisis* emerged for the first time in the autumn 1958 in *Partisan Review* and *Reflections* in winter 1959 in *Dissent* does not mean *The Crisis* was written earlier. For *Reflections* came to being already in November 1957 and was firstly commissioned by *Commentary*, where it evoked a strong controversy even before being published. The editor, outraged by the attitude represented by Arendt, asked a Sidney Hook for the response, whom Arendt riposted. As *Commentary's* publication was constantly postponed, Arendt eventually withdrew the text, and as the question of desegregation not only stayed actual but became even more urgent, she published it in winter 1959 in *Dissent* together with an *Introduction* containing fragments of her response to Hook (Cf. Young-Bruehl 2004, p. 313-315).

taken the cultural situation of a particular time and place as the point of departure, can easily be applied to the West in general.

In *The Crisis* the threefold division of the areas of a human's being is evidently polarized. Now the meaning of education becomes visible in the perspective of the tension between basic, although dichotomously understood spheres of being human: life and the world. *The Crisis* is an autonomous text, where Arendt explains clearly her point. Nevertheless, for better understanding, it may be fruitful to read this text in the wider perspective of the philosophical project of *The Human Condition*.

In *The Human Condition* Arendt, on the basis of the interpretation of antiquity, brings forth a historical framework for genuine anthropological theory. This model becomes somehow autonomous against its historical origins and becomes a specific hermeneutic device. It is obviously derived from the origins of European culture in order to enable the comprehension of the later course of events in this culture, but also to rethink the difficult situation of contemporary man. This framework consists of many interwoven concepts and categories, but the most revealing, from our point of view, seems to be the opposition between life and the world.

Life in its most basic and substantial aspect corresponds with the bare endurance of the human body. In Arendt's model, life is inevitably attached to work, understood as a "metabolism with nature" (Cf. Arendt 1998, p. 115). It is only the world, built on life, but in its essence totally different from it, that makes the human condition truly human. The physical structure of the world is an order of things made by humans. However, the world can be humanized only by human action – the least biological of human activities.

The work provides the individual endurance, but first of all the life of a species. From this point of view death is only an exchange necessary to lasting the circularity of life, and the process itself is eternal, as in its bare form it does not involve individual fate. For in the life-process individuality does not exist – it is exemplarity that does: from the point of view of life the exemplars of a species are just the copies of themselves, as far as biological functions are concerned. Life circulates along the eternal recurrence of the same and this circularity is also an aspect of humanity as a species. It is only the activity of making that bestows "a measure of permanence and durability upon the futility of mortal life" (p. 8). A human being exceeds this purely lifelike, circular structure of work by virtue of making things, which for Arendt means functioning according to instrumental rules. Owing to the fact that humans make things other than those demanded by this circular life, they can somehow emancipate partly from this circularity. Human life becomes fragile in the background of longer lasting things, but owing

to speech and remembrance it can be preserved and commemorated. The life of an exemplar of the species, described and captured with words, as long as it takes part in making the world, becomes an individual life, a biography – in this way it exceeds the circularity of bare biological life.

The most important consequence of those distinctions is that nature and circular movement know nothing not only about the individual meaning of death, but also about the individual meaning of birth – while for human beings birth and death are not plain natural events, but are connected to the world. It is the world that enables humans to become unique, non-exchangeable individuals, appearing in this world and disappearing. Birth and death in the human sense require the stability of the world. Where we encounter just the natural circularity, we cannot describe these two phenomena as truly human. Things, made by humans, constitute a background for individuality. That is why telling stories, considered by Arendt as the highest form of making, enables preservation of our action; owing to the narration, the human world becomes coherent and intelligible, i.e. it becomes a place where speech and action are possible. The basic characteristics of the human world are plurality and community. The community of the world consists in the innumerable amount of different perspectives. This plurality of perspectives also guarantees the reality of the world. Without this space of appearances, without this in-between (*inter-esse*), that both connects and shares people, neither the reality of an individual (identity), nor the reality of the surrounding world can be unquestionably constituted.

