

## **TITLE PAGE**

Title: "THIS is produced by a brain-process!" Wittgenstein, transparency, and psychology today

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## **“THIS is produced by a brain-process!” Wittgenstein, transparency, and psychology today**

“The human body is the best picture of the human soul” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 178).

On the last page of the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein makes some damning remarks about the discipline of psychology:

The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. . . For in psychology there are experimental methods and *conceptual confusion*. . .

The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by (p. 232).

If we think of psychology as having been established as a formal discipline with the experimental work of Wilhelm Wundt in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Wittgenstein’s remarks are made less than a century after its inception, and the claim might be made that in the sixty or so years since the writing of the *Investigations*, psychology has moved on. For example, if the confusion that once surrounded the notion of “intelligence” as it was developed in IQ testing has now been partly dispelled, this is in no small measure thanks to the conceptual efforts of psychologists themselves. No doubt theories not only of intelligence but of motivation, of emotion, of personality, and of social interaction are more refined and sophisticated as a result.

But there may still be a gap between contemporary experts in the discipline and psychology’s trail-effects in popular consciousness, some of which infiltrate what is commonly thought of as common sense. Thus, I find myself saying something to a friend or colleague or student who responds: “Just wait a minute while I process what you have said.” But then what is it they are doing? Perhaps I have explained something complex or said something disturbing, and they need time to think this through. Yet “thinking through” is not the expression they have chosen: “processing” is what they believe is going on “in their heads”: their brain “thinks” by processing data. And this invokes a picture of internal mental operations of a kind that has, in some of its more enduring phases, been psychology’s stock-in-trade. Given that such a way of speaking has found its way into common sense, it is perhaps hard to see what is wrong with it. But we know, do we not, that sometimes societies can succumb in their ways of thinking to pathologies to which they are blind?

A degree of exaggeration here will make the point more vivid. In medieval Europe belief in witchcraft was widespread in ways that are difficult to imagine today, and this generated systematic means of “explaining” aspects of the human condition. Such beliefs were so deeply embedded in popular consciousness that they could not easily be detached from the prevailing world-view. Witchcraft was not, so it would seem, something to be explained, but rather the basis of explanation, the means by which explanation was possible and one of the ways in which that world seemed to make sense – or, say, an *expression* of that sense of meaningfulness. Is it possible that psychology has figured in modern consciousness in a parallel way?

This may be an unwarranted exaggeration, and in any case we should not indulge in it without acknowledging that, if there is a problem along these lines, psychology is not its sole source. Wittgenstein did indeed speak of philosophy as “a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (#109), but he saw this as originating often in philosophy itself. But let me for a moment broaden the focus to test the plausibility of this. Around the time that Wittgenstein was writing, Gilbert Ryle published his *The Concept of*

*Mind*. A major target in that book is what Ryle memorably calls “the Ghost in the Machine” (Ryle, 1949, p. 15ff). This phrase tries to capture the way that a certain conception of mind and of its relation to the body, and hence of human being, has been generated in modern European thought, René Descartes being a key figure in this genesis. Descartes’ ultimate purpose, so he claimed, was no less than to establish foundations for belief in God, but what is really at stake in his writings is surely the securing of grounds for knowledge in a more general way. His *cogito ergo sum*, and the philosophy that this then legitimates, which Ryle calls the Intellectualist Legend, involves an understanding of the mind and body as separate, yet connected in mysterious ways. This has a number of further implications: it crystallises an opposition of subject and object, of something inside and something outside; it underwrites the spectatorial stance, where an inner consciousness looks out on and stands in a calculative relation towards an object-world; and it authorises an understanding of practical action as always preceded by mental operations, hence of a separation of theory (as mental processes) and practice (as behaviour). Ryle spoke of such inner mental processes, which must go on behind even our most ordinary dealings with one another, as “occult”.

Ryle’s gesture towards witchcraft with the word “occult” is provocative, to be sure, but the great influence of his book perhaps helps to make my own remarks above seem less exaggerated. When Ryle elaborates a philosophical position in response to the one he demonises, his focus is particularly on the relation between *knowing-that* and *knowing-how*, and his purpose might, *inter alia*, be said to be to release us from the view that doing something in practice requires doing something first in theory. The considerations I want to press reflect more on the relationship between the inner and the outer, as explored by Wittgenstein. They will take us, first, through a realisation of the error of thinking that there must be something that lies hidden beneath the surface of our ordinary language renderings of our reactions and responses to the world and, second and very briefly, towards a suspicion of some of the ways that attempts have been made to make our practices more explicit and supposedly more accountable than ordinary language will allow. These are distortions of thought and life that both involve forms of scepticism about ordinary judgments and language. Before embarking on this, however, I need to say something further to make plausible the way that Cartesian dualism came to permeate modern European consciousness.

