

Philosophy is (as) an exercise in *parrhesia*: an example of a philosophical practice outside the school

Name

Nancy Vansieleghe

Nancy.vansieleghe@ugent.be

Ghent University

Department of the Foundations of Education

H. Dunantlaan 1

9000 Ghent

Belgium

Phone: 0032(0)92646389

Fax: 0032(0)92646490

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INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s there is a growing attention for philosophy with children and adolescents. Increasingly philosophy appears as a solution to the problem of what has been called a disoriented, cynical, indifferent and individualistic society. From this point of view philosophy is understood as a discipline that stimulates knowledge and the capacity to think for oneself and to investigate in particular problems in our society and our lives. It has to offer par *excellence* ‘effective’ resources and stimuli in order to be able to express one’s (real) opinions in a mutual informing process of questioning one’s needs and stakes (Splitter, 2009). As a consequence, it becomes quite obvious to assess whether and under which conditions philosophical programmes are effective in stimulating this kind of thinking. Our intention to write a paper on philosophy and her educational dimension, however, starts from another point of view. What I want to do in this paper is not in the first place related to the problem of individuality and indifference, but to the possibility to rethink philosophy as an *ethos*. In this understanding of philosophy, it is not so much the question whether and how philosophy has an effect on the development of (philosophical) potential which is at stake, but the question of being present in the present. As such, the aim of this paper is not to write about effective ways to think for oneself, but about ways to introduce a discontinuity in our current mode of thinking and self-understanding. Philosophy in this paper, will thus not be about means of becoming conscious and acquiring a critical perspective which takes into account the perspective of others in terms of knowledge (i.e. Lipman, 2003; Splitter & Sharp, 1995). It will not depend on epistemological or normative criteria requiring an efficient methodology and theory, but will rely on discipline in terms of *care for the self and parrhesia* (cf. Peters, 2003, Masschelein, 2006; Luxon, 2008). By this I do not want to understand philosophical research as a means to acquire competences or expertise, but as a particular way of speaking, thinking and acting. Hence, the first aim of this paper will be to reconsider philosophy for children by indicating how it time and again is related to a particular mode of thinking about the child and philosophy that does not alter ‘an epistemological logic’ but that forms the central belief in almost all theory and practice on education today (Marshall, 2008). Second, I will rethink philosophy in terms of both an open and an oriented preparation of the individual for the events of life. In a third part I will relate these issues with an idea of philosophical education. An idea that becomes understandable by practicing particular exercises in terms of *ascesis* and meditation. I will explore these exercises along a comment on a concrete philosophical practice with children I did in Cambodia.

PHILOSOPHY (FOR CHILDREN) AND THE NEED FOR COMPETENCES

Speaking about philosophy nowadays, we are easily speaking in terms of acquiring knowledge, skills and attitudes in order to learn to think for oneself. At different domains and places philosophy is understood as a ‘powerful vehicle which empowers youngsters to become better learners and “better” more fulfilled people’ (Cleghorn, 2002, p.51). Accordingly it is less about theories and techniques derived from a discipline that makes it possible to ‘know’ the meaning of life, than about acquiring competences and skills derived from what one has to be able to do in order to think about the meaning of life (Lipman, 2003, Splitter & Sharp, 1995) Cleghorn for instance is very clear about this. In his article ‘*Why philosophy with children?*’, he writes that ‘we spend so much effort teaching children the

content of the subjects but do not actually teach them how to think, how to learn' (Cleghorn, 2002, p.50). Philosophy appears thus not in the first place as an instrument to think, but as an instrument to learn 'how' to think (better) for oneself and with others. Additionally, speaking about philosophy is about acquiring competences and capacities to construct and reconstruct the individual (implicit) knowledgebase. In relation to this philosophy is about competences and the use of particular dialogical methods and strategies to develop these competences. It is about the competence to analyse individual (or collective) norms and values and to make and examine validity claims by oneself (UNESCO, 2007). The outcome of philosophy is as such formulated in terms of reflective and dialogical competences and intelligences (also emotional and spiritual) that are held to be valuable for our individualistic and permanently changing society. What determines the meaning of philosophy is as such the reflective character of the philosophical discourse and the learning process involved therein. Accordingly, children learn through particular philosophical models that the validity of judgements and actions is related to dialogical rules. Consequently, they have to develop reflective and dialogical competences conditioned by a post-conventional attitude (Simons, 2006). The potential of philosophy for children, in this understanding, is in other words mostly related to reflective procedures and dialogical methods functioning as guiding principles (of justification, of critique) in life. Philosophy for children is therefore likewise related to a particular way of speaking and thinking about the child, the individual and society. A way of thinking and speaking that is not limited and restricted by philosophy for children, but that takes philosophy for children as one means among others to contribute to a need for competences and expertise to guarantee an autonomous, self-reflective and critical life. Philosophy for children in this understanding is thus pursued by a way of thinking that is conducted by particular principles or ideas. Consequently, existing relations, actual behaviour and events are approached under the aspect of being or not being the realisation of these ideas or principles (under which true knowledge is possible) (Vansielegem, 2009).