The difference and the opposition between life and the world is the philosophically more mature version of the older division into private and public spheres. As we remember, this distinction was of great significance for both the parvenu-pariah relation and the context of racial desegregation. In *The Human Condition* though, Arendt makes this opposition autonomous against the influences of her own biography and the wider history of the 20th century, and derives it from the Greek origins of European culture. As the historical context is of the lesser relevance here, we will focus our attention on the bare conceptual structure. The private sphere, i.e. the home area (*oikos*) is clearly opposite to the public sphere, (*polis*). The driving force of a household is bare life and its requirements: its principle is necessity. The agent of the private sphere is *homo laborans*, a human maintaining the biological cycle of his own and another's life.

The public space is in its essence a realm of freedom. The citizen of this realm is a human being who speaks and acts (*zoon politikon logon*). By Arendt occur three *modi* of human being: the purely private *homo laborans*, functioning in a circular way, submitted to

compulsion and necessity, and preparing the conditions for *homo faber*, who becomes worldly to some extent, owing to the exchange market (as a *quasi*-public space) and who initiates instrumental processes. And the most worldly *zoon politikon logon*, taking advantage of both the work of *homo laborans* as of the usefulness of things made by *homo faber*. Only the acting and speaking agent, appearing in the world as a public space, can be fully free. He does not revolve as the circularity of work does, nor does he hold together the chains of instrumentality. His action consists in the faculty of initiating events. As the opposite to the circularity and instrumentality, the faculty of beginning something new is a purely worldly possibility, and it is rooted in the fact that a newborn human being is a beginning (Arendt 2006 b, p. 163-166). The human world, as it is not submitted to the circular nature, but is bestowed with history and memory, obviously is something very fragile and requires constant revival. That is why Arendt can write: „The miracle that safes the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, «natural» ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, In which the faculty of action is ontologically rooted” (p. 247).

It is this very moment that leads us to the reflection on education. According to Arendt, education in its essence is a human response to the biological fact of birth. It is only upbringing and education that enable human beings to come up in the world. But for them, we could only speak about the preservation of human species, but not about renewing the world. That is why it is crucial for us to understand that both poles of our existence are equally important in education: not only that connected with biological endurance and supported by work, i.e. *life*, but also the second pole, remaining with the latter in constant dispute, i.e. *the world* as a field of human affairs, exceeding both biology and instrumentality. The sense of education lies in dealing with the fact that new people come to this world. Education strives to preserve the old world – old, as it is always older than one generation. This is not the typical conservative attitude, as this preservation is to consist in renewing. For the sense of education lies also in enabling new people to live in this world and impress it. It is one of the Arendtian paradoxes: “Exactly for the sake of what is new and revolutionary in every child, education must be conservative; it must preserve this newness and introduce it as a new thing into an old world” (Arendt 2006a, p. 189). Where the world is under threat (like under totalitarian rule), the individuality of human beings is also under threat: in the flow of *worlde s s* life, where the public space of human action is lacking, nothing new can appear.

Due to this tension between life and the world, education (as it concerns both) is a phenomenon burdened with this tension and that is also the reason why it is so vulnerable to crises. The crisis of education will always mean disturbing the fragile balance of this tension.

Arendt distinguishes certain symptoms of this unbalancing. One of them seems to directly stem from Little Rock. The tension between life and the world in education means that education has to assume responsibility for both the development and life of the child and for the continuity of the world. There is often conflict involved between those two aspects of education: in a sense the responsibility for the development of the child turns against the world, because the child needs to be shielded and protected against it – but the world in its turn also needs to be protected against the destructive power of newness. The characteristic trait of American education, the establishing of a certain kind of autonomous children's society equals the destruction of children's life space and threatens the necessary conditions for a child's development. The extreme version of such a situation took place in Arkansas, when black children had to deal alone with the enormous peer pressure of whites: "Therefore by being emancipated from the authority of adults the child has not been freed but has been subjected to a much more terrifying and truly tyrannical authority, the tyranny of the majority" (p. 178).