Descartes’ thought does not occur in a vacuum. Christianity enshrines the kind of dualism that Descartes’ philosophy formalises. It is not the body that matters but the soul (or the mind?). And the world in which we find ourselves is the product of the Fall (from the perfection of the Garden of Eden): its temporal nature is to be devalued in relation to the eternity of the life to come. Moreover, there is a latent Platonism in the Christian thought that a kind of vanity draws us to the surface of things, when the truth is to be sought beyond appearances. But what also needs to be noticed is the congruence of Descartes’ thought with the rise of science and technology, in which the spectatorial and theoretical stance is reinforced, the idea of objectivity is hardened, and the world is neutralised of value in a progressive disenchantment. Spectacular success in the physical sciences, the role of technology in exploration and empire-building, and the massive social and cultural shift brought about by the Industrial Revolution all reinforce a sense not only of the value of this way of thinking but of its being a natural part of the human condition and complement to the way the world is – that is, its being the object of spectatorial scrutiny and of manipulative intervention. When, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the social sciences begin to develop, they do this under the shadow of, and hence seek to emulate, the physical sciences. It is no surprise that their focusing of systematic and experimental enquiry on human beings takes to a new level the metaphysics of the subject/object dichotomy. It is in such terms that the rise of psychology needs to be understood.

## Nothing is hidden

In the light of this background, let me turn then to the first of the Wittgensteinian lines of thought I want to pursue: the error of thinking that there must be something that lies beneath the surface of our ordinary ways of speaking about our reactions and responses to the world. I tried to suggest something of what is at stake here with my example of the person who responds to me: “Just wait a minute while I process what you have said.” There are various ways in which Wittgenstein considers the relation between our language and our thought, including the relation of expression to various psychological states. The caption that is the title of this section, “nothing is hidden”, is to be found in the *Investigations*, and it is also the title of a late book by Wittgenstein’s friend and interpreter Norman Malcolm (1986). I propose to concentrate on just a few connected paragraphs of Wittgenstein’s text, intercalating these with my own comments.

In what follows, then, it is important to realise the play between different dialogical voices. Wittgenstein is concerned here with the relation between, on the one hand, sentences and gestures and, on the other, something beyond them, where this something beyond may be “an act of understanding” or a thing portrayed or a representation. Representation, it needs to be remembered, has been at the heart of epistemology throughout much of the modern period, central to its project of explaining the relation of thought to the world. And this has tended to lead to explanation of meaning in terms of an underlying logic, to the neglect of the variety of things we do with words and in blindness to the subtle differences realised in natural language (or, to be more precise, languages). In the first of the paragraphs the interlocutor speaks assertively, imploring the reader to hear the apparently obvious truth of what is claimed, and Wittgenstein initially withholds his response:

#431. “There is a gulf between an order and its execution. It has to be filled by the act of understanding.”

“Only in the act of understanding is it meant that we are to do THIS. The *order* – why, that is nothing but sounds, ink-marks. – ”

The inverted commas signal that a thought is being expressed that is not exactly Wittgenstein’s own but one by which we are typically tempted: this is the thought that the words that are used must be accompanied by a mental process – here an “act” of understanding. The emphatic “THIS” is intended to convey the speaker’s sense that an intense mental concentration has captured the nature of the action that has been specified: mere words could not do this – hence, the imploring tone.

In the next paragraph, however, Wittgenstein offers a response, and this is marked by a different, quieter tone:

#432. Every sign *by itself* seems dead. *What* gives it life? – In use it is *alive*. Is life breathed into it there? – Or is the *use* its life?

In much of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein is, as it were, applying a kind of therapy to the thinking that had once held him captive, where, in his early work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the assumption of representation found expression in the *picture theory of meaning*. What is emphasised here, by contrast, is the doctrine of *meaning as use*. While the former tended to foreground examples that purported to show a mirroring relation or correspondence between thought and world, here we find meaning illustrated in multifarious, dynamic contexts of human practice. The sign by itself, without context, seems dead. And Wittgenstein is drawn for a moment, so it seems, by the animistic phrasing that use

“breathes” life into it. But in the end he settles for the less spiritually charged thought that the use *is* its life – though still expressed as a rhetorical question.