In this contribution, I want to explore another way of thinking about philosophy (for children): a way of thinking that has been overshadowed by current discourses on philosophy for children and does not respond to the need for expertise and competences. This however does not want to say that it will be about a way of thinking that criticises the idea of general principles or norms that claim the truth, but that suspend this idea. To explore this way of thinking I will make use of the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault makes it clear from the very beginning that he is not so much interested in a search for principles or general ideas that claim the truth. This, however, does not want to say that Foucault rejects the possibility of truth-telling as it is often argued by critics. On the contrary, he is particularly interested in truth-telling beyond epistemology and methodology. In this sense that for Foucault truth-telling does not refer to something (knowledge or expertise), but to *someone*. In other words, truth-telling for Foucault is not about the production of new knowledge or more complex insights. Instead it refers to a particular way of acting and speaking or form of life (*an ethos*) which expresses a relationship towards the other and the world (Luxon, 2008). Contrary to many he therefore does not stick to an absolute conception of the truth, neither to expertise, but honours a positive pluralism, distancing himself at the same time from those critics who argue in favour of a rejection of the truth altogether. Especially in his later work, Foucault explains a very positive appreciation of the truth, particularly in relation to his theory about the formation of the subject for whom acting and speaking ethically is central (Peters 2003, Franek 2006, Luxon 2008). In this form of speaking and doing philosophy, Foucault starts from the assumption that the self is shaped in her relation towards the other. This means that what is dealt with in truth-telling is precisely the *self* which constitutes her/his self in a process of subjectivation to a (true) subject. This does not mean that truth-telling is at the service of the constitution of the self, but that this constitution of the self is itself a kind of

speaking the truth that does not represent a form of knowledge, self-conscience, or expertise, but exposes one's relation to the self, the other and the world (Foucault, 2005; Smart, 1998). This exposition, however, is not given. Rather, it has to do with "a set of necessary and sufficient moves, of necessary and sufficient practices, which will enable us to be stronger than anything that may happen in our life" (Foucault, 2005, p.322).

I first will recall how Foucault describes the idea of truth-telling as *parrhesia*. I will then present how the incorporation of truth-telling in the subject corresponds with a practice of *ascesis*. Finally, I will clarify how this practice relates to the proposal to understand philosophy as a liberating practice outside the school.

PHILOSOPHY AS A FORM OF LIFE (AN ETHOS)

Philosophy for Foucault is thus closely related to speaking the truth. It is, however, a form of truth-telling that may not be understood as speaking from a neutral or objective point of view in order to identify what is true and what is false, as Thomas Nigel (1988) seems to suppose. It is not an activity of which it is possible to make an analysis of thoughts by scientific disciplines in order to get access to true knowledge. Neither is it a matter of producing competences to construct and reconstruct one's individual knowledge-base. Philosophy as truth-telling for Foucault is not about the subject's access to true knowledge, even if this knowledge can be object of discussion (Habermas, 1981). For Foucault, philosophy as truth-telling is the form of speaking that asks "what it is that allows the subject to have access to the truth and which attempts to determine the conditions and limits of the subject's access to the truth" (Davidson, 2005, p.xxiii). Modifying this, Foucault makes a distinction between philosophy understood as an "analytics of truth in general" and philosophy as an "ontology of ourselves" (ibid.). While the former poses the question of the formal conditions (the validity claims) under which we can have access to the truth, the latter concerns the question "how we have constituted ourselves as subjects of knowledge and truth" (ibid). As such, the kind of truth-telling Foucault speaks of is not to be understood as a philosophy of knowledge that has to be acquired for the subject's access to truth, but as "an inquiry into the practices we must undertake to transform ourselves, the necessary work of ourselves on ourselves, in order for us to have access to truth" (ibid).