Another aspect of the crisis of contemporary education is the tendency to focus more on methods of teaching than on subject matter that is to be taught, and the conviction, rooting in pragmatism, that learning should cease to be work and as much as possible become play. It is connected with the modern presupposition that educating and teaching is to "prepare for life". Education conceived as introducing newcomers into the old world perishes here. Similarly as the child needs to be protected against the world in order to be able to appear in it as a grown-up, so the world also needs to be protected against the primarily destructive power of a new generation. The advanced aspect of education, in European culture traditionally associated with what Germans called *Bildung*, is to assume the responsibility for the preservation of the world. The essence of *Bildung* lies in the obligation of remembrance, i.e. an obligation to acquire the history of culture. It is too complex and abstract to be simply acquired by means of play and fun. The substitution of learning with playing (and especially the pragmatic turn with the substitution of reading and counting with making things) means that teaching is intended not to transfer knowledge but to inculcate skills. "The result was a kind of transformation of institutes for learning into vocational institutions" (p. 179). It means that school ceases to assume the responsibility for the common world.

Both aspects of the crisis of education: on the one hand the threat to the development of children (caused by the demand that they, deprived of adult help, deal with this caricature of the public world as the autonomous children's society is), but on the other hand the threat to the endurance of the world (hidden in perishing of true teaching), have their origins in the

modern genesis of social world. “It is [...] to be found in the judgments and prejudices about the nature of private life and public world and their relation to each other which have been characteristic for modern society since the beginning of modern times” (p. 184). Here, again, the analyses from *The Human Condition* will be of help for us.

The establishing of modern society was the main symptom of alienation from the world. According to Arendt, the conceptual substitution of the political by the social, (mediated by the Latin translation of *zoon politikon logon* as *animal socialis*) signifies the loss of original Greek understanding of politics, and, what follows, of the common world. This conceptual transition was for Arendt nothing accidental: it was a linguistic reflection of the transition of the meaning of being of the western humanity. This transition became overwhelming only in modern times, when *animal socialis* materialized in the new social sphere. This sphere was neither private nor public, as modernity obliterated the abyss between *oikos* and *polis*. The emergence of social sphere changed the meaning of both what is private and what is public. “In the modern world, the two realms indeed constantly flow into each other like waves in the never-resting stream of the life process itself” (Arendt 1998, p. 33). Along with the establishment of the social sphere, activities bound with privacy fled into the public realm. The social sphere started to unify and swallow both private life and the public world. The very process of life was directed into the public, from which it had been banned previously. Modern communities organized themselves around work, necessary for preserving life: „Society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public”. (p. 43). Work, earlier described and understood as a correlate of the eternal recurrence of bare life, exceeded this cycle by virtue of being introduced into the public area. But, neither the enhancement of the productivity of work, nor making this process public by means of socializing it, can remove privacy of corporal processes in which life is reflected. That is why work is not able to establish the common world. The socialized *animal laborans* still stays at service of life, not the world. The public realm ceases to be an area of speaking and acting, nor even making (which, according to Arendt, differs from work substantially). In short, all the human activities, even art and politics began to serve the life process.

Thus, in *The Crisis* Arendt can say: “The more completely modern society discards the distinction between what is private and what is public [...], the more it introduces between the private and the public a social sphere in which the private is made public and vice versa, the harder it makes things for its children, who by nature require the security of concealment in

order to mature undisturbed” (Arendt 2006a, p. 185). But, even where this condition of security is fulfilled, it remains still the task of introducing the child into the world. At this stage of education the most important thing is the development of talents and gifts, as it is them which will define the individuality of an adult and will guarantee the renewal of the world. Educators are kinds of advocates of the world and are responsible for it by virtue of authority. Presently we discharge, and for good reasons, any kind of political authority, but while political life does not have to rely on authority, education, as understood by Arendt, cannot even be imagined without it. Education cannot simply dispose of authority, even if authority no longer defines our adult being-together. This is a paradox of modern education: the “innocent” parent or educator, who refuses to assume authority, refuses also to assume the responsibility for the world, gives up on the hope carried by a new human being, and submits to his alienation from the world.

Both analyzed texts on education, along with the shifting of the meaning of “society”, mediated by *The Human Condition*, show also the qualification in Arendt’s understanding of the character of pedagogical institutions. In *The Crisis* school does not simply belong to the social (as it still did in *Reflections*), but is understood as a kind of mediating institution between life and the world, enabling young people to exceed private home area (and it must be added, though Arendt does not write it explicitly: the limitations of the social sphere) and prepare to appear in the world. That is why in *The Crisis* the context of the Jewish community and its basic dichotomy of pariah-parvenu ceases to be silent but inevitable context of analyses and becomes rather their historical premise.

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