In the longer paragraph that follows this one, the present example of the giving of orders leads into a consideration of the nature of gesture. Wittgenstein appears to be thinking first of the kind of gesture of the hand that might accompany the speaker’s emphatic (and artificial and forced) utterance of “THIS”. But an implicit question lies in the background here of how gesture figures in ordinary life, of what importance it *does* assume:

#434. The gesture – we should like to say – *tries* to portray, but cannot do it.

The negative thought here, which seems to afflict Wittgenstein’s interlocutor, is that gestures and words alike are doomed to a kind of inadequacy, existing only in a precarious relation to the achieving of understanding, the grasp of inner meaning. The trace of a more positive thought is to be found, by contrast, in the idea that it is not exactly the purpose of words or gestures to “portray”, as if there must be some other mental operation with which they correspond, for the meaning is already there in their use.

Let me digress for a moment to allow the thought that the sense is already there in the surface of the signs. Following the wonderful aphorism of the epigraph to this paper, “The human body is the best picture of the human soul”, Wittgenstein writes:

And how about such an expression as: “In my heart I understood when you said that”, pointing to one’s heart? Does one perhaps not *mean* this gesture? Of course one means it. Or is one conscious of using a *mere* figure? Indeed not. – It is not a figure that we choose, not a simile, yet it is a figurative expression (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 178).

Not only does this passage try to show something about the understanding: it also says something about the human heart. Unlike the metaphysical aspirations of the gesture that accompanies the utterance of “THIS” (in #431), here is a natural, unforced expression. The reference and gesture to one’s heart is a figurative expression, but it is not a *mere* figure and not self-consciously adopted. It is not a fancy, metaphorical elaboration that codes our literal meaning: a literal expression would not be more real. This is to say that such figures are woven into our natural forms of expression and constitute part of the fabric of our lives. What, in any case, is a heart? It is true that it is an organ of the body, but such a statement is only adequate when one thinks in terms of biology, and biology has developed as an abstraction from our ordinary ways of being in the world. Ordinarily the heart is rightly connected with a particular, powerful range of emotion, and hence with trust and sincerity. This is the natural life of human beings, and it is a mistake to think of the account that biology provides as somehow more basic, as coming closer to what is most real – immensely valuable though biology undoubtedly is! I say “in my heart” or gesture to my heart. The meaning is there in the surface of the expression, and it has its importance as expression rather than explanation.

What, by contrast, is the force of the capitalisation of “THIS”? At this point in the *Investigations* Wittgenstein has already adopted this particular accentuation of this word five times, with two occasions in #412, the paragraph from which my title is drawn.<sup>1</sup> There he writes, initially, “THIS is supposed to be produced by a process in the brain! – as it were clutching my forehead,” and asks in response, “But what can it mean to speak of ‘turning my attention on to my own consciousness?’” – subsequently referring back to the statement in the abbreviated form found in my title. It is important that there are no easy routes here to the disparagement of neuroscience, for Wittgenstein is at pains to dispel any sense of paradox about connections between brain-processes and consciousness; of course these exist! But the

threat of the reduction of the latter to the former provokes the animus of his analysis of these words and their thematic ramifications. The note of melodrama here – Wittgenstein speaks of “logical sleight-of-hand” and “giddiness” - extends through the *Investigations*’ evocation of, *inter alia*, Augustinian ostensive definition, the theorisation of indexicals, the psychology of “inner processes”, and representation itself. In the next paragraph in the sequence we are considering, it is our obsession with representation that is brought under scrutiny:

#435. If it is asked: “How do sentences manage to represent?” – the answer might be: “Don’t you know? You certainly see it, when you use them.” For nothing is concealed.

How do sentences do it? – Don’t you know? For nothing is hidden.

But given this answer: “But you know how sentences do it, for nothing is concealed” one would like to retort “Yes, but it all goes by so quick, and I should like to see it as it were laid open to view.”