In relation to this Foucault refers to the 'Cartesian moment' not primarily as a chronological moment but as a conceptual moment in the history of thought. He claims that it is the moment in which the practice of care for the self is disqualified for the benefit of the installation of a sort of continuous development of knowledge of the self. Moreover Foucault (1984) distinguishes between an understanding of *Aufklärung* that consists in a commitment to certain theories, elements of doctrine, and accumulated bodies of knowledge and a conception of *Aufklärung* as the permanent reactivation of an attitude, an *ethos* or a form of philosophical life (Ibid.). Referring to philosophy as a form of life, he re-enters the possibility of the testing of oneself, of one's mode of being and thought. In relation to this he speaks of his concern to put oneself to the test of contemporary reality in order to characterize the philosophical *ethos* appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves. This test in this sense is not a test that indicates what is true or false, but refers to the prize to be paid for having access to the truth. It is a historico-practical test of the limits that we can go beyond, and therefore a work of ourselves on ourselves as free beings (Donaldson, 2005, p.xxvii; Foucault, 1984). As such for Foucault philosophy is the critical work of thought on itself in order to know how and to what extent it would be possible to think differently. Moreover, not the simplifying appropriation of knowledge for the purpose of legitimating what one already knows is at stake in Foucault's philosophy, but the effort to regard our mode of being as no longer obvious. This point concerning the possibility to modify our mode of being and the preparedness to

detach oneself from the already given systems, orders, doctrines and codes of thought, is thus not about getting at a more complete or better perspective, but with about displacing the gaze to become confronted with oneself (Foucault, 2005; Masschelein, 2006).

Moreover, philosophy for Foucault is about “converting the gaze to the self”, and at the same time exploring the order of the world (Foucault, 2005, p.260). This means that philosophy is not a question of either knowing the world or knowing oneself. It does not elicit a confrontation with one’s individual knowledge-base. Rather, it is an exercise which draws one away from one’s individual knowledge base and confronts with the question *how* to think, live, ... the present in such a way that one attends oneself and does not forget oneself as subject of action that takes care of the present and of one’s presence in that present (Foucault, 2005). Philosophizing in this sense means that one experiences oneself not as an object of knowledge but as a subject of action. Philosophy, as such, is nothing but the experience which confronts oneself with the question ‘How shall I continue’? This question does not attend for prescriptions or overviews of possible truths to hold, but makes oneself present in the present. This means that it exposes oneself to the kind of subject one has to be in order to get access to the truth. Philosophy, as such, is expressed in the experience of not coinciding with what is silently accepted as taken for granted and corresponds with the possibility to think about one’s own subjectivity. It is in this sense that truth-telling for Foucault does not refer to something (an knowledge or an expertise), but to *someone*. Therefore it is placing oneself, in thought, in the situation of someone who does something that goes beyond one’s thought. Philosophy, therefore, is not a game the subject plays with his own thought. As Foucault writes, a completely different kind of game is involved: “a game that thought performs on the subject himself” (Foucault, 2005, p. 357-358). Truth-telling is in other words not just a matter of attending oneself, of focusing one’s gaze on oneself, or remaining alert with respect to oneself. It involves a real shift, a certain movement of the subject with regard to oneself, whose nature one will have to investigate (Foucault, 2005, p.248)

PHILOSOPHY AND PARRHESIA

For Foucault philosophy manifests itself thus not as a body of knowledge but in the first place as an activity. An activity, however, that does not direct us to the present in order to understand it better, but to ‘cut’ into the present and to introduce a discontinuity in our actual mode of being (Foucault, 1984). This Foucauldian practical philosophy is furthermore motivated by the courage to say what one (as subject) has to say. This is what one thinks that ought to be said because it is necessary to say (Foucault, 2001). A necessity that is, however, different from speaking about one’s deepest emotions or convictions. To say what one has to say is not speaking out of conviction or emotion, but speaking out of experience, of being-bodily-or-physically-in-the-world, of being present in the present (ibid. p.2). It is displaying or exposing one’s thoughts and manifesting that these are the thoughts of the one who speaks. Foucault describes this activity with the Greek word *parrhesia* and refers to a type of relationship between the speaker and what he says.

Parrhesia, in this sense, means “to tell the truth” (ibid, p. 14, 2005, p.366). Considering that for Foucault telling the truth does not mean saying what one *thinks* is true, but because one *knows* that it is true (Foucault, 2001, p.14). Characteristic for *parrhesia* is moreover that there is always an exact coincidence between belief and truth. Considering this it is important to compare *parrhesia* with the modern conception of evidence. For since Descartes, the coincidence between belief and truth is obtained in a certain (mental) evidential experience. For the Greeks, however, the coincidence between belief and truth does not take place in (mental) experience, but in a verbal activity that needs courage. What is at stake in *parrhesia* is as such not the question whether one can be certain that what one believes is

truth. Being a truth-teller or not, depends on whether one is to be recognized as a *parrhesiast*. This is not to be compared with responding to what one really means, but with the creation of a solid framework of propositions that are valid as prescriptions for oneself as principles of behaviour. If telling the truth, as such, is conceived in this way, as the creating of a framework of true propositions for oneself, it cannot be conceived as a matter of certainty, but as an exercise of the self. This understanding of philosophy emphasises in this sense the experimental character of the activity. It indicates that the one who speaks the truth does not know the answer in advance, does not know where or how to arrive. The practice of *parrhesia* is, hence, rather ‘experimental’ than ‘expertised’: the philosopher is not supposed to apply ideas, but to test and modify them, to challenge them, not with one’s ideas but with one’s life, at the risk of one’s own subjectivity. This practice is furthermore immediately linked to a conversation with oneself “which enables the subject not only to act as he ought, but also to be as he ought to be and wishes to be” (Foucault, 2005, p.319; Masschelein, 2008). The touchstone of truth-telling is as such not situated in external rationalities or instances, but in the way one relates to oneself, in what one says and does, in what one thinks. Thus, not in the subject’s knowledge, but in his practice of truth one can find a kind of ‘proof’ of the sincerity of the *parrhesiastes*. Foucault refers in this context to *parrhesia* as a verbal activity “through which the self constitutes himself as a subject of sovereignty over himself and as a subject of veridiction on his own account” (Foucault, 2005, p.372). Contrarily, for Foucault, not the content of the true discourse is at stake, but “the form in which this discourse is delivered” (Foucault, 2005, p.384). In this sense for Foucault the function of *parrhesia* is not to demonstrate the truth to someone else, but to take up a particular relationship to oneself in order to constitute oneself as *parrhesiastes*.

The question that arises now, is how to be able to speak the truth. Can one learn to be a *parrhesiastis*? Foucault writes that *parrhesia* is not something one has to acquire through learning, rather it involves exercises in which one puts oneself at stake. These exercises are essentially linked to practices of ‘meditation’ or ‘asceticism’ transmitting the realisation of a certain *ethos*. These practices however are not to be understood as procedures or methods guaranteeing an effective exposition or a successful self-transformation. Neither do they refer to spiritual capacities or competences one has to acquire in order to be able to ‘enter’ into a philosophical experience. The practices I am referring to are rather disciplinary exercises of the self upon the self which imply a kind of concentration and involvement. Meditation appears as such as a practice that does not provide access to the truth and that it is not a part of an academic discipline or a profession (meditation does not proclaim or provide any truth or doctrine). Through meditation one puts oneself at stake and *in* the present. Ascetic practices, as such, open up for what there is to see and to hear and are striking the eye. They make exposition possible. Masschelein (2006) writes that for concrete practices or exercises we can think of walking, reading, writing, listening, speaking etc. What these practices have in common then are not their absence of (direct) goal-orientedness and methodology in the first place, but their rhythmical, repetitive character, which relates to the absence of goals and methods and assures a certain endurance, a longevity, that is in se characteristic for the practice of truth-telling precisely because it enables to expose the things as they are and not the way we wish or think they are. Ascetic practices, as such, could be called an open preparation of the individual for the events of life.

AN EXAMPLE OF AN ASCETIC PRACTICE IN CAMBODJA

In what follows I want to present a concrete example of how an ascetic practice can be carried out today. It may sound strange to take a personal project as an example, but there is no reason why philosophy of education (or philosophy for children) would only be about a

description of what others have thought and said, and not about oneself. And although it is not my intention to present the project I did as an invitation to do the same, I want to draw some elements out of it with regard to the kind of moves that are necessary and sufficient to appropriate *parrhesia* today. In this sense this example will not only reveal something about our educational presence, but as an exercise of thought, it will also reveal some methodological indications about the relationship between what is done during the exercise and the achieved results. These indications as such will not be definite rules, just a sequence of thoughts that make it possible to explore other ways of thinking (about philosophy for children).