Wittgenstein, I take it, is leading us away from the question, easing the anxiety that prompts us to pose and address it in a particular way. For to abstract and isolate, say, the “general form of the proposition”, as Wittgenstein had attempted to do in his earlier work (*Tractatus*, 4.5), would be to adopt a methodology that will become the source of our problems. And to imagine that there must be something concealed, something hidden below the surface, will be the source of metaphysical confusion.<sup>2</sup>

Wittgenstein is not only exorcising the ghostly aspects of his earlier vision, for the problems he exposes are endemic in the Western philosophical tradition, with their trail-effects in popular consciousness along the lines I have tried to describe. He explains:

#436. Here it is easy to get into that dead-end in philosophy, where one believes that the difficulty of the task consists in our having to describe phenomena that are hard to get hold of, the present experience that slips quickly by, or something of the kind. Where we find ordinary language too crude, and it looks as if we were having to do, not with the phenomena of every-day, but with ones that [as Augustine puts this] “easily elude us, and, in their coming to be and passing away, produce others as an average effect”.

Philosophy in some of its phases then encourages the all-too-human thought that reality lies, as it were, just outside our ordinary grasp, that something lies hidden beneath the surface of our experience and language. It is difficult to read these words without recalling Emerson’s remark around a century earlier, in “Experience”: “I take this evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our fingers then when we clutch hardest to be the most unhandsome part of our condition” (Emerson, 1982, p. 288). Emerson’s “clutch” and “slips through our fingers” anticipate Wittgenstein’s “hard to get hold of” and “slips quickly by”. And Emerson’s wilfully inelegant “unhandsome” would suggest, first, “un-beautiful”, but this in the manner of being clumsy, implying that, second, we do not handle things well or lose touch with the world. (Heidegger, writing around the same time as Wittgenstein, will speak of thinking as a handicraft (Heidegger, 1968, pp. 16-17).) It is, in these lines from Emerson and Wittgenstein, as though we were dissatisfied with, or sceptical of, our accustomed interaction with the world and longed for something that exceeded the ordinary purchase of our words. But this is a scepticism that, however much it may be natural to the human condition, threatens to anaesthetise our relation to the world and to deaden the way the world is.

One of Stanley Cavell’s figures for the deadening effects of this better-than-ordinary knowledge that we clutch after is that it is tainted with the Midas touch, where the touch that succeeds in turning everything to gold deadens the world before our eyes (Cavell, 1979, p.

455). We are dissatisfied with the currency of our common practices and, avariciously like Midas, seek the harder coinage of a Gold Standard – altogether losing sight of the fact that standards can be maintained only on the basis of continuities of human interaction and trust. These are continuities upon which learning and enquiry depend. By contrast, the ordinary economy of our lives turns into a flexible “knowledge economy”, where knowledge is rendered exchangeable and commodified. If we can, for a moment, entertain this thought alongside Karl Marx’s analysis of commodities, and of the fetish value of commodities, the dangers being considered here are only too apparent, and this is especially so in conditions of globalisation.

It is this thought that, I hope, leads naturally to the second point that I wanted to pursue: suspicion of some of the ways that attempts have been made to make our practices more explicit and supposedly more accountable than ordinary language will allow.

### **Transparent accounts**

“How does learning take place?” Don’t you know? You certainly see it when you watch a class. “Yes, but I should like to see it laid open to view.” Then you must construct tests to verify that the intended learning outcomes have been reached. And you must replace systems of inspection that rely on accumulated experience and practised judgement with what you will imagine to be the greater rigour, the greater transparency of data-driven check-lists and measures of performance.<sup>3</sup>

The current global financial crisis has seen leading politicians around the world call into question values and assumptions that have been sacrosanct these past three decades. This is a period in which accountants have thrived, while educational and other public institutions have found themselves disparaged and financially stretched. Is there not some irony then in the fact that the solution to the latter’s problems is held to be the imposition of greater accountability? The accountants, alongside armies of financial consultants and advisors, have, it now seems, failed to achieve the confidence, continuity, stability, and trust that are needed if financial institutions are to work well. Why should we have any faith that they can succeed in education? Hence, it is worth looking even more critically at the kinds of measures that the so-called “audit culture” has imposed. One watchword of this is “transparency”. The form this takes not only covers financial scrutiny, of course, but applies to teaching and learning and curricula themselves. Thus, it is expected that it will be made clear to the student embarking on a course exactly what they are to learn, and teaching is not to deviate from this. Moreover, what is learned must be made to fit perfectly with the assessment used, for this in turn will make transparent what has been achieved. And it goes without saying that this evidence will need to be in a form that can be processed by spreadsheets and, hence, fed into calculations of efficiency. This, reductively, is what it is to be accountable in education.

Now, on the face of it, it may seem that transparency is a welcome avoidance of those occult elements, those mysterious, hidden things, that have been under suspicion throughout my discussion, but in fact it is their accomplice. For once again we find the same pattern: our ordinary confidence in teaching and learning is devalued in favour of some more technical language, which is thought to be closer to the reality of things. Ironically again, one casualty of this approach is the word “criteria” itself. Amongst teachers and amongst students, the word now has a special, technical sense: it typically connotes lists of numbered points, each referring to a behavioural outcome that can be identified with minimal interpretation or judgement on the part of the teacher, often as a binary value. This, it is supposed, is objectivity! Such thinking reinforces the sense that teachers’ judgements are merely “subjective” and so must be avoided where possible. The teacher becomes more like a flexible, replaceable technical operative, and the communities of practice that have in the past

sustained standards are progressively eroded. What is more, the students themselves grow up in the belief that hitting objectives in this quasi-mechanical system simply is what education is! In the UK it has become normal for children of eight to talk about whether they have met the “criteria” for an “assignment” or “satisfied” its “learning objectives” – words that would never in the past have figured in the vocabulary of children of this age.

Of course the audit culture has come under heavy criticism, but it has proved peculiarly resistant. In the Reith Lectures, in 2002, Onora O’Neill spoke to the effect that

Our revolution in accountability has not reduced attitudes of mistrust, but rather reinforced a culture of suspicion. Instead of working towards intelligent accountability based on good governance, independent inspection and careful reporting, we are galloping towards central planning by performance indicators, reinforced by obsessions with blame and compensation. This is pretty miserable both for those who feel suspicious and for those who are suspected of untrustworthy action - sometimes with little evidence (O’Neill, 2002).

The audit culture stands in the way of confidence and trust, and distorts conceptions of professional practice and expertise. It almost totally misses the critical role that must be played by judgement if such practice is not to be reduced to a caricature of itself. And it places emphasis on technical and managerial innovation to the detriment of continuities of practice on which professional and expert judgement depend. The requirement of transparency, which has become more explicit since O’Neill’s Lectures, increases the pressures in these respects, but it is important that the word also brings something new. While “accounting” and “auditing” imply monitoring and scrutiny of a perhaps punitive kind, “transparency”, however much an emblem of democratic governance, evokes the kind of virtue prized by consumer associations. Why would anyone object? But what is it that is being made explicit? What I have tried to draw from Wittgenstein is the insight that we idealise something “deep” and then render this explicit through special techniques, thereby denying or distorting the practice that is our proper concern.

I began by speaking of Wittgenstein’s suspicions of the “young science” of psychology. In the present decade a new “science” has entered the scene, heralded and celebrated by Richard Layard’s widely cited book *The New Science of Happiness* (2006). Writing before the present recession, Layard ponders the way that increases in material prosperity often do not bring increases in happiness, but he tries to show that there now exists the means for addressing this systematically and scientifically: “The main evidence comes from the new psychology of happiness, but neuroscience, sociology, economics and philosophy all play their part. By bringing them together we can produce a new vision of how we can live better, both as social beings and in terms of our inner spirit” (Layard, 2006, p. 4). And as to any difficulty over what “happiness” might mean, he has the following explanation:

Happiness is feeling good, and misery is feeling bad. At every moment we feel somewhere between wonderful and half-dead, and that feeling can now be measured by asking people or monitoring their brains. Once that is done, we can go on to explain a person’s underlying level of happiness – the quality of his life as he experiences it. Every life is complicated, but it is vital to separate out the factors that really count (p. 6).

So what happiness consists in - “feeling good” – is apparently straightforward, and fortunately there are convenient measures for this: we can ask people *or* we can monitor their brains. And this will reveal “underlying” “levels”. Of course human lives are complicated, but through a kind of abstraction we can find the factors that “really count”. Is this the new

accounting we need? Can this be science? (Can it be economics?) It would be false to attribute the errors here to psychology *per se*, but these are influential trail-effects of that discipline.

There is no doubting the impact and influence that Layard's work has had, as well as countless other studies along similar lines. One does not have to be a Wittgensteinian to see this as a muddle of empirical experiment and conceptual confusion, but if the account of Wittgenstein I have provided above has succeeded at all, it should have suggested occult elements in what is increasingly masquerading as common sense.

### **Postscript: new science or magical art?**

Is it possible that we are missing a trick here? Have these trail-effects of psychology in fact been misunderstood? How might we gain greater distance on these matters?

On reading Sir James Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, Wittgenstein commented acidly: "It is very remarkable that in the final analysis all these practices are presented as, so to speak, pieces of stupidity" (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 119). Are we in danger of presenting these developments as pieces of psychological stupidity when that is not what they are at all? Frazer's error arises when magic is interpreted scientifically. We can imagine a Frazerian anthropologist surveying our "primitive culture" and coming to the conclusion that the calculation and measuring of happiness, no less than contemporary practices of accountability, or some of the pretensions of neuroscience, are just so much bad science. This indeed is the conclusion this paper has been drawn to. So how might a Wittgensteinian anthropologist differently interpret the scene?

Some remarks on Frazer's account of child-adoption practice in Bulgaria and amongst Bosnian Turks help to illustrate what Wittgenstein thinks is at stake:

If the adoption of a child proceeds in such a way that the mother draws it from under her clothes, it is surely insane to believe that an *error* is present and that she believes she has given birth to the child.

Operations which depend on a false, overly simple idea of things and processes are to be distinguished from magical operations. For example, if one says that the illness is moving from one part of the body to another, or takes precautions to divert the illness as if it were a liquid or a condition of warmth. One is then creating a false picture for oneself, which in this case, means a groundless one.

What a narrow spiritual life on Frazer's part! As a result: how impossible it was for him to conceive of a life different from that of the England of his time!

Frazer cannot imagine a priest who is not basically a present-day English parson with the same stupidity and dullness (p. 125).

Could it be that there is something parochial in our critique? To the extent that the practices under criticism in the main part of this paper purport to be *explanations* but depend on false pictures, they are rightly condemned as bad science. To the extent that they are instead *expressions* of a sense of meaningfulness, they belong less to science and more to magic – that is, to the realm of magic and religion, of the spiritual, as Wittgenstein loosely sees this. "As simple as it sounds," Wittgenstein writes, "the distinction between magic and science can be expressed by saying that in science there is progress, but in magic there isn't. Magic has no tendency within itself to develop" (p. 141). Hence magic is not a matter of technical solutions but an expression of, or adjustment to, the way things are perceived to be. To make sense here we need to consider, he says, the "*surroundings* of a way of acting" (p. 147). The surroundings of contemporary accounting include practices of prediction and projection, of

consultation exercises and focus groups, of competition and league-tables, of naming, shaming, and scape-goating. The new science of happiness is located within commercially-fuelled, feel-good notions of well-being, in which a supposedly transparent self-monitoring and measurement are consistently to the fore. Against this background, could it be that these trail-effects of psychology have become less a matter of explanation and more the expression of way of life?

One obvious objection is that this would not coincide with the self-interpretation of adherents of these practices, who would surely attest to their scientific credibility. But this objection might to some extent be met in the light of Wittgensteinian accounts of religious belief. Thus, the religious person may take the view, if pressed, that their belief that Jesus is their saviour has a logic no different from their belief that today is Saturday. On a Wittgensteinian view, however, this would be tantamount to a misrepresentation of those beliefs, the substance of which would need to be understood in terms of their place in “surrounding ways of acting”, in the particular language games to which they belonged. By analogy, the rationale for the practices characterised in this paper in terms of the trail-effects of psychology would be at odds with what really drives them. To concede that this may so is in no way to exempt those practices from the criticisms advanced, but it may help to explain their imperviousness and the performative magic of their art.

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<sup>1</sup> See also ##253, 263, and 398.

<sup>2</sup> It would be a mistake to think of the desire for things to be laid open to view expressed here to be of a piece with the aspiration, in Wittgenstein's terms, to achieve a perspicuous representation (an *Übersicht*). The interlocutor's words appear to be asking for the kind of closer examination that might be achieved, say, by slowing down a film so that one might observe it as a series of stills: “How do films do it?” – “Don't you know? You certainly see it when you watch them.” These are forms of murdering to dissect. The achieving of an *Übersicht* that Wittgenstein advocates involves seeing in a manner appropriate to the object in consideration, which is to say with a proper sensitivity to the criteria that give it meaning, and to the context of use from which meaning draws its breath.

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<sup>3</sup> This is a fair account of what has in fact happened to inspection systems in the UK.