The concrete example I want to describe here, has to be situated within a larger project of the VVOB¹. The general aim of the VVOB is, next to the improvement of the quality of education in developing countries, improving teaching methods in which the development of pupil's talents and capacities is the focal point. In relation to this aim philosophy for children appears to be an interesting approach considering that it aims at providing challenging environments stimulating the pupil's self-reflective capacities. As I had written a PhD-dissertation on philosophy for children, I was invited to organise a workshop on this matter. At first sight however, this seemed to be a mission impossible. After all, the focal point of my dissertation was not the question whether philosophy for children stimulates the pupil's self-reflective capacities, but the subject for whom philosophy for children appears to be an investment in society. Considering the idea of philosophy for children as a successful enterprise that leads towards the development of self-reflective capacities, I raised the question whether the ideal of self-reflection still has any meaning, and whether such an ideal might still inspire us as a liberating practice. After all, when 'critique' and 'self-reflection' are required and reclaimed for everybody, should we not have to consider the question if the autonomous, critical, self-reflective person that appears, can still question existing social power relations? Acknowledging this however, lays the way for an exploration of alternative approaches to the critical potential of education. As such, I organised a workshop on philosophy as truth-telling practice outside the school and even outside the philosophical profession to turn it into a mode of relationship between individuals. The question that arose was of course how to arrive at this point.

First of all by *walking*. The children were invited to walk. This is what we have done. Walking and nothing but walking.



¹The VVOB is the Flemish Association for Development Cooperation and Technical Assistance, a non-profit organisation. By order of the Flemish and the Belgian government, the VVOB wants to contribute to the improvement of quality of the education in developing countries. Their core task is to provide technical assistance in projects and programmes and to stimulate sustainable development

We did not have a direction. We were just walking and talking. Talking in the language that we share: you can say the language that is spoken between the tourist and the seller. ‘Do you know Ankor Watt?’, ‘Do you want to buy a postcard?’, ‘Do you want bracelets?’ were the questions the children asked me. I was the tourist, they were the sellers.



We were walking next to each other in the dessert or that piece of land that divides the school (and their homes) from the tourist attractions (the Temples of Ankor Watt). It was a place that had no function and only existed as space between the school and the temples. You can say that it was no man’s land or a place of abandonment. It was a place of waste and dust, where there was nothing to experience or to see.



We wandered for hours on this open or non-place. Step by step. There was not a specific route or plan. There were only the tourist attractions at a distance which reminded us that we were not there.



It was also a place of exhaustion. Exhaustion was a second element.



The heat and the walking-journey made the mind and body empty. The relationship between the actors was changing. There was less and less attention for countenance and keeping up appearance. The exhaustion made everybody sincere and quite. Questions and remarks as ‘What am I doing here?’, ‘There is nothing to see!’, ‘There is nothing to experience!’ were entering the mind.



The children were invited to go walking, but this walk could not be classified under the models of traditional education. It was not a walk that fits into the school-curriculum. It was a walking tour that directed us, step by step, to exposure and to what there is to see before our eyes. It directed and attached us to that what did not have a meaning (at least not for our educational present that is obsessed by competences), but which existed nevertheless.



The walk and the exhaustion broke the rhythm, the systematics and the hidden meanings. They prepared the rupture necessary to expose our thinking to what was happening and to get through our own reflections in order to see anew.



The tourist language gradually extinguished and the stranger stopped being a tourist. Or was it different? The foreigner became a real stranger, an intruder or someone who has penetrated the gaze: someone who was *there* not easy to receive, nor, perhaps to conceive. She became someone who walked with them: someone who brought the children into a position in which they did no longer recognize or knew themselves as learners. At the same time she no longer recognized herself as an expert. Both the expert and the learner became strangers to themselves. A gradual slippage was separating them from themselves. The expert and the pupil emerged from this adventure in a position of being lost. For a moment their role or position (these words) did no longer have a meaning, just as, properly speaking, they were no longer their own role or their own position. In a single moment, they were withdrawn to an infinite distance and subsided into an intimacy more profound than any interiority. They became present in the present, exposed to the situation and to each other. They gradually registered what they were doing and not doing and this became more important than who they were and what would happen. The walking-tour appeared as such as an invitation to act and to speak (to begin anew) and no longer as a part of a discourse. Step by step, the temples, the school, the expert were disappearing as kingdoms of truth and gradually they became fixations of that what made us believe that it is about freedom. As such, the pupils and the expert were confronted with the situation that there is also another world or another language possible than the one of the seller and the tourist, the expert and the learner. A world or a language that has to be invented, that does not have an interior or a limit and that does not have to be defended by any truth or convention, but that asks how to continue.



At a certain moment the children decided to break off the walking-tour. I was waiting at a distance, nervous and attentive for each sign and gesture. The children returned to the school. They did no longer need the discourse of the expert: a reversal of relationship was taking place. Arriving at school the children were invited to draw a self-portrait. No more explanation was given. The advice to portray was not an attempt to reinstall the traditional courses. It was an invitation to endure the trial, the test of reality. Drawing a self-portrait was part of the exercise with the advantage of two possible and simultaneous uses. Drawing after exposing oneself, was meant to enable the child to look again: to look again at oneself, at one's thoughts, at one's actions and thus incorporating the true discourse one has experienced from a particular exercise one has performed. Drawing thus was meant to conserve one's thoughts, to keep them available: to make them the object of one's conversation with oneself or with another. This helped to establish what one thinks in the soul and in the body as a kind of habit for the body, or at any rate a physical virtuality (Foucault, 2005). The other use was meant for others – as a correspondence between subjects whose objectives were not so much providing the other with information about one's inner feelings, needs or aims in order to confess a fault or shortcoming. The self-portrait was more an invitation to the other to inquire about what was happening in the soul. So making one's thoughts available for others was not only meant to reactivate them for oneself, but also to make them free for use.



The children painted for another two hours, not for instrumental obligations or reasons, as for bringing about a change in their relation to themselves, the other and the world. Drawing, painting or speaking then meant that the children 'placed' themselves 'in' the activity. It meant that the children experienced that it was not they, but the painting or what was painted that expressed in a certain sense the person who was drawing or speaking. To draw a portrait of oneself, then, did not mean to paint one's true self, or one's deepest emotions. It meant much more drawing for an inside, bringing oneself in line with what one thinks and does and making this clear in the self-portrait. This became not only visible in the way or in what the children painted, but also to the extent that they tried to paint what had to be painted. Therefore that what was said through the portrait was also embodied by the painter. The norm of this embodiment could not be articulated, but expressed itself in the first place in the way the person acted.



What the painting presented was something of their own, something which entitled them as subjects of veridiction. For the children it was not the same what was painted. The paintings contained to a large extent a dimension of care and truth. An example of this dimension was beautifully expressed by a girl who made a very decorative painting. I praised her work. My appraisal however could not stop her from correcting the red lips into pink lips which precisely made the portrait very decorative. This correction made the painting plainer and more sober, more vulnerable. For the child, painting was not a question of flattery and of gaining the superior's favour and benevolence, but of doing what one has to do, seeking only to produce effects of veridiction and passion.



PHILOSOPHY AS AN ASCETIC PRACTICE OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL

In line with this, I want to propose to think of philosophy for children as a liberating practice outside the school. What the educational force of philosophy could be about then is neither its acquisition of techniques or competences, nor its initiation in philosophical theories, but its *ascetic* practice. This practice that has no other purpose than to act and to see, is educative (Luxon, 2008) in such a way that it opens up the possibility to find oneself in a

situation in which the person to whom one is speaking, needs no longer the other's discourse (Foucault, 2005). How and why does he no longer need the other's discourse? Precisely because the other's discourse is true and because it functions as an invitation to take the word, to speak and to act (again). It is insofar as the teacher has given, has conveyed a true discourse to the child, that the child internalizing and subjectivizing this true discourse, can leave the relationship with the teacher. I think that precisely this act has to do with what philosophy of education or more precisely philosophy for children could be about: giving the child the possibility to speak and to try the words. As such the teacher here does not appear as someone who leads the other to a decipherment of the self by the self, as to an opening one gives the other onto oneself (Luxon, 2008, p.390). These activities do not ask for a method, but are an invitation to inquire the relationships that binds individuals to another (the teacher and the child).